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 Abstract 
Reflective practice is the central tenet of occupational therapy professional practice. As a result, 
reflection is something that occupational therapy students are taught and assessed on before 
they qualify as practitioners. However, research shows that there are some issues relating to 
how reflection is being taught, assessed, and learned in institutions. Dialogic reflection, a 
process where students engage in reflective conversations with their peers about their 
experience, was suggested as a possible alternative, albeit the theories about it are rather 
scarce.  
This research explored the suitability of dialogic reflection in promoting professional 
development in the occupational therapy curriculum. Fourteen post-graduate diploma 
occupational therapy students and I formed two action research groups for this enquiry. We 
developed our understanding of dialogic reflection through iterative cycles of participating in 
dialogic reflections and reflecting on our experiences of them. Reflection and thematic analysis 
were used to make sense of the data we generated. 
In this thesis, I argued that issues relating to reflection and dialogic reflection stem from 
fundamental differences in the many perspectives of reflection. Therefore, dialogic reflection 
should be conceptualised as something beyond a skill for practice, a tool for learning or a 
method of demonstrating professional development. In our theory of dialogic reflection, we 
argued that it is a co-operative way of understanding ourselves through an emotionally charged 
and morally driven exploration of our interactions with the world. My original contribution is 
this perspective of dialogic reflection as an epistemology, and I assert that it should be treated 
as so in education and professional practice. Hence, I maintain that it is something that can be 
taught but cannot be assessed. Dialogic reflection can promote professional development and 
it is important in occupational therapy practice as it encourages the practitioner to explore 
himself or herself as a practitioner and a person. 
3 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Occupational therapy is a caring profession (Devereaux 1984) that aims to get its service users 
back to participating in activities that they value after a period of interruption such as an ailment 
or injury, change in physical or mental condition or change in their social circumstances (Duncan 
2011). Occupational therapists see their service users as unique individuals and occupational 
therapy practice thus needs to be client-centred. Being in a profession of this nature, 
occupational therapists are encouraged to look back on their practice and develop from their 
own past experiences (COT 2014). This process is referred to as reflective practice. 
My interest in reflective practice began when I was a BSc Occupational Therapy student. I was 
perplexed by the fact that reflective practice was considered by the occupational therapy 
profession as of great importance however I personally found reflective practice, as I had 
understood it then, rather contrived and meaningless. Thus, as part of my degree course, I 
conducted a research study to understand how other occupational therapy students from my 
cohort experienced reflective practice. That study concluded that some students understood 
reflective practice as a problem-solving method. In addition, they experienced reticence when 
reflecting with their educators and when writing reflective assignments. However, they also 
noted that reflection, when conducted with their peers, was effective for triggering professional 
development. I saw reflection on one’s own and reflection with someone else as different 
processes. I call the latter dialogic reflection.  
These findings were significant because they suggested that there are some issues with teaching 
and learning about reflective practice in the curriculum. I realised reflective practice was not 
meaningless like I had initially thought, rather it was how reflective practice was taught and 
encouraged in the profession that made it appear so. 
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While dialogic reflection was suggested as a better alternative in that study, there was a 
remarkable lack in the literature about the topic. There was an afternoon at the university where 
we were grouped according to our placement settings and allowed an hour to share our 
experiences. It was at that session when I felt that I had learnt more about my placement setting 
than I had when I wrote my reflective pieces. I thought: why do we not do more of this form of 
reflection on the course? That was when I started becoming interested in the reflective process 
as a collaborative and dialogic venture rather than a monologic process that one undergoes on 
one’s own. 
Having just graduated from my degree in occupational therapy, I conducted this PhD study to 
understand the suitability of dialogic reflection in the occupational therapy curriculum. To this 
end, I sought to better understand dialogic reflection, its value for occupational therapy students 
and how it can be integrated into the curriculum. I recruited fourteen Post-Graduate Diploma 
occupational therapy students for this action research. I was first introduced to them by the 
programme manager when I was observing their problem-based learning groups. I became 
acquainted with these students during my observation sessions and they became interested in 
my PhD research. Some of these students eventually joined my study as co-researchers. 
However, as this research progressed, it was discovered that dialogic reflection is far more 
meaningful than a problem-solving method and can be more than an instrument for learning. 
Dialogic reflection is also more than a method of professional development or an evidence of it. 
This research revealed that dialogic reflection can be seen as a way of life and a way of knowing 
about the world. It plays an instrumental role in our understanding of the world around us 
through an intellectual, emotional, and morally-driven analysis and evaluation of our own 
experience. It is a natural and artistic way of knowing from our own experience, with others 
whom we choose to reflect with. Dialogic reflection can arguably be viewed as an epistemology. 
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1.1. Thesis layout 
I present this thesis in four parts: background information about reflective practice and 
occupational therapy in Part One, my methodological approach to conducting this study in Part 
Two, my findings and discussions about dialogic reflection as an epistemology in Part Three and 
finally my findings and discussions about the implementation of dialogic reflection in Part Four. 
The following table summarises the layout of thesis: 
 
Table 1. Thesis Layout 
The following sections explain the contents of each part of the thesis and how they relate to 
each other, with reference to the above table. 
1.1.1. Part One: Reflective Practice in Occupational Therapy 
Beginning with a discussion about occupational therapy as a profession, I draw the links between 
the nature of the profession and the importance of reflection in occupational therapy practice. 
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The way reflection and reflective practice were being encouraged in professional practice had 
led to some confusion about what it means (Eraut 1994). It also bred a rather instrumental 
perspective of what reflection was and how it could be used (Johns 2013). This part lays the 
background to this study from the literature review I conducted. It describes occupational 
therapy and reflection and how they relate to each other. It also reports some issues in reflection 
(Burton 2000; Gilbert 2001; Russell 2005) and theories that describe dialogic reflection where 
one reflects with others (Gibbs 1988; Driscoll 1994; Boniface 2002). I further elaborate on some 
of these concepts in Parts Three and Four of this thesis alongside my findings to build a deeper 
and more coherent discussion. 
1.1.2. Part Two: Developing This Study About Dialogic Reflection 
I conducted this research to develop my understanding about dialogic reflection. To do so, there 
are some deep methodological considerations in the development of this study. This part of the 
thesis features the paradigmatic debate in this research and my thoughts on the purpose of 
enquiry in general. These considerations then guided me in my choice of methodology and 
method in this research. The methodology of this research was highly reflexive in the sense that 
it developed as the research progressed in response to how my co-researchers and I decided to 
direct the research to explore and develop our theory. In this thesis, I refer to my participants 
as my co-researchers. In appreciation of the participatory paradigm and Co-operative Inquiry, 
they were both the researchers and the participants of the study. Maintaining a great degree of 
co-operation in this research was tricky but it enhanced the trustworthiness of the findings of 
the research as these findings were developed, analysed, discussed jointly by my co-researchers 
and me. 
1.1.3. Part Three: Dialogic Reflection as An Epistemology 
Synthesising evidence from literature and from my research findings, I present my arguments 
for dialogic reflection to be considered as an epistemology about knowledge construction from 
experience. The four lines of argument for this are: 
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1. The current state of confusion and difficulties regarding the use and the expression of 
reflective practice and dialogic reflection appears to stem from a conflict in the 
fundamental perspectives of these concepts. Due to the clashes in the understanding of 
reflection at the epistemic level, there is a need to conceptualise dialogic reflection at 
this level to avoid adding to the confusion. 
2. As this research was essentially a meta-dialogic reflection – a dialogic and reflective 
enquiry on dialogic reflection, I argue that dialogic reflection is an approach to knowing 
and enquiry. Dialogic reflection is about developing an understanding of oneself in 
natural, unfacilitated, yet highly analytical dialogue with others. 
3. Dialogic reflection is about knowing from our experiences, and from others whom we 
choose to reflect with. Dialogic reflectors are a community of knowers and enquirers 
who craft an understanding of their own worlds in a social environment. 
4. Experience carries an aesthetic characteristic which results in dialogic reflection being 
an artistic approach to knowing. Dialogic reflection is not only an intellectual analysis of 
our experience, it is also emotional and value-driven. 
I end Part Three of the thesis by presenting a taxonomy of dialogic reflection which delineates 
two distinct forms of this epistemology – extrospection and introspection. 
1.1.4. Part Four: Implications and Applications of Dialogic Reflection 
Part Four is predominantly discussions of the significance of the findings and its impact for 
occupational therapy students, educators and practitioners. I draw on some of the data from 
this research in support of the discussions where suitable. In concluding that dialogic reflection 
can be perceived as a way of knowing, I present the implications in the education and the 
professional milieus. I also provide some recommendations for the application of dialogic 
reflection in these settings.  
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Even though Part Three and Part Four of the thesis draw on the findings of the research, I 
decided to start some of the chapters in these parts with some theoretical discussion about the 
ideas and concepts that are central to the chapters. While some of these theoretical discussions 
were conducted as part of the literature review, some ideas only became pertinent as the theory 
of dialogic reflection developed through the research. By opening and interweaving these 
chapters with some background theory, I hope the reader can get a better sense of the 
discussion as it develops and transforms in the chapters with the inclusion of the findings. 
I do not claim that dialogic reflection is the only way to acquire knowledge nor that we only learn 
from experiencing something. Rather, my contribution to knowledge is this claim for dialogic 
reflection to be perceived as an epistemology. In considering it as a philosophy of knowing, there 
are many implications and potential applications in education and professional practice. As an 
epistemology, it naturally has far reaching influences in our lives and the way we understand 
our relationship with the world. I offer the perspective of dialogic reflection as a philosophical 
position which I believe should be further developed with more research. 
As an occupational therapist myself, this research was an enlightening experience because it led 
to me to question myself as a reflective practitioner. This thesis is an expression of this journey 
that I undertook to arrive at this new understanding and perspective of dialogic reflection. It is 
only appropriate that I write about this theory of dialogic reflection in a deeply reflective 
manner, demonstrating the reflective exchanges I had with others in this research and with 
myself as this research developed.  
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 Part One: Reflective Practice in 
Occupational Therapy 
The two chapters in this part of the thesis establish the importance of this research and its 
relevance. It features discussions about occupational therapy as a reflective profession and the 
inherent issues of reflective practice. 
Chapter Two introduces occupational therapy as a profession and its place in the health and 
social care system. It presents a discussion about the nature of the profession and the 
importance of reflective practice. 
Chapter Three concerns reflection and the issues regarding its use. It also explores the 
implications of these issues and introduces dialogic reflection. 
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Chapter 2. Occupational Therapy 
and the Importance of Reflective 
Practice 
Occupational therapy is a profession that uses daily activities as part of therapy to “achieve goals 
that are meaningful” to its service users (Duncan 2011a, p. 5). The profession believes that each 
person desires to participate effectively in meaningful activities for better health, well-being and 
life satisfaction (Dige 2009; COT 2015). Activities that are valuable and meaningful to the service 
user is what the profession refers to as occupation. The profession understands that the value 
and meaning in occupations are constructed by the service users (COT 2015), hence these 
occupations will differ according to individual needs, strengths, environment and circumstances 
(Duncan 2011a). 
The knowledge base in occupational therapy is derived from a wide range of disciplines from 
medicine to social sciences, including ethics and art and crafts (Duncan 2011a). In addition, the 
profession also relies heavily on knowledge drawn from experience since every service user is a 
unique case with his or her unique set of needs, abilities, and circumstances. The focus on the 
service user’s everyday activities appears to be deceptively simple; the intricacy of occupational 
therapy practice lies in the understanding of the service user and the occupations, the factors 
and impact of the affliction or interruption of these occupations and the development and the 
evaluation of therapeutic interventions that help service users achieve their goals (Duncan 
2011a). 
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2.1. Development of Occupational Therapy as a 
Profession 
The development of the occupational therapy philosophy began during the 1700s (Occupational 
Therapy New Zealand 2010). The mentally unwell were put in asylums as they were thought to 
be a danger to society. In France in 1793, Phillipe Pinel pioneered a moral and occupational 
approach to the treatment of mental illnesses. This approach of treatment made use of 
purposeful daily activities with the belief that in getting involved in activities that one is 
interested in and values, one can be relieved of emotional stress (Occupational Therapy New 
Zealand 2010). William Tuke then furthered this moral treatment of mental illnesses in the 
1800s, arguing that religion, family and occupations would promote function and mitigate 
symptoms of the mental conditions (Wilcock 2001).  
During the First World War, there was a need to rehabilitate the injured to return to 
employment due to the scarcity of manpower in the workforce. This allowed the development 
of occupational therapy initially in the treatment of those with physical disabilities. Occupational 
therapy started gaining recognition in the 1900s though for economic gain via generating more 
productivity rather than therapeutic purposes in the United Kingdom (UK) (Duncan 2011b). 
Nonetheless, this led to the setting up of formal training centres in occupational therapy, with 
the input of theory and practice from medicine and other disciplines (Duncan 2011b). The World 
Federation of Occupational Therapists (WFOT) was formed in 1951 as the international 
organisation for the promotion of occupational therapy and advancement of its education and 
training (WFOT 2012a). The British Association of Occupational Therapists (BAOT), the 
professional body, was formed in 1974 and subsequently set up the College of Occupational 
Therapists (COT) in 1978, later renamed Royal College of Occupational Therapists (RCOT) in 
2017, which is responsible for the professional, educational and research business of the 
profession, i.e. the representation of the professional body (BAOT 1999). The profession is 
regulated by the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC) in UK which protects the public by 
13 
 
ensuring that its registered occupational therapists meet their standards for training, 
professional skills, behaviour and health (HCPC 2016a).  
Occupational therapy has seen multiple roles and identity changes in its process of 
professionalisation. This was largely because the profession is constantly adapting to the shifts 
in the needs of society. Occupational therapy finds its groundings in the meaning of activities to 
its service users. As social needs change, this meaning often shifts accordingly (Zemke 2004). For 
example, the value of being able to go to work to earn money may change according to the 
economic climate. The breadth of responsibilities of occupational therapy, while allowing the 
profession to be relevant in multiple areas and circumstances, makes the profession vulnerable 
to changing expectations and requirements of its service users. However, as the role of 
occupational therapy changes, it becomes harder for the profession to establish a stable 
professional identity that people can commonly identify with. 
Apart from the difficulties of establishing a professional identity in the eyes of its service users, 
occupational therapy also faces difficulties in drawing clear professional boundaries within 
which it has dominance. The purview of occupational therapy is rather broad, encompassing the 
biological, cognitive, psychological, philosophical aspects of life. Hence there is a certain struggle 
for occupational therapists to find their place in the professional environment amongst other 
professions that have more definite expertise such as nursing, physiotherapy and dietitians 
(Clouston and Whitcombe 2008). The danger for occupational therapy is that it can be 
considered a profession that does nothing and at the same time, does everything, resulting in 
situations where it can be considered unimportant or useful to fill any gaps in the provision of 
care.  
2.1.1. Technical Rationality 
Part of this difficulty to establish a professional identity in occupational therapy also lies in the 
concepts of professionalism and the reasons that make a profession. Occupational therapy 
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formally received recognition as a profession in the UK through the Professions Supplementary 
to Medicine Act (1960). However, Schön (1983) argued that Technical Rationality was a concept 
of professionalism that dominated during that time, while Fish and Boniface (2012) argued the 
occupational therapy profession was still subjected to such a view of professionalism at the point 
of their publication. 
Schön’s (1983) work on reflective practice was written in contention with the positivist 
interpretation of professional practice, which he referred to as Technical Rationality. Positivism 
here refers to the view of knowledge being only valid when supported by empirical data and 
research (Markie 2013). 
According to the model of Technical Rationality … professional activity consists in 
instrumental problem-solving made rigorous by the application of scientific theory and 
technique. (Schön 1983, p. 21) 
Through the positivist lens, professional practice is technical and rational in the way that it solves 
problematic situations in practice with hard scientific theory (Schön 1983). In Schön’s (1983; 
1992) opinion, the reason such a view was fiercely popular at that time was because of the way 
professions were treated then. Professions were regarded as experts of society as they claim to 
possess special knowledge on crucial social issues, through education, research and practice 
(Hughes 1959). Society thus granted professionals special rights and privileges in exchange for 
solutions to the social issues present. Society then come to define professions by their expert 
knowledge (Schön 1983). 
Under the model of Technical Rationality, Glazer (1974) divided professions into major and 
minor professions. Major professions refer to those grounded in large amounts of research and 
knowledge such as medicine and law. Minor professions such as town planning and social work 
are those that rely on applying the knowledge base of more established disciplines and are 
perceived to be superior to the professions such as political sciences and economics. Etzioni 
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(1969) considered them as semi-professionals. Major professions “operate in stable intuitional 
contexts” (Schön 1983, p. 23) and are “disciplined by an unambiguous end” (Glazer 1974, p. 
363). These professions are grounded in systematic and scientific knowledge and thought to 
possess greater autonomy in the way they conduct their practice. Minor professions on the 
other hand deal with ambiguous ends and shifting contexts of practice hence are unable to 
ground themselves with a stable scientific knowledge base as the application of scientific 
research is unclear and vary with context (Schön 1983). These minor professions deal with 
problematic situations which are perplexing and uncertain, and it is up to the practitioner to 
make sense of them. Additionally, they have less autonomy over their own operations and are 
thought to be directed by major professions. 
According to Fish and Boniface (2012), Technical Rationality is pervasive in modern day 
perspectives of health and social care practitioners and this is evident from the focus on 
“standards”, “competencies” and “quality assurance activities” (Fish 2010, p. 192). Practitioners 
publicly defend their profession through scientific and absolute terms such as technical 
expertise, evidence-based practice and education level (Fish and Boniface 2012). They fail to 
make explicit that they  
… actually use interpretation and professional judgement (acting with discretion on the 
patient or client’s behalf) and thus engage in practical professional rationality. (Fish and 
Boniface 2012, p. 15) 
Even though professionals define themselves in a technical rational way, they are in fact 
demonstrating more than that in their own practice (Fish and Boniface 2012). 
Schön (1983), argued against Technical Rationality and the distinction between minor and major 
professions. Technical Rationality only thrives when the ends to be achieved by professional 
practice are clear and distinct. Only under these circumstances, practice situations and problems 
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that need solving are straightforward and so is the application of scientific theory in practice. 
However, this does not happen in reality (Schön 1983).  
In the real-world practice, problems do not present themselves to the practitioner as 
givens. They must be constructed from the materials of problematic situations which are 
puzzling, troubling and uncertain. (Schön 1983, p. 40) 
Schön (1983) argued that professionals must first make sense of the problem. Problematic 
situations that make little sense are increasingly central to all professions. Problem setting is 
hence increasingly more necessary than problem-solving. Technical Rationality sees professional 
practice as a process of problem-solving (Schön 1983). As professional practice is moving away 
from problem-solving to problem setting, it is imperative that the paradigm of professional 
practice moves away from Technical Rationality as well. Along with the paradigm shift, the 
positivist epistemology of practice becomes less applicable (Schön 1983). 
In addition to clear cut situations, professional practice also deals with problems that are unclear 
and uncertain. 
When the ends are confused and conflicting, there is as yet no “problem” to solve. A 
conflict of ends cannot be resolved by the use of techniques derived from applied 
research. It is rather through the non-technical process of framing the problematic 
situation that we may organise and clarify both the ends to be achieved and the possible 
means to achieving them. (Schön 1983, p. 41) 
Instead of major and minor professions, Schön (1983) proposed the varied topography of 
professional practice: the “high, hard ground” (Schön 1983, p. 42) where situations are clear and 
practitioners can make use of scientific theory and the “swampy lowland” (Schön 1983, p. 42) 
where the situations are confusing and cannot be solved using technical knowledge. A 
profession deals with problems in both the high ground and lowlands, however it is the 
practitioner who chooses where to situate his or her practice. Occupational therapy is a 
profession that has both elements. 
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2.1.2. The Professional Knowledge Base of Occupational Therapy 
In relation to its knowledge base, occupational therapy would be considered as a minor 
profession in Glazer’s (1974) categorisation. In part, this is caused by the societal perception that 
it is not as important compared to medicine and its lack of its own theoretical base (Etzioni 1969; 
Rivett 1997), relying heavily on the knowledge established by others such as medicine and 
psychology (Wilcock 1999). This treatment of occupational therapy is evident in the Professions 
Supplementary to Medicine Act (1960), highlighting its secondary status to medicine. Despite 
being under the protection and regulation of the HCPC later, occupational therapy is still 
grouped under the umbrella term “Allied Health Professionals” which suggests that these 
professions are more similar, hence deserving to be collectively referred to, and less distinct 
than medicine and nursing (Clouston and Whitcombe 2008).  
The indeterminate situations that occupational therapy finds itself in makes it hard to be 
recognised as a profession with its own knowledge base by society. However, the profession has 
turned to occupational science, to separate its theoretical base from that of others (Clouston 
and Whitcombe 2008), validating itself as a full-fledged profession by its own right (Creek 2014; 
2003). Though it is important to occupational therapy practice, occupational science is still 
considered nascent and is still insufficient as a scientific knowledge base considering the wide 
variety of settings occupational therapists find themselves in (Estabrooks et al. 2004).  
Within the profession, there is an appreciation of people as unique individuals with their own 
set of strengths, weaknesses, and circumstances. In other words, each service user is a new 
context in practice, with his or her unique sets of circumstances. Relying solely on scientific 
knowledge is insufficient in occupational therapy practice to deal with problems in the “swampy 
lowlands” (Schön 1983, p. 42). Indeterminate situations not cited in textbooks make up a large 
part of occupational therapy practice.  
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Technical knowledge complemented with implicit knowledge (Kinsella 2007a; Schön 1987) help 
to successfully negotiate effective interventions that are sensitive to the service users’ needs 
and are thoughtful of their circumstances and strengths. Technical or explicit knowledge in 
occupational therapy refers to the academic knowledge of the workings of the human body, the 
understanding of occupational therapy models of practice and practical skills required in the 
profession. Generally, technical knowledge can be obtained from textbooks and taught in 
lectures. Implicit knowledge in professional practice is 
Implicit in the artistic, intuitive processes which some practitioners do bring to situations 
of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict. (Schön 1983, p. 49) 
Implicit knowledge is synonymous to Polanyi’s (1966) term, tacit knowledge. Tacit or implicit 
knowledge refers to things we did not know that we know already. Argyris and Schön (1978) 
described this as: 
What we display when we recognise one face from thousands without being able to say 
how we do so, when we experience an intimation of a discovery we cannot put into 
words. (Argyris and Schön 1978, p. 10)  
Polanyi’s (1966) work assumed that ‘we know more than we can tell’ (Polanyi 1966, p. 4). 
According to Argyris and Schön (1978), this tacit knowledge is crucial for understanding theories-
in-use which are the theories which practitioners base their professional actions on. These 
theories are constructed using both technical and tacit knowledge and are apparent in their 
actions (Kinsella 2007a). Tacit knowledge is key to reflection-in-action, where the practitioner 
examines the experience as it unfolds and then reacts on the spot, informed by this analysis 
(Finlay 2008), without being fully aware of the knowledge or of how it is used. In professional 
practice, some situations that are unexpected and require quick judgement and an immediate 
response. In these situations, tacit knowledge and reflection-in-action inform these actions 
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reflexively (Schön 1983). Occupational therapy students are expected to identify this implicit 
knowledge as part of their development (COT 2014b). 
Schön (1987), drawing on Dewey (1938), noted that professional practice is artistic. The artistry 
of practice in occupational therapy practice is explained by Wong et al. (2016). 
This aesthetic nature is significant in occupational therapy practice where every client is 
treated as a unique individual and versatility and sensitivity to the client’s circumstances 
is the crux of an effective intervention plan in occupational therapy. The artistry of 
practice is largely tacit and can leave many practitioners unsettled as they struggle to 
find a clear explanation of this artful competence they often find themselves 
demonstrating. (Wong et al. 2016, p. 475) 
Such confusion about one’s artistry in practice is reflected in Boyd and Fales’ (1983) research 
participants’ comment: 
I know that I reflect and I consider myself a reflective person, but I have never thought 
about it and I am not exactly sure what it is that I do. (Boyd and Fales 1983, p. 99) 
Occupational therapists find themselves working in the lowlands where both technical and tacit 
knowledge are crucial for artistic practice. Because of the tacit components of practice, 
practitioners find it hard to articulate clearly how they have achieved such artistry, often 
attributing this to professional instinct refined over years of experience (Wong et al. 2016). Tacit 
knowledge is a result of one’s wealth of experience of dealing with indeterminate situations. 
Reflection is the process of making this implicit knowledge more overt (Boniface 2002) such that 
the practitioners become more aware of their practice and elements of it that make them 
competent, or incompetent, professionals. 
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2.2. Importance of Reflective Practice in Holistic, 
Client-Centred Care 
Because of the nature of the profession, occupational therapy aims to provide holistic client-
centred care to service users (COT 2015). The nature of the knowledge required for such a 
practice is the reason behind the importance of reflection to the profession. 
The way the profession has defined itself has allowed it to concern itself with a wide variety of 
responsibilities. The concerns of occupational therapy are more than merely the physical 
afflictions of the illness or condition. In describing occupational therapy as a caring profession, 
Devereaux stated that: 
It is our responsibility to know and understand the emotions of illness, to be sensitive to 
the many variations of these emotional manifestations in patient behaviour, and to 
acknowledge this in empathic, yet therapeutic, responses as an integral part of our 
treatment. (Devereaux 1984, p. 791) 
There is an appreciation of service users as unique individuals with their own set of strengths 
and weaknesses and circumstances (WFOT 2012b); in other words, no service user is the same. 
This understanding is the driver behind the provision of care that is sensitive to the needs of the 
service user, i.e. client-centred care.  
Practising in such a profession also means that every case is considered different and unique. It 
thus becomes hard to apply the same approach to other service users or rely on textbook case 
studies to guide practice. The occupational therapist is required to examine his or her practice, 
understand why it had gone well or poorly and learn from the experience. They are then applied 
in the other cases where applicable. It is not so much of repeating good and avoiding bad 
practices as understanding what made that practice work or fail and applying this understanding 
in future practice. 
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Reflection and practice share a close relationship in the health and social care milieu. Reflection 
pushes practitioners to refine their tacit knowledge in the professional context, encouraging 
professional development (Holly 1989; Saylor 1990; Jarvis 1992; Moon 2004).    
Reflection develops one as a person and a professional (Wald et al. 2009; Jarvis 1992; Saylor 
1990). In settings where the role of occupational therapy is still emerging, reflection can help 
develop this professional identity and role (Booth and Nelson 2013; Wald et al. 2009).  
Professional development encouraged by reflection is important to occupational therapy 
practice (COT 2014a). The reflective process is made difficult in occupational therapy education 
by the fact that students need to develop implicit knowledge, which they often find hard to 
express, while simultaneously appreciating the aesthetic nature of occupational therapy 
practice. Regardless, this professional development is so important that the HCPC (2016b) and 
RCOT (COT 2014b) have taken measures to ensure that occupational therapists are actively 
reflecting. This has led to a culture where reflections are to be made explicit and assessed so 
that they can be used as evidence of continuing professional development (CPD).  
2.2.1. Monitoring of Reflective Ability 
Appropriate ethical considerations and professional conduct are expected of health and social 
care staff (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). However, in England, the Mid Staffordshire Public 
Inquiry report (Francis 2013) and the Winterbourne View Hospital report (Department of Health 
2012) revealed evidence of unprofessional behaviours and unethical practices in the health 
setting. The regulatory bodies such as HCPC (2013) protect the public from such practices by 
scrutinising practitioners under their purview. One way of doing so is through monitoring their 
registrants’ reflective practice which is understood to lead to more ethical practices (Fish and 
Boniface 2012). 
Alongside ethical practices, the HCPC (2016b) also expects its practitioners to demonstrate 
professional competence through remaining current with developments in the practice setting. 
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Constant developments in the field require practitioners to keep up to date so as to provide top 
quality care to their service users (Brockbank and McGill 1998; Khanna 2004). A method of 
demonstrating such professional development is using reflection, which is also a key strategic 
action to improve the quality of care in the NHS as noted in a recent report (Ham et al. 2016). 
In relation to the allied health professions such as occupational therapy, the HCPC and the RCOT 
have encouraged, and indeed require, their practitioners to utilise and demonstrate reflection 
(COT 2015; HCPC 2016b). At present there are 38,212 occupational therapists registered under 
the HCPC (2018). The HCPC (2016a) requires its registrants to renew their registration every two 
years and part of this process is to confirm that they have met the standards of continuing 
professional development. Since 2008, a random sample of two and a half percent of registrants 
is selected in a CPD audit where they are expected to submit a portfolio which illustrates their 
participation in CPD activities and how they have met the CPD standards (HCPC 2016a). As part 
of the evidence of their development, registrants are encouraged to use reflective accounts to 
demonstrate how the activities they have taken part in have led to better quality in their 
practice.  
While the HCPC regulates and audits the practitioners, the professional body, RCOT also known 
previously as COT, ensures that its registrants are indeed developing professionally. The RCOT 
pushes for reflective thinking as a core method to professional development especially in the 
recent revision of its Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct document for occupational 
therapists (COT 2015) and the Code of Continuing Professional Development document in 2014 
(COT 2014a). The RCOT highlighted that an occupational therapist’s reflective thinking needs to 
involve his or her personal values, beliefs and attitudes, professional capability, practice setting 
and relevant policies (COT 2015). 
Learning and development opportunities occur in both professional and personal areas 
of life and may be formal or informal. These experiences can support and evidence 
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professional development if considered through a critically reflective approach and 
applied to occupational therapy practice. (COT 2015, p. 41) 
Participation in developmental opportunities and activities is not sufficient as evidence of 
professional development and needs to be supplemented with reflective thinking on how it is 
related to one’s practice for it to be considered. According to the RCOT, reflective thinking 
synthesises the “ideas and application of all professional development activities” to the benefit 
of the service users (COT 2015, p. 41). In addition, occupational therapists are to demonstrate 
how they have developed their critical reflective thinking skills throughout their professional 
career. The RCOT also states that occupational therapists need to undertake “systematic formal 
reflections” in the form of supervision and annual appraisals (COT 2015, p. 42). This 2015 
revision of the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct suggests that the RCOT is now taking a 
more assertive stance on the importance of reflection in occupational therapy.  
This expectation and requirement to be able to reflect are part of WFOT’s (2008) entry-level 
requirements of students. Occupational therapy curricula thus require students to learn about, 
demonstrate and be assessed on their reflective ability to become qualified practitioners. 
2.3. Occupational Therapy Curricula 
The development of students as professional therapists is the ethos of occupational therapy 
education (COT 2014b; WFOT 2008). With this understanding, skills and knowledge imparted 
during the curriculum are designed to encourage the professional development of occupational 
therapy students. 
Cardiff University, for example, offers two pre-qualification occupational therapy courses: a 
three-year BSc (Hons) Occupational Therapy course and an accelerated two-year Post-Graduate 
Diploma Occupational Therapy course. In Cardiff University, alongside understanding of 
anatomy, students learn about the philosophy and role of an occupational therapist, 
occupational therapy theories that underpin practice and the occupational engagement of an 
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individual across the life span (COT 2014b; Cardiff University 2012; WFOT 2008). Students are 
also introduced to reflective practice and aspects of professional development via keynote 
lectures and they are graded on their reflections along with their demonstration of therapeutic 
skills during their placements.  
Practice education or placement is an important feature of all occupational therapy programmes 
in the UK (COT 2014b) and the world through WFOT (2008). To qualify as a practitioner in the 
UK occupational therapy students are required to log one thousand hours of practice in a 
supportive environment (COT 2014b; HCPC 2013). The purpose of practice education in 
occupational therapy education is to prepare students to become competent practitioners 
(Knightbridge 2014), who can remain relevant in the rapidly changing health and social service 
system (Hocking and Ness 2002). Practice education has been shown to contribute to 
professional development, improve preparedness for practice and influence future practice 
choices (Doherty et al. 2009; Hodgetts et al. 2007; Crowe and Mackenzie 2002). A practice 
educator supervises students when they are on placement. These educators are responsible for 
assessing and grading the student’s performance against a list of competencies when on 
placement (Cardiff University 2013). In Cardiff University (2012), occupational therapy students 
are expected to demonstrate skills with increasing proficiency as they gather more experience 
in practice. Therefore, the grade descriptors for placement become more demanding as the 
student goes on more placements (Cardiff University 2012). 
In some occupational therapy curricula, problem-based learning (PBL) is inherent throughout 
the curriculum (Cardiff University 2012). PBL is the use of case studies, as initial triggers for 
learning such that critical thinking can be applied iteratively to achieve a new understanding of 
the case, theory, and practice. Information is consolidated over time and at the same time, the 
student develops his or her understanding (Clouston and Whitcombe 2007; Boud 1985). PBL is 
often undertaken as a collective effort in groups of seven to eleven students. Apart from the 
25 
 
learning of the topic, students learning through the PBL method also get a chance to observe 
learning styles of others in their group and have the opportunity to acquire knowledge in 
alternative ways (Holen 2000). Students also develop social skills in the process which will be 
transferable to their ability to interact with service users in the practice environment (Holen 
2000). Most importantly, PBL offers a method of learning that closely resembles learning that a 
practising occupational therapist experiences at work in a safe and supportive environment in 
the university (Holen 2000). Hence this can ease the transition from the university into practice 
settings upon qualifying as a registered occupational therapist. 
2.4. Conclusion 
Occupational therapy has come a long way since its origin in the eighteenth century. In the UK, 
it has been regarded as a profession since the Professions Supplementary to Medicine Act 
(1960). However, its role in the health and social care settings appear to differ in different 
countries, departments, and health settings. In addition, this professional identity can 
sometimes be interpreted to overlap with that of nurses and other allied health professions. 
As a profession, occupational therapy mostly deals with indeterminate situations where the 
solutions are not very clear. On top of relying on technical knowledge, occupational therapists 
must make use of their tacit knowledge as part of their daily professional practice. Tacit 
knowledge is implicit and hard to articulate; therefore, it is hard to teach or can even be 
unteachable. However, reflection on practice experience can allow the practitioner to make this 
implicit knowledge explicit.  
Additionally, ethical practice and professional development is expected of occupational 
therapists and this is often facilitated by reflective thinking. As reflection is evidently of great 
importance to the profession, the international professional body, WFOT, the UK occupational 
therapy regulatory body, HCPC and professional body, RCOT, have made reflective practice a 
core component of occupational therapy practice and education. Before one can be recognised 
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as a registered occupational therapist, one must show evidence of reflective thinking and 
practice and be assessed on them. Despite being of paramount importance in occupational 
therapy practice, reflection is not an easy process nor is it a straightforward concept. This is 
further explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3. Reflection and Dialogic 
Reflection 
Reflection is understood in this thesis as the intellectual, emotional, and value-driven 
exploration of a situation or thought. Reflection is an elaborate process of understanding one’s 
experience in the world with an in-depth analysis of how the experience relates to one’s values 
and perception of the world (Dewey 1933). It is a notoriously difficult term to define (Eraut 1994; 
Kinsella 2009) because many theorists understand it differently and practitioners of reflective 
practice understand it in their own way as it is used in their own practice.  
Despite the lack of consensus on the definition of reflection (Lee and Tan 2004), research has 
revealed that reflection engenders professional development (Holly 1989; Saylor 1990; Jarvis 
1992; Moon 2004; Wald et al. 2009; Booth and Nelson 2013). Hence, it is of great importance in 
many professions. This importance is recognised especially by the HCPC. The RCOT encourages 
and enforces that occupational therapists are to demonstrate their development through 
reflective thinking (COT 2014a; COT 2015). In addition, occupational therapists are expected to 
show how their reflective thinking have developed throughout their career (COT 2014a; COT 
2015).  
As a result of regulation and the pursuit of professional development, reflection is treated as a 
learning tool (Russell 2005) and evidence of development (COT 2014a). This concept of 
reflection seeps into the pre-registration occupational therapy curricula as educators teach 
occupational therapists to be the reflective practitioners that the HCPC and RCOT expects. The 
Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAAHE) is an independent body that ensures 
and advises on the quality of UK higher education (QAAHE 2016). In their benchmark statement, 
occupational therapy programmes are expected to develop reflective practitioners who are able 
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to reflect on their performance and the limitations of their practice (QAAHE 2001). This 
benchmark statement is reference material for the development of occupational therapy 
programmes in higher education institutes, acknowledging the minimum requirements of 
statutory regulatory bodies that need to be incorporated into the design of programmes (QAAHE 
2001). 
However, viewing reflection as a learning tool is not only reductive in essence, it has also 
resulted in a culture where reflection is treated as something deliberate and artificial (Russell 
2005). This culture of reflection encourages reflection to be taught in methods that can be 
considered rote (Wong et al. 2016) which in turn leads to a reductive understanding of reflection 
by emerging occupational therapists, perpetuating a vicious cycle. This reduces the elaborate 
process of understanding the world from one’s experience in it to a method of problem-solving 
or a quick and dirty method for professional development (Wong et al. 2016). The concern here 
is that the way that reflection is currently treated would lead to a paradoxical situation where 
reflection is being used in an unreflective manner, becoming an empty meaningless phrase 
(Kinsella 2009). While reflection can be a problematic concept, reflection in the dialogic sense 
has been suggested as a better alternative (Boniface 2002), albeit theories about it are rather 
scarce.  
3.1. Bridging the Theory and Practice Divide with 
Reflection 
Practice education or placement is an important aspect of health and social care professions’ 
curricula as it serves to supplement the knowledge and skills taught in the university. The 
purpose of practice education is to create a supportive environment in clinical settings to allow 
students to apply what they have been taught. Learning needs to be done in the context of its 
application (Dewey 1933) and this is especially so in health and social care education. 
Unintentionally, there is a mismatch between what that is taught in university and what actually 
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happens in practice settings (Bossers et al. 1999). As a result, a discursive gap between theory 
and practice is established. However, one purpose of reflection is to bridge the gap between the 
student and the practice environment (Schön 1983; Crist et al. 1998), however this is also rather 
difficult in reality. 
In occupational therapy education, and health and social care education in general, the 
curriculum is not merely about teaching scientific knowledge. Professional development forms 
an integral part of the curriculum and it is purposed to furnish emerging practitioners with a 
holistic understanding of practice and the underpinning theories (Bossers et al. 1999). In 
occupational therapy curricula, the foundation of clinical practice such as human anatomy and 
developing therapeutic interventions is complemented with professional behaviours and 
knowledge such as ethics, reflective practice and professional values and philosophy (Bossers et 
al. 1999). However, learning these modules in a university setting can be rather false and sterile 
and not reflective of the messiness of practice (Eraut 1994). Educational institutions have 
progressed to a point where they are able to offer a safe learning environment which can be 
sometimes hardly relatable to the reality of practice (Eraut 1994). Gold standard practice is 
taught and encouraged in university which some students may find impractical on their 
placements due to barriers in the settings such as time constraints and policies. This is rather 
confusing for the student as there is an incongruence between what is taught and what is 
experienced on placement. Students and even fresh graduates find difficulty in bridging the 
theory and practice gap in spite of practice education being part of the curriculum (Ajani and 
Moez 2011). 
Schön (1983) proposed that reflection is one way to do so, however, it is not easy to reflect in 
practice settings. Technical and tacit knowledge inform one’s practice (Schön 1983). Despite 
being implicit in nature, tacit knowledge can be made explicit through reflection (Boniface 
2002). Even though one of the aims of practice education is to encourage reflection, it is not the 
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most conducive place to do so. Reflection requires a “surprise” (Schön 1983, p. 56) or a degree 
of “perplexity” (Dewey 1933, p. 23) and “experimental action” (Schön 1983, p. 269). These are 
all anathema to settings that prioritise efficiency (Argyris and Schön 1978). It is difficult for 
students to engage in reflective practice in environments that are unable to accommodate 
actions that are deemed experimental and inefficient. Thus, this theory and practice gap is 
further perpetuated. 
Reflection is an important component of occupational therapy education, however teaching and 
learning this concept is made difficult when it is so nebulous. Many have critiqued its lack of 
clarity of what it means and its process. Despite the lack of clarity, some professions such as 
education and nursing have taken on the concept of reflection and theorised its process for use 
in practice (Gibbs 1988; King and Kitchener 1994; Fish et al. 1991; Korthagen and Vasalos 2005; 
Johns 2013).  
3.2. Conceptual Confusion 
Reflection, being an un-unified concept (Gilroy 1993; Kinsella 2009), results in reflective practice 
being ill-defined (Kember et al. 2001) and there is a lack of consensus on its definition (Ghaye 
and Ghaye 1998; Lee and Tan 2004).  There are, therefore, multiple definitions of reflection and 
often these are different largely due to the theoretical underpinning used by the theorist. In 
addition, conflicting or divergent theories about reflection further perpetuate this confusion. In 
fact, reflection is often used synonymously with different terms as a result such as reflective 
thinking (Dewey 1933), reflective practice (Schön 1983), reflective observation (Kolb 2014), 
critical reflection (Mezirow 1990), reflective judgement (King and Kitchener 1994). It appears 
that the word “reflection” is almost treated as a prefix or a suffix for a term to imply a deeper 
or as Dewey (1933, p. 3) had defined reflection, “better” way of thinking.  
Regardless, reflection and reflective practice have been adopted rather widely by educators, 
paramedics, nurses, doctors and other health and social care professions (Bullough and Gitlin 
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1989; Fish et al. 1991; Ghaye and Lillyman 1997; Donaghy and Morss 2000). Despite the broad 
use of reflection and reflective practice, practitioners who are familiar with its use, even 
amongst those belonging to the same profession, are unable to offer a common description of 
the concept (Ghaye and Ghaye 1998; Mackintosh 1998; McLaughlin 1999; Newman 1999; 
Kinsella 2009).  
3.2.1. The Nebulous Process of Reflection as Intended by Schön 
Often, in the discussion of this conceptual morass, fingers point to Schön and his lack of a clear 
definition of reflective practice and how it can be conducted (Greenwood 1993; Eraut 1994; 
Bengtsson 1995; Kinsella 2009). 
Reflection-in-action is the act of reflecting during an action without interrupting it (Schön 1983). 
Schön (1983) distinguishes this from reflection-on-action which is conducted after the action has 
taken place and requires one to stop and think. While Schön (1983; 1987) did not offer a formal 
definition of what he meant by reflection, in both The Reflective Practitioner (Schön 1983) and 
Educating the Reflective Practitioner (Schön 1987), he attempted to convey process and the 
appearance of reflection-in-action through various examples. However, these examples did not 
show a uniform process of reflection, rather they demonstrated that reflection can be 
approached and used in different ways (Schön 1987; 1983). 
This however attracted strong criticism from his readers. Bengtsson (1995, p. 29) referred to his 
work as “influential but most unclear”. Ecclestone (1996) noted that reflective practice had 
revealed unaddressed conceptual and practical confusion. Munby and Russell critiqued that: 
There is virtually no elaboration of the psychological realities of reflection-in-action… His 
work is not sufficiently analytical and articulated to enable us to follow the connections 
that must be made between elements of experience and elements of cognition so that 
we may see how reflection-in-action might be understood to occur (Munby and Russell 
1989, p. 74). 
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Eraut (1994) bemoaned about the amount of effort spent on elaborating on the examples and 
he indicated that Schön (1983) has still not offered a coherent view of reflection through them. 
He even went as far as to write: 
To rescue Schön’s original contribution from this morass, I believe it is necessary to take 
the term ‘reflection’ out of his theory, because it has caused nothing but confusion (Eraut 
1994, p. 148). 
In Schön’s (1987) defence, he never intended to offer a unified theory of reflection: 
I have tried in Part II to show how practitioners in very different sorts of professions 
reveal an underlying similarity in the art of their practice, and especially in the artful 
inquiry by which they sometimes deal with situations of uncertainty, instability and 
uniqueness. (Schön 1983, p. 268) 
I have so far stressed the similarities of pattern in various arts of reflective professional 
practice, but there are also importance differences. (Schön 1983, p. 270) 
Schön (1983) then went on to suggest that the examples of reflective practice differed because 
of the practitioners’ past experiences, values, theories that they use to guide their practice and 
the way they frame their role in practice settings. Schon (1983, p. 274) concluded that “the 
nature of the reflective conversation varies, from profession to profession, and from practitioner 
to practitioner”. It is rather apparent that reflection was deliberately left nebulous due to 
Schön’s respect for the differences of each profession and professional. Aggregating a unified 
theory on reflection-on-action would have done injustice to the unique work and thought 
processes required in the profession.  
With reference to constructivism, Schön (1987, p. 33) referred to knowing-in-action as 
“embedded in the socially and institutionally structured context shared by a community of 
practitioners”. Schön (1987) suggested that professional knowing-in-action, perhaps also 
applicable to the field of occupational therapy, is socially constructed and bounded or 
emancipated by the practice environment. He insinuated that this knowing-in-action does not 
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necessarily need to be in line with that of other professionals in the same field of practice since 
it is constructed and not directed. The cry for more clarity in the process of reflection-in-action 
hence misses this point that Schön (1983) was trying to make.  
In summary, the confusion did not come from the works of Schön. He had taken up the 
constructivist epistemology in his theory of reflection-in-action (Kinsella 2006), consequently 
and deliberately left it nebulous, respecting the unique nature of each profession. This lack of 
clarity, while intended, had caused some confusion about how one should go about reflecting 
in practice.  
3.2.2. Reflection as a Rational Thinking Process Theorised by Dewey 
While Schön (1983) had offered a nebulous concept of reflection, Dewey’s (1933) theory of 
reflective thinking is clearer and rational. In Dewey’s (1933) theory of reflective thinking, he 
emphasised that the thinking feeds into the doing which feedbacks into the thinking, it is a 
continuous process. Dewey (1933) believed that there are many forms of thinking, however, 
reflective thought is the more intellectual and esoteric variant.  
Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge 
in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends, 
constitutes reflective thought. (Dewey 1933, p. 6) 
The purpose of reflective thought is thus to confirm or refute the suggested the belief. The belief 
here points to the guiding principles which one follows when interacting with the world. When 
circumstances are such that these beliefs are applied and used without question, reflective 
thought does not occur. However, when the situation conflicts or deviates from one’s belief, 
when one is forced to reassess one’s belief, reflective thought then refers to the act of 
reconsideration of these beliefs.  
Two sub-processes are involved in triggering reflective thought: a state of perplexity and an 
enquiry directed at uncovering facts to challenge or support the suggested belief. Reflective 
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thought requires a shock, a situation perplexing enough to challenge the mind such that it 
triggers an uncertainty about one’s beliefs. One then recalls and recognises the facts that will 
help resolve this perplexing situation. These facts can corroborate with the past beliefs or 
suggest that there is a need to change one’s beliefs (Dewey 1933). 
3.2.3. The Implications of the Conceptual Confusion 
The wide use of reflection and its related vocabulary, despite the confusion, may eventually 
create a disappointing scene in the practice milieu and all fields that employ its theories. 
Reflection is so often used glibly in literature and the practice settings without any analytical 
scrutiny (Clarke et al. 1996; Newman 1999) that it is ironic when it is used in an unreflective 
manner (Bengtsson 1995). McLaughin (1999, p. 9) wrote that “‘reflective practitioner’ is often 
used as a vague slogan rather than a concept whose meaning and implications are well thought 
through and worked out”. Bauer (1991) noted that reflection is used so loosely and applied 
without any understanding of its nature and the design of its function. Kinsella (2009) went 
further to note that: 
Reflective practice is in danger of becoming a catch-all term for an ill-defined process… 
so broad and idiosyncratic is its application that some have suggested that ‘reflective 
practice’ is in danger of becoming an empty, meaningless phrase, that at once means 
everything and nothing. (Kinsella 2009, p. 4–5) 
Ixer (1999) went as far as to denounce reflection, considering the confusion and contradiction 
that it has caused. 
In the field of education, where Dewey (1933) wrote about reflective thinking and where 
reflection first became a popular concept, the implications of the demeaning of the concept 
have started to show. Zeichner (1994) noted that reflection had become a fad and teachers, 
regardless of their ideological orientations, had jumped on the bandwagon and focused their 
time and energy in the pursuit of whatever form of reflective teaching practice they have been 
told about without understanding how that may conflict with or align with their beliefs. Rogers 
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(2002) later felt that the lack of clarity of what reflection meant had resulted in the loss of its 
value in teaching.  
Reflection can be taught rather reductively at times in education (Wong et al. 2016). Rather than 
for achieving professional development as described previously, reflection is taught as a method 
of evaluation of an experience or activity. This reductive use of reflection strips the elaborate 
process to merely description and analysis, a method of problem-solving.  
Such ideas can sometimes find their way into education as educators are made to teach 
something so nebulous and students try to understand something so elaborate. This concept 
can be imparted in ways that appear to be didactic, and thus taught in its reductive form. It is 
then not surprising that it is used superficially as well in the practice environment (Wong et al. 
2016). This could potentially result in a generation of unreflective practitioners. 
Jones (2008) was fearful that what had happened in the field of education and nursing portends 
a similar fate for the field of paramedic education if the lack of clarity is not addressed. This fear 
is indeed warranted for reflective practice had already shown some problems in the field of 
nursing. Johns (2013) wrote that: 
The words reflection and reflective practice are used glibly, as if reflection is the most 
normal thing in the world requiring little skill or guidance. I recently met a district nurse 
at my local village fete. My partner mentioned that I was a bit of a guru in reflective 
practice. The district nurse recoiled and said she hated reflective practice, that she had 
had it shoved down her throat. I smile. I could imagine her experience of being taught 
reflection in an instrumental way of using a model of reflection by unreflective teachers. 
I know this because I see it everywhere. (Johns 2013, p. 2) 
The above account is not a one-off case. There appears to be a certain sense of dissent in the 
field of nursing about the usefulness of reflective practice (Burton 2000). Gilbert (2001), drawing 
on Foucault (1980), argued that reflective practice is a form of hegemony over nurses, and later 
extended it to all of the health and social care professionals. It can be argued that under the 
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guise of continuing professional development, the professional and regulatory body monitor the 
activity of professionals through advocating reflective practice. Foucault (1980) suggested that 
this surveillance was omnipresent and can appear to be ethical when it is made explicit. This 
manifests in the form reflective practice and clinical supervision in the case of health and social 
care professionals (Gilbert 2001; Clouder and Sellars 2004).  
Gilbert (2001) believed that surveillance in the form of reflective practice (Clouder and Sellars 
2004), is reliant on the practitioner’s ability to self-manage, write or talk about their activities 
“in a way that they accept responsibility themselves both for the agenda and the consequential 
actions” (Gilbert 2001, p. 202). Professionals reveal the truth about themselves and lay bare, 
through reflective practice, confessing to the agenda and rationale for their actions which may 
be motivated by the professional or regulatory bodies, more so than the individual practitioners. 
Through reflective practice, the agendas of these professional or regulatory bodies are being 
internalised and echoed through the actions of individuals, regardless of whether it is in line 
with their own ideology (Gilbert 2001). In the case of the reflective practice agenda, it is “shoved 
down her (the practitioners’) throat” (Johns 2013, p. 2) and becomes something that the 
professionals have to do, to demonstrate continuing professional development to the regulatory 
bodies, even if it is something they may not believe in (Zeichner 1994) through moral obligation 
over their actions (Gilbert 2001). Schön (1983) argued that professionals need to reflect. Dewey 
(1984) took this further by noting the ability to reflect and express their experiences 
authenticates the professional. Gilbert (2001), drawing on Foucault (1981), referred to this as a 
confession. The need to reflect on one’s practice is instilled through health and social care 
education; hence it is so pervasive and subtle (Gilbert 2001) that it is natural and part of daily 
practice.  
The obligation to confess is now relayed through so many points, is deeply ingrained in 
us that we no longer perceive it as an effect of power that constrains us: on the contrary, 
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it seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, ‘demands’ only to surface 
(Foucault 1981, p. 60). 
Reflective practice in nursing and health and social care can be perceived as a form of 
surveillance (Gilbert 2001; Clouder and Sellars 2004); in paramedic education, there is a fear 
that reflective practice will lose its value due to its lack of clarity (Jones 2008), while in teaching, 
this was thought to have already happened (Zeichner 1994). The use of reflection is so prevalent 
in today’s culture, sometimes without a clear understanding of what it stands for, whilst new 
theories of reflection are being generated without a unified definition. Reflection and reflective 
practice may be the cause of their own erosion in the future practices if this confusion is 
perpetuated. 
3.3. Dialogic Reflection 
The literature has indicated that the typical lecture-and-listen method is not an effective way to 
teach and learn about reflection (Russell 2005). Reflection is nebulous and ill-defined (Schön 
1983). Unlike the study of human anatomy, there is no right and wrong answer to it (Wong et 
al. 2016). It should not be straightforward and also should not be treated as such in education. 
Learning about reflection and how to do it is important to occupational therapy practice. 
However, reflecting on what reflection means to the individual and his or her practice takes 
precedence. Unfortunately, this answer is only found in oneself and not determined by the 
regulatory body, professional body nor the higher education institutions. Thus, the only way to 
do so is to practice it and reflecting on the meaning of the reflective process to the individual 
(Russell 2005), conducting a meta-reflection. 
Arguably, reflection cannot be taught in a rote manner (Wong et al. 2016). The concept can be 
introduced to students, and they can also be lectured on the theories about it. However, it 
should be something that students learn from experiencing it according to Russell (2005). 
Schön’s (1983) reflective practice paradox also indicated that to understand reflective practice, 
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one has to practice it. This is perhaps an idea that is challenging to educators that prefer the 
more instrumental and didactic method of teaching where one has to understand before one 
can practice.  
Reflection should not be taught, rather it should be guided (Russell 2005). However, this begs 
the question of who is best to do so. Boniface’s (2002) study indicated the supervisor may not 
be an ideal person do so as he or she may sit in judgement of the student from a position of 
superior knowledge, experience and power over the student’s academic path. If reflection is 
something that is required to be experienced, developed over time, guided but not supervised, 
then perhaps it is possible that reflection in a peer setting would be the best environment to 
learn reflection and be supported on it. 
3.3.1. Reflection as A Dialogic Process 
Reflection is often seen as a monological process (Clouder and Sellars 2004). Schön’s (1983; 
1987) examples of reflection in his works depicted scenes where professionals appear to be 
talking to a superior however the reflective conversation is between the professional and the 
situation, not with the superior. Johns (2013) described that reflection is necessarily on the self 
while Boud et al. (1985) described reflection as a process that one conducts in isolation. Dewey 
(1933) called reflection as reflective thinking as it is an internal cognitive process. There are 
strong arguments for the reflective process to be something implicit and self-driven. 
However, there are also indications that reflection can perhaps be treated as something that 
can be done with someone else as well. Boniface’s (2002) study suggested that there are certain 
people that individuals are more comfortable reflecting with. Driscoll (1994) encouraged nurses 
to make use of group situations such as discharge planning as settings for reflections to occur. 
Gibbs (1988) mentioned that stages of his reflective cycle can be done with different groups of 
people. Fish et al. (1991) provided a model of reflection for use between the teacher and 
student.  
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Research has suggested that reflection can perhaps be done with others (Gibbs 1988; Driscoll 
1994), however, little is done to explicate the reflective process that occurs when it is done as a 
dialogue. In comparison, reflection as a monologue is widely theorised and utilised. Theories 
that suggested that it could be conducted in groups provided some explanation on the process 
of reflection itself that one of the members in the conversation undertakes but they do not 
consider the dialogic aspect of it (Gibbs 1988; Driscoll 1994). As a result, they seem to have only 
provided another theory of reflection and not reflection as treated as a dialogue.  
3.3.1.1. Glazer et al. (2004) 
Glazer et al.’s (2004) research into collaborative reflection indicated that it is valuable to the 
development of teachers. Their research also showed that facilitation is important to drive the 
group and to ensure a safe environment. However, the role of the facilitator can shift in the 
group as members start to take on the leadership role. Though initially designed to be 
structured, their groups had behaved differently; one group designed the group reflection to be 
the structured linearly, brainstorming, grouping topics for discussion, reflection and finally 
closure. The other group, however, found it hard to follow the linear structure as designed by 
the first group and approached it more dynamically. Nonetheless, Glazer et al. (2004) had not 
theorised the process of reflecting in this manner nor did they offer a more in-depth explanation 
about the dynamics and how the interaction had resulted in reflection. Glazer et al.’s (2004) 
research also seemed to have focused on finding a solution to problems that the members had 
voiced and it is questionable whether their use of reflection is for problem-solving or 
professional or personal development. There is little indication of how the teachers had 
developed even though they noted that it was a valuable and positive experience. Hence while 
they had offered suggestions on how it can be carried out, they had contributed little to 
understanding the dynamic process of reflecting in groups, the personal or professional 
development it may have triggered and what actually happens when the reflective process is 
approached collaboratively. 
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Glazer et al. (2004) carried out their research in two steps, first to build a framework for 
collaborative reflection and then to test it out. Initially, a group of five teachers and three 
researchers met to explore the nature of professional reflection and to develop a process of 
reflection as productive professional development. These meetings were open-ended 
discussions and the collaborative group decided on the steps required to organise and structure 
collaborative reflection. These decisions were then tested with another different group of 
teachers and who met to reflect collaboratively as structured by the previous group. A final 
meeting was then devoted to the discussion about the process. 
Glazer et al. (2004) had two distinct phases in their research: a design phase and an experimental 
phase. While I felt that it was collaborative to recruit participants to design the execution of the 
collaborative reflection, there was no continuity in the experimental phase because the group 
of participants involved in the design phase was different from that of the experimental phase. 
They have concluded that the process of the collaborative reflection had differed quite 
significantly from how it was initially designed. Perhaps the major cause of this was the fact that 
the participants who designed it did not experience it and those who experienced it were not 
involved in the designing phase. The lack of continuity throughout the entire research process 
is perhaps the reason behind incongruity between the intended design of the group reflection 
and the actual execution. The researchers also analysed collaborative reflection without 
collaborating with either group of participants. With reference to the paradigm of dialogic 
reflection discussed later in Chapter Four, I saw a clear mismatch between the method of 
research and the topic Glazer et al. (2004) intended to theorise. 
3.3.1.2. Tigelaar et al. (2008) 
Tigelaar et al. (2008) researched into the teacher interaction process and collaborative reflection 
process during peer meetings. Five experienced teachers and a teacher trainer met thrice to 
understand and improve their teaching practice. The meetings were held two months apart 
lasting forty-five minutes each. The meetings were videotaped and transcribed. The relationship 
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between the types of interaction and the content of collaborative reflections were analysed 
using two frameworks. The meetings were conducted using the following structure: 
1. Phase one: Reading of all critical incidents submitted by members and one account was 
selected for discussion and analysis 
2. Phase two: Clarifying questions were prepared over a short break, no solutions or 
alternatives were implied or suggested 
3. Phase three: All clarifying questions were asked and answered by the presenter whose 
account had been selected in phase 1 
4. Phase four: Analysis and advice was prepared over a short break 
5. Phase five: Advice and analysis were given 
6. Phase six: Positives and negatives of the advice and analysis were discussed 
7. Phase seven: The presenter of the account selected the most suitable solution and 
analysis 
8. Phase eight: Participants evaluated what had been discussed. 
Tigelaar et al.’s (2008) research appeared to contradict the natural process that Glazer et al.’s 
(2004) research group had preferred. It is also questionable if the interactions in Tigelaar et al.’s 
(2008) research, while may appear to be collaborative, can be considered dialogic because of 
how each phase was isolated from each other. Such an approach was not indicative of any 
exchange of ideas and seemed rather one-sided where the participants reflected for the 
presenter rather than reflect with the presenter. Additionally, there was no indication of the use 
of reflection as more than a problem-solving method even though non-technical aspects such 
as emotions and morals were discussed. Tigelaar et al.’s (2008) research failed to shed light on 
the collaborative process as they had claimed or show the value of reflecting in groups to the 
development of teachers, whether professionally or personally.  
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Unlike Glazer et al. (2004), Tigelaar et al. (2008) had designed their peer meeting using the 
critical incident method (Hendriksen 1997). This resulted in a highly structured process of 
reflection that was collaborative but perhaps not dialogic. Additionally, there is little equality in 
this reflective process because one incident was nominated out of five to be reflected upon, 
suggesting that some participants had experiences that are more worth reflecting upon than 
others. Similar to Glazer et al.’s (2004) research, the researchers did not participate in the 
collaborative reflection. 
Glazer et al. (2004) and Tigelaar et al. (2008) were key influences of this research, both of whom 
had carried out their research in the form of peer meetings. While they served as suggestions as 
to how a research about dialogic reflection can be conducted, they also served as cautionary 
tales of the implications of approaching my research in an unco-operative manner. 
Both Glazer et al. (2004) and Tigelaar et al. (2008) had not described their research paradigm or 
their research methodology even though they had detailed the process of conducting their 
research. From their research designs, I inferred that they were conducting peer meetings as a 
form of action research. However, both research designs were not participatory as the 
researchers were theorising dialogic reflection by studying the behaviours and actions of their 
participants. I found this rather troubling as having considered the paradigm of this research it 
would have been contradictory to craft an understanding about dialogic reflection in an unco-
operative manner. 
I had designed the research similar to how Glazer et al. (2004) and Tigelaar et al. (2008) had 
conducted theirs, however, there were some areas I had chosen to deviate from. Peer meetings 
appeared to be the trend in the research about the topic. Appreciating the nature of dialogic 
reflection and the paradigm of my research, I decided that this was the best method to conduct 
this research. However, unlike Glazer et al. (2004) and Tigelaar et al. (2008), I wanted the 
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research to involve the co-researchers as much as possible in my action research. Co-operative 
Inquiry hence became the obvious methodology of choice. 
3.4. Conclusion 
The literature review elicited that reflection, even when suggested that it could be done 
collaboratively, is still an internal and monologic process. There appeared to be some inherent 
difficulties in understanding reflection as a collaborative, dialogic process and how it contributes 
to one’s development. While Glazer et al.’s (2004) and Tigelaar et al.’s (2008) research had 
suggested methods in which it can be organised for teachers they had not explicated the 
dynamic nature of reflection in this manner. Burton (2000) had critiqued that 
Nurses are now directed to reflect effectively and practice effectively. When there is 
scant evidence to support the use of reflection, why does the United Kingdom Central 
Council, English National Board for Nursing and Midwifery and Health Visiting and 
institutes of nurse education insist that nurses at all levels of experience reflect. (Burton 
2000, p. 1) 
While it is important to understand how to conduct dialogic reflection, the more important 
question to answer is if dialogic reflection will contribute any professional development to the 
participating individuals. If not, it renders the former question moot. It is vital that dialogic 
reflection steers clear from being a concept that is applied blindly in education, just because it 
is another variant of reflection and assumed to be beneficial to professional growth. The value 
of dialogic reflection was thus of great importance to this research. 
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 Part Two: Developing This Study 
About Dialogic Reflection 
This part of the thesis concerns the methodological considerations of this research. It introduces 
the research question along with the paradigm of this research. I also discuss my position on the 
purpose of enquiry. This guided me to developing a research study on dialogic reflection that 
was highly collaborative and reflective. 
Chapter Four explains the research question and objectives. The participatory paradigm is 
introduced, and research methodologies is also discussed. 
Chapter Five describes research as it was conducted, from literature review to conclusion of the 
action research groups.  
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Chapter 4. Paradigm and Purpose of 
Enquiry 
As established earlier, although there is a considerable amount of literature on reflection, there 
is a paucity in literature relating to dialogic reflection per se. Some literature (Gibbs 1988; Fish 
et al. 1991; Boniface 2002; Glazer et al. 2004; Tigelaar et al. 2008) had suggested that reflection 
can be conducted dialogically, but there was little information regarding the dynamic interplay 
in a dialogic reflection. More recent research (Glazer et al. 2004; Tigelaar et al. 2008) had 
illustrated how it could be conducted. However, these research studies had not neccessarily 
encouraged dialogic reflection as they had claimed. Furthermore, they were carried out in in the 
field of education and the research in the use of dialogic reflection in the context of health and 
care is still sparse. The scarcity of research into dialogic reflection lead me to conduct a research 
to better understand it. Being an occupational therapist who had recently graduated, I felt 
impelled to investigate dialogic reflection in my own field and specifically with occupational 
therapy students.  
I had initially termed what I currently refer to as dialogic reflection as collaborative reflection, 
as it was the term used by Glazer et al. (2004) and Tigelaar et al. (2008). However, as the research 
developed, it emerged that dialogic reflection was a better term for this research as it more 
accurately captures the reflective process that I mean. The reason for this change is further 
elaborated in the findings later in Chapter Six. In this thesis, I use dialogic reflection 
predominantly, except for when I am reporting the way I had written the research question and 
objectives and conducted the literature review for accuracy. 
Thus, I initially developed the following research question: 
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How suitable is collaborative (or dialogic) reflection for occupational therapy students in their 
professional development? 
The objectives of the study developed then were: 
1. To understand the experience of engaging in collaborative (or dialogic) reflection 
from the perspective of student occupational therapists 
2. To explore the potential of its use in occupational therapy education for professional 
development 
3. To attempt to develop a model for the use of collaborative (or dialogic) reflection in 
occupational therapy education 
As the first objective of this research, I sought to theorise dialogic reflection using a synthesis of 
the occupational therapy students’ experience and theories to make sense of the process. While 
I had initially intended to understand dialogic reflection from the students’ perspective, upon 
further consideration of the paradigm and methodology of this research, I had realised that it 
was important for me to also understand dialogic reflection from my own experience of it. This 
is further expanded upon later in this chapter and I will also show the changes I had made to the 
first objective of the study. Current theories (Gibbs 1988; Fish et al. 1991; Boniface 2002; Glazer 
et al. 2004; Tigelaar et al. 2008) available are insufficient to provide a satisfactory explanation 
of what dialogic reflection means and how it happens. It is often thought of as an extension of 
the monologic version of reflection and not as a unique method of reflection in its own right or 
deserving of a dedicated theoretical knowledge base. However, as Schön (1983) hinted, the best 
way to learn about reflection is to actually experience it (Wong et al. 2016). Therefore, it can be 
inferred that the best way to learn about dialogic reflection in the occupational therapy 
curriculum was perhaps to conduct dialogic reflection amongst the occupational therapy 
students and I, and understand dialogic reflection through our active engagement in it. Existing 
theories were then used to make sense of the experience of dialogic reflection, upon which the 
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theory of dialogic reflection was built. This resulted in a theory grounded in theory and 
experience. 
The second objective of the research was to understand the possible value of dialogic reflection 
in occupational therapy education. It is not sufficient to understand the theory behind dialogic 
reflection as it does not imply that it would be valuable to the professional development of 
occupational therapy students. In addition to learning about its merits, it is also imperative to 
understand its problems for if the consequence of engaging in dialogic reflection is damaging to 
the professional development of occupational therapy students, then it would not be wise to 
encourage it in the curriculum.  
Conditional on addressing the first two objectives, the last objective served to explore possible 
ways of incorporating dialogic reflection in occupational therapy curricula.  
After deciding on the research aim and objectives, the next step was to design a research project 
that allowed me to achieve them. It was important that the research was conducted in a 
paradigm that appreciated the nature of dialogic reflection.  
4.1. Paradigm 
The paradigm, or worldview, is an overarching framework which serves to organise the approach 
to guide the development of the research and the research direction (Kuhn 1996). It represents 
a way of thinking and the beliefs and values that are shared by researchers in their own discipline 
(Schwandt 2001). Kuhn (1996) argued that while researchers are aware that concepts and 
theories should not be learned instrumentally, they do not usually make explicit the legitimacy 
of the research problem or solution, which would require them to declare the paradigm and 
methodology of their research. Polanyi (1962) suggested that these methodological and 
paradigmatic considerations often reside in the tacit dimension and since the researcher may 
not be aware of the implicit process that goes on, it is rarely made explicit in the research. 
50 
 
However, considering this research is about reflection, it is imperative that I, as the researcher, 
made these considerations explicit. 
In consideration of a paradigm, I had to consider the philosophical assumptions (Patton 2002): 
• Ontology – What do we believe about the nature of reality?  
• Epistemology – How do we know what we know? 
• Axiology –  What is considered true? 
Chilisa and Kawulich (2012) wrote about the selection of a paradigm, suggesting that paradigms 
are something like a road the researcher chooses to take to conduct the research. However, I 
questioned if this was the case for this research in particular. Rather than choosing a paradigm, 
I believed the research topic had already chosen its own paradigm, considering how this 
research was essentially an understanding of how one can learn and know from one’s 
experience. Additionally, this knowing was more than just professional knowledge (Schön 1983), 
it also included personal beliefs, assumptions (Mezirow 1990) and way of thinking (Dewey 1933) 
for example. These forms of knowing suggested the ontology, epistemology and axiology of the 
research which led me to think that the paradigmatic approach to conducting this research was 
not within my control.  
4.1.1. Epistemology 
The epistemological consideration was of paramount importance for this research relative to 
the ontological and axiological considerations. As this consideration required me to explore the 
epistemic nature of reflection and dialogue, it also had a profound influence in my interpretation 
of the data. The epistemic exploration of reflection and dialogue had an impact not only on the 
decision on the paradigm of the research but also the findings of this research. 
The epistemologies of the theories of reflection are often implicit (Schön 1983; Gibbs 1988; Fish 
et al. 1991). Kinsella (2006), Moon (2004) and Fenwick (2001) however considered reflection to 
be constructivist in its epistemology. Constructivism here refers particularly to the subjectivist 
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epistemology in this philosophical concept, where knowledge about the world is created with 
others through an internal cognitive process (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Mehay and Waters 
2010). At the same time, when reflection is referred to more broadly as getting knowledge from 
one’s experience, it can also be considered as rational or empiricist, depending on where the 
focus lies in the reflective process. Fenwick (2001) explained that reflection is constructivist 
because: 
Individuals are understood to construct their own knowledge, through interaction with 
their environments… a learner is believed to construct, through reflection, a personal 
understanding of relevant structures of meaning derived from his or her action in the 
world (Fenwick 2001, pp. 9–10) 
Constructivists believe that cognitive structures - one’s network of knowledge and 
understanding and their associated feeling or emotions - are malleable (Moon 2004; Kinsella 
2007a). They are responsive to new understandings elicited from new experiences and develop 
accordingly.  
The state of the cognitive structure at a given time facilitates the selection and 
assimilation of new material of learning… it guides what we choose to pay attention to, 
what we choose to learn and how we make meanings of the material of learning. (Moon 
2004, p. 17) 
Therefore, through the constructivist lens, learning is less about the accumulation of knowledge 
and more about the transforming of concepts (Bowden and Marton 1998; Moon 2004).  
Reflection is also constructivist because of the way knowledge is being assimilated in the process 
of learning. Kolb (2014) identified that the individual first lives through concrete experiences 
which he/she will reflect on, eliciting certain abstract conceptualisations which are incorporated 
into the cognitive structures. These newly learned concepts are then utilised in new situations. 
The experience is not assimilated directly as knowledge constructs, rather, it has to be 
deconstructed through reflective enquiry before the reconstruction of learned concepts can 
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occur. Learning only happens when the individual makes sense of the experience through 
reflective thought, links it to previous learning and transform his or her previous understanding 
(Fenwick 2001). This learning through reflection is thus demonstrated through one’s action 
(Schön 1987). 
Though Plato did not write about reflection explicitly, he offered a more rational view to the 
distilling of knowledge from experience (Jowett 1980). Plato argued that what one experiences 
are mere shadows of the truth (Jowett 1980). He believed that these experiences are opinions 
and it is only through thinking and dialectic, the Socratic method, that one can attain knowledge 
hence the truth. What one experiences through one’s senses and one’s untested beliefs of one’s 
world are opinions, hence false, as they can mislead one to make false conclusions about the 
world. However, through rigorous intellectual interrogation of one’s experience through the 
Socratic method, one is able to attain knowledge. The Socratic method is where the learner 
poses a question and tries to answer it himself. Someone else offers a contradictory example or 
answer and the learner then revises his or her answer in response. This answer and then 
contradicted again, and the learner comes up with a revised answer. This happens until the 
learner can come up with an answer that cannot be contradicted. As this answer can no longer 
be challenged, it is therefore ‘true’ and hence it is what Plato understands as knowledge. 
Therefore, Plato’s rational approach to distilling knowledge from experience can also be viewed 
as a form of reflective thought. However, in Platonic rationalism (Jowett 1980), the experience 
and untested beliefs are of little value relative to knowledge that crystallises from them and the 
Socratic method of doing so.  
Empiricism shifts the focus from the intellectual interrogation of the experience to the 
experience itself. Empiricism is the belief that the source of knowledge is our sensory experience 
of the world (Markie 2013). The difference between this and platonic rationalism is that 
knowledge lies in the experience itself and is not gained from the analytical process. Most, if not 
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all, reflective theories value the intellectual process of deconstructing an experience and one’s 
premise (Mezirow 1981; Fenwick 2001). Experience, unlike pure rationalism, is the sole resource 
for knowledge development in empiricism. In Gibbs’ (1988) model of reflection, the reflective 
cycle starts with an experience followed by an analysis of the emotional, practical and 
intellectual components of reflection. Emotion and thought is analysed procedurally in his model 
which suggests that they can be analysed in isolation of each other, favouring the concept of 
experience offered by empiricism. Hume (1748) believed that one’s perception of the world is 
made up of ideas and impressions. Ideas here refer to thinking involved while impressions refer 
to feeling, with reference to our sensory experience and emotions. Locke (1690) understands 
perception as sensation and reflection. Sensation referring to the experience that occurs outside 
the mind and perceived through the senses. Reflection refers to the experience of the internal 
operations of the mind as it processes sensation. Knowledge in empiricism lies in sensory 
experience itself and not the analysis of it. Hence reflection from an empiricist stance focuses 
on understanding the different sensations rather than the extended analysis of how they are 
different to previous experiences like in the constructivist stance or analytical process itself like 
in the rationalist perspective. 
Reflection, if considered as learning from experience, can be seen to be constructivist (Schön 
1983; 1992; Moon 2004; Kinsella 2007a), rational (Jowett 1980; Schön 1983) and even empirical 
(Locke 1690; Hume 1748; Gibbs 1988). Nonetheless, instances, where theorists of reflection 
have explicitly, declared the epistemological position of their theory is rather rare. It appears 
that part of the difference in these many theories is their understanding of experience and how 
knowledge is gained from it. 
Though reflection had been approached in multiple epistemologies, constructivism appeared to 
be most predominantly used (Schön 1983; Moon 2004; Kinsella 2009). Experience was an 
important consideration for this research. This was largely drawn from the fact that the subject 
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matter of concern was reflection. As a result, how experience could be examined and the type 
of knowing that is elicited from it would be key to the understanding of dialogic reflection. It 
was clear that the research would be under a paradigm that appreciates the importance of 
experience and knowledge gained from it.  
However, constructivism did not seem to represent reflection completely because of how Schön 
(1983) had differentiated reflection-in-action from reflection-on-action. Goodman’s (1978) 
constructivist theory on worldmaking was quite evident in reflection-on-action where one 
examines the experience after having experienced it (Schön 1983). However, Schön (1983) 
appeared to have dedicated most of his theory to understanding reflection-in-action rather than 
reflection-on-action. In fact, it was the ability to reflect-in-action that defined a reflective 
professional in his opinion. Reflection-in-action differs subtly in that the reflection occurs in the 
action rather than after. While subtle, this made a difference in the consideration of the 
epistemology of reflection because it also suggested that knowing does not only come from the 
examination of an experience but also from the participation in the action itself. This form of 
knowing was what Schön referred to as knowing-in-action (Schön 1983) or Polanyi’s (1966) tacit 
knowledge.  
However, it is important to note that this research was about dialogic reflection. The dialectical 
aspect of dialogic reflection was also of interest and hence also had an influence on the paradigm 
of the research. Dialogic reflection suggested that knowledge was not only achieved from a 
solitary interaction with the world and that knowing could be a social activity (Glazer et al. 2004; 
Tigelaar et al. 2008). In addition, the dialogic reflection featured two ways of knowing: learning 
resulting from the dialogic examination of an experience, and learning from the act of 
participating in the dialogue (Tigelaar et al. 2008). Therefore, the epistemology of dialogic 
reflection was more than knowing from looking back on the experience and also included 
knowing elicited from the act of conversing in a reflective manner; the epistemic nature hinted 
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at the participatory paradigm where researchers create an understanding of the human 
condition through the embodiment of the experience (Heron 1971), in this case, the experience 
of reflecting dialogically. 
4.1.2. Ontology 
Knowing through experience and action suggested that reality is found in the participation in 
the world. Heron and Reason (1997) argued that it is not possible to give an absolute description 
of reality. In fact, according to them, it is not even possible to have absolute experiential knowing 
because one interacts with the world from one’s perception. Hence the understanding of reality 
is conditional on the experiences of the individual, and the reality of those experiences is 
conditional on prior experiences (Heron and Reason 1997). This was distinct from constructivism 
as an ontological concept where reality is a mental construction based on tangible entities rather 
than the perception of these entities as informed by prior experiences (Heron 1996; Denzin and 
Lincoln 2000; Mehay and Waters 2010).  
In reflection, reality is understood though experiencing something and understanding that 
experience, however, this process of understanding is dependent on what the individual 
understands from his or her prior experiences. This is most clearly understood from the cyclical 
models of reflection where learning is utilised in experiences that follow them (Gibbs 1988). The 
new experience is then experienced and examined based on what the individual knew 
previously. Reflection is where new knowledge results in new experiences and these 
experiences then allow the development of new knowledge (Wong et al. 2016). Hence the 
reality is perceptual and absolute experiential knowing is not possible (Heron and Reason 1997). 
The concrete reality for many social scientists is a list of particular facts that they would 
like to capture; for example, the presence or absence of water, problems concerning 
erosion in the area. For me, the concrete reality is something more than isolated facts. 
In my view, thinking dialectically, the concrete reality consists not only of concrete facts 
and (physical) things, but also includes the ways in which the people involved with these 
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facts perceive them. Thus in the last analysis, for me, the concrete reality is the 
connection between subjectivity and objectivity, never objectivity isolated from 
subjectivity. (Freire 1982, p. 30) 
Similar to relativism (Lincoln and Guba 2000), reality can be known through a solitary process of 
knowing as in monologic reflection or collectively as in dialogic reflection. Therefore, an enquiry 
in dialogic reflection required participation in dialogue in order to create any form of knowing. 
In the participatory paradigm, 
Reality is the fruit of an interaction of the given cosmos and the way the mind engages 
with it (Heron and Reason 1997, p. 277) 
Things become what our consciousness makes of them through the active participation 
of our mind (Skolimowski 1994, pp. 27–28) 
Heron and Reason (1997) argued that the interaction between the individual and his or her mind 
with the universe is the process of understanding reality and thus because of this, reality is not 
absolute. Skolimowski (1994, p. 100) argued that the world “is an epistemological construct, a 
form of our understanding”, a product of our interaction with the universe. Thus, the ontology 
of dialogic reflection lies in the objective-subjective, the dialectic between the occupational 
therapy students and I as dialogic reflectors and the experiences that we found ourselves in. It 
was our understanding of the world that granted us the state of being and therefore, the ability 
to know.  
4.1.3. Axiology 
Axiology is the question of the value of the enquiry paradigm (Heron and Reason 1997). It 
requires the researcher to question what is intrinsically worthwhile and valuable to the research 
(Heron and Reason 1997; Chilisa and Kawulich 2012). Heron and Reason (1997) argued that 
paradigms, as a representation of the beliefs of the discipline (Kuhn 1996), should also represent 
what was inherently valuable or it legitimised all means to the pursuit of truth, scrupulous or 
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not. Hence the consideration of axiology is also the part of the ethical consideration of this 
research. 
Apart from valuing human experiences, and knowledge from it as the word ‘reflection’ would 
suggest, this research also valued participation in dialogue. Gaining knowledge and 
understanding from experience can be a social activity as dialogic reflection indicated (Glazer et 
al. 2004; Tigelaar et al. 2008). In keeping with this principle, the understanding of dialogic 
reflection and ways of doing it should also be a social experience. This research question should 
be answered while immersed in the experience and knowledge about the topic and its related 
disciplines; the theory should be crafted in the synthesis of these experiences and knowledge 
generated in the dialogue. In other words, this research should be approached dialogically and 
therefore, participation in this dialogue should be a core value in this research. 
The participatory paradigm answers the axiological question in terms of human 
flourishing, conceived as an end in itself where such flourishing is construed as an 
enabling balance within and between people of hierarchy, co-operation and autonomy. 
(Heron and Reason 1997, p. 280) 
A feature of the participatory paradigm is the importance of collaboration in the enquiry. 
Collaboration grounds individuals in the research within the community, providing each other 
with support and feedback through the offering of different perspectives (Randall and Southgate 
1980). In the participatory paradigm, this collaborative approach occurs through the hierarchical 
relationship present in the research, where those with greater skill and experience providing 
guidance (Torbert 1991). However, this is also emancipatory and democratic, allowing for the 
expression of creativity and actualisation of those involved in the enquiry (Heron 1992). 
Nonetheless, inherent in this paradigm are the echoes of constructivism as the approach to 
enquiry is value-laden and knowledge generated is subjective and mind-dependent (Chilisa and 
Kawulich 2012).  
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With the consideration of the epistemology, ontology, and axiology of the topic of dialogic 
reflection, it was clear that the participatory paradigm is the most suitable research approach 
for this study, as chosen not by me but by the values and nature of the topic. Because of the 
relationship between reflection and constructivism, the research also had hints of the 
constructivist approach. My part in the selection of this paradigm was my decision to appreciate 
and respect the nature of dialogic reflection and to allow it to guide me to a better 
understanding of it. It was my opinion that this was the best way to arriving at an understanding 
that is closest to its true nature.  
The participatory paradigm of the research was perhaps the biggest influence on the research 
method chosen, even more so than the methodology. This was largely because of how I had 
understood the purpose of enquiry in general, my thoughts on who I was as a researcher and 
what this research meant. By accepting my preconceptions on the topic of dialogic reflection, I 
designed a research project that appreciated these preconceptions from the students and me, 
but at the same time challenged them repeatedly.  
4.2. Methodologies in This Research 
The methodologies in the participatory paradigm should revolve around the democratic 
participation of all involved in the enquiry (Heron and Reason 1997). Therefore, in such a dialogic 
method of enquiry, participants are co-researchers and at the same time co-participants (Heron 
1996). Knowledge is generated from the collaborative examination of themselves and their 
experience. Hence it indicated that in this research about dialogic reflection, the research 
question was answered through experiencing, studying, and reflecting on dialogic reflection. 
Learning about reflection is best done through experiencing it (Russell 2005; Wong et al. 2016), 
and the same should be applied to dialogic reflection.  
Reason (1994) cited three main approaches to enquiry in the participatory paradigm: Co-
operative Inquiry, Participatory Action Research and Action Inquiry. Co-operative Inquiry and 
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Action Inquiry stood out more than Participatory Action Research due to being strongly 
grounded in theory, practice, and their emphasis on different aspects of Participatory Inquiry. 
Participatory Action Research is about emancipating oppressed populations by developing 
knowledge for them, with them (Reason 1994). As this was not in line with the research question 
I sought to answer, I had not considered Participatory Action Research as a suitable 
methodology. 
This research started with the Co-operative Inquiry methodology. However, as it developed, the 
methodology shifted towards an Action Inquiry and then towards something that was less 
structured and more dynamic. As co-researchers in a research in the participatory paradigm, we 
were part of the development of the research itself. As a result, the shifting methodologies of 
this research was heavily influenced by us who had co-operatively made decisions on how to 
best answer the research question and what was worth further exploration (Heron and Reason 
2001). More details on the developing methodology of this research will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
4.2.1. Co-operative Inquiry 
Co-operative Inquiry is the embodiment of Heron’s (1971) critique of traditional social science 
enquiry methods where subjects are removed from the thinking and decision process. In his 
opinion, they are treated as less than self-determining people and the exclusion of them in the 
enquiry also consequently alienates them from the knowledge generated. Therefore, 
inappropriate to be considered as the science of the people. 
In Co-operative Inquiry, Heron and Reason (1997) proposed the following extended 
epistemology: 
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Figure 1. The extended epistemology (Heron 1996) 
With reference to the figure above, propositional knowing is knowing through theories and ideas 
concerning the topic. In Co-operative Inquiry, co-researchers of the research define the 
questions that need to be explored and how they can do that. This method is then applied in 
practice and practical knowing - knowing how to do something - manifests in the form of skill 
and competence, where the group decides on how they would like to go about confirming their 
propositional knowledge. Carrying out what the participants have planned leads to new 
experiences which are experiential knowing. Participants then try to make sense of the 
experience and arrive at presentational knowing, which then feeds into the propositional 
understanding of the initial inquiry (Heron and Reason 1997; 2001). Co-researchers cycle 
through these four forms of knowing multiple times to enhance the coherence and congruity of 
their understanding (Heron and Reason 1997). 
The two key principles of Co-operative Inquiry are epistemic participation and political 
participation. The former means that any knowledge that emerges from the research is 
grounded in the researcher’s experience, and the latter means that all those involved in the 
research have a part in the designing of the research as the information gathered is about 
themselves (Heron and Reason 1997). From the first principle, the researcher is also the subject 
of the research and from the second principle, the subjects are also the researchers.  
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The research is done by people with each other, not by researchers on other people or 
about them. (Heron and Reason 1997, p. 282) 
Qualitative research about people is a half-way house between exclusive, controlling, 
quantitative positivist research on people and fully participatory, co-operative research 
with people. (Heron and Reason 1997, p. 283) 
Williamson et al. (2012) insisted that the Co-operative Inquiry methodology fits in neither the 
qualitative nor the quantitative research tradition because it is about researching with rather 
than researching on participants (Heron and Reason 1997). The more fully the co-researchers 
participate in the enquiry, the more co-operative it is. This is in line with the paradigm in which 
dialogic reflection finds itself - the methodology of this enquiry to understand dialogic reflection 
should be should be collaborative and dialogic. This also meant that I was a participant in the 
research as much as I was a researcher, and the participants I recruited for the study were in 
equal parts researchers. My co-researchers and I were active agents in the research where we 
were all involved in the designing and management of the enquiry, experiencing and drawing 
conclusions from it (Heron and Reason 2001). 
However, as with any human group, enquiry groups often have problems with inclusion, 
influence and intimacy. Co-researchers will take different roles in the dialogue and the 
contribution, in terms of quality and quantity will differ. Reason (1994) suggested that the 
member(s) that initiated the enquiry may act as the facilitator(s) of the process and how the 
group negotiates the power differentials will affect the quality of work produced. Even though 
unanimity is ideal, it is rarely feasible (Reason 1994). At the very least, all the co-researches 
should be given the opportunity to participate in every part of the enquiry process and be 
allowed to freely voice their thoughts about the process and the outcome. 
4.2.2. Action Inquiry 
Action Inquiry was a transitional methodology as the research developed from a Co-operative 
Inquiry to something less structured. Action Inquiry is based on the key thought that “knowledge 
62 
 
is always gained in action and for action” (Torbert 1981, p. 145). Central to Action Inquiry is that 
the theories that are used to guide action, if identified, can be used to predict behaviours. The 
focal point of this methodology is in the actions taken. Espoused theories, which are those that 
one claims to follow, can be incongruent to the theories actually evident in one’s action –  
theories-in-use (Argyris et al. 1985). This difference may not be a conscious decision. 
Action Inquiry can be conducted in the first, second or third person types of research (Torbert 
2001). First person Action Inquiry is about being mindful of one’s actions in life and identifying 
possible differences between what one believes in and how one behaves (Torbert 2001). In 
second person Action Inquiry, a group of researchers engage in this exploration together 
through collaborative enquiry and mutual influence (Torbert 2001). Third person Action Inquiry 
occurs at the organisational level, providing the right environment for first and second person 
Action Inquiry to occur in the organisation (Torbert 2001). Action Inquiry was a suitable 
methodological approach to this research because of its appreciation of the importance of 
reflection in the research process. The first person Action Inquiry is fundamentally a monological 
reflective process, while the second person Action Inquiry describes a form of research that 
features reflection amongst a group of researchers, essentially describing a dialogic reflection. 
Third person Action Inquiry thus describes an organisation that encourages reflection and 
dialogic reflection, such as a university. These three forms of Action Inquiry were in line with my 
intention to understanding dialogic reflection and its place in the curriculum.  
Co-operation and reflection were the crux of the methodological consideration for this research. 
The two themes were well represented in Co-operative Inquiry and Action Inquiry. Co-operative 
Inquiry was chosen over Action Inquiry at the start because principles of political participation 
and epistemic participation echoed the epistemological, ontological, and axiological 
considerations described earlier in this chapter. Over the course of research however, it 
appeared that my co-researchers and I moved away from a research that would be considered 
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as a Co-operative Inquiry towards one that resembled an Action Inquiry. It was not a conscious 
decision to switch the methodology. This change was brought about by the change in the 
discourse generated as the research developed and a change in the way my co-researchers and 
I had decided to approach the topic of dialogic reflection. This will be further explained in the 
next chapter. 
4.3. The Purpose of Enquiry 
The exploration of the paradigm and methodology of the research has led me to a reflect on the 
purpose of this enquiry. The participatory paradigm takes the following philosophical positions, 
1. Reality is what our consciousness makes sense of through the processes of one’s mind 
2. Knowledge can be found in one’s experience of the world 
3. There is value in experience and participation in the enquiry about the world 
These statements indicate an appreciation of the subjective-objective perspective of reality, 
knowledge, and truth. This, however, contradicted Myrdal’s (1970) stance on social research, 
The ethos of social science is the search for “objective” truth. The faith of the student is 
his conviction that truth is wholesome and that illusions are damaging, especially 
opportunistic ones. He seeks “realism,” a term which in one of its meanings denotes an 
“objective” view of reality. (Myrdal 1970, p. 3) 
Myrdal (1970) believed researchers should liberate themselves from the influences from his or 
her own personality that is moulded by the individual’s background. 
This research on dialogic reflection, being in the participatory paradigm, was not about the 
search for an objective truth, but a subjective version of it. Hence in this vein, this research 
should not have expected my co-researchers or me to cast aside our individual “history, 
constitution, and inclinations” (Myrdal 1970, p. 4) for it would have rendered the experience a 
mere itinerary of actions we had taken in this research. Rather, all of us should make explicit our 
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backgrounds, prior preconceptions and knowledge and experiences and explore how they 
influence, contradict, and change each other through the enquiry. For dialogue to be 
democratic, the research should take prior experiences of all the co-researchers as relevant and 
they should be open minded to each other’s opinion and preconceptions of the topic (Gustavsen 
2001).  
Plato pointed out an interesting paradox of enquiry in his work, Meno. 
Man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not 
know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not 
know the very subject about which he is to enquire (Plato 402 BC, 80e) 
Enquiry is paradoxical in the sense that the thought that a problem exists presupposes some 
knowledge of the solution to it hence a method to solve the problem which is the enquiry 
process. Therefore, the problem does not exist in the first place since there is a method to a 
solution. Plato attributed this prior knowledge of a solution to the innate knowledge of the soul 
(Jowett 1949) while Polanyi (1966) presented a different answer to this paradox: tacit 
knowledge. He argued that 
Meno shows conclusively that if all knowledge is explicit, i.e. capable of being clearly 
stated, then we cannot know a problem or look for its solution. And the Meno also shows, 
therefore, that if problems nevertheless exist, and discoveries can be made by solving 
them, we can know things, and important things, that we cannot tell. (Polanyi 1966, p. 
22) 
Polanyi (1966) argued that enquiry is ultimately driven by the tacit knowledge that is so implicit 
that the researcher regards it as a discovery rather than uncovering what is already known but 
not explicit to the researcher. Hence, this suggested that this enquiry into dialogic reflection was 
a process of making explicit this tacit knowledge possessed by all the co-researchers and me. As 
tacit knowledge is built on experience, all the co-researchers of this research, at some point in 
their lives prior to the research have experienced and already generated some tacit knowledge 
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about dialogic reflection. Hence this research method should be reflective so as to elicit this tacit 
knowledge. 
The presence of preconceptions in the enquiry is appreciated widely even beyond social 
sciences, in fact, many would argue that preconceptions are the initial drive for scientific 
enquiry. Oppenheimer (1958) argued that scientific enquiry is the correction of preconception  
Science starts with preconception, with the common culture, and with common sense. It 
moves on to observation, is marked by the discovery of paradox, and is then concerned 
with the correction of preconception. (Oppenheimer 1958, p. 67) 
Preconceptions have an important place because of its role in the formulation a hypothesis 
(Ayala 2009). Popper (1987) furthered this argument by noting that objectivity is impossible for 
human beings. 
Therefore, for this research, preconceptions, prior experiences and knowledge, explicit or 
implicit, were not anathema to the theory generation like Myrdal (1970) suggested. In fact, in 
consideration of the participatory paradigm, it should be embraced because it only adds to the 
richness of the theory generated. The methodology of this research should, therefore, allow 
these preconceptions to be shared and challenged and tacit knowledge to be made explicit. In 
other words, this research should encourage my co-researchers and me to be open and 
reflective. It was important that while I was a researcher, I was also a participant in this research 
and thus I had to be mindful of my own participation. In addition, I also had to share my own 
preconceptions, prior experiences, and knowledge with my other co-researchers to 
collaboratively develop our understanding of dialogic reflection. 
4.4. Conclusion 
This research was conducted to understand the suitability of dialogic reflection for occupational 
therapy students in their professional development. After considering the epistemology, 
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ontology and axiology of dialogic reflection, the participatory paradigm appeared to most 
suitable for this research. In appreciation of the nature of the participatory paradigm and my 
position in this research, it became apparent that the initial objectives as stated at the start of 
this chapter required some rewording, particularly the first objective. The objectives of the 
research should reflect the fact that, I was part of the process of experiencing dialogic reflection 
and creating an understanding about it, along with the occupational therapy students involved. 
The research question remained the same as before: 
How suitable is collaborative (or dialogic) reflection for occupational therapy students in their 
professional development? 
The objectives of the study were reworded as: 
1. To understand the experience of engaging in collaborative (or dialogic) reflection 
from my perspective and that of student occupational therapists. 
2. To explore the potential of its use in occupational therapy education for professional 
development. 
3. To attempt to develop a model for the use of collaborative (or dialogic) reflection in 
occupational therapy education. 
When conducting this research, I was acutely aware that while I was a researcher, I was also a 
participant. Shifting between these roles were at times a difficulty and this is elaborated upon 
in the later chapters as part of the findings of this research. Nonetheless, as the participatory 
paradigm and the purpose of this enquiry suggested, it was inherently crucial that I was a 
participant in this research, as much as I was a researcher. Conversely, the occupational therapy 
students in this research were also treated as co-researchers, as well as participants. The dual 
roles that all of us had played was a key argument in situating this research in the participatory 
paradigm. 
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As my co-researchers also had a say in how we went about researching dialogic reflection, the 
methodology shifted as they research progressed. Even though we had started off with a Co-
operative Inquiry, the methodology quickly became more like an Action Inquiry. This was not a 
conscious decision because it was a result of responding to the progress of the research and 
deciding on what we all felt important and worth further discussion. This is further elaborated 
in the next chapter about the research process. 
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Chapter 5. Conducting the Research 
I started this research by first reading up on the topic of dialogic reflection, initially to formulate 
a theory about dialogic reflection based on available literature around this topic. However, 
instead of formulating a theory, I became more perplexed by dialogic reflection and how it 
worked. My initial confusion about dialogic reflection was then further explored through deep 
reflective discussions with fourteen students from the Post-Graduate Diploma (PGDip) 
Occupational Therapy course.  
When I first started with the literature review, I wanted to conduct a structured search for the 
literature hence I used a method called Critical Interpretive Synthesis (Dixon-Woods et al. 2006). 
Even though I had first thought this method would be suitable for my literature review, I quickly 
realised that this was not so for various reasons relating to the nature of the topic of this 
research. Thus, I changed my literature search method to something that was more reflective in 
nature, which I saw as a better fit for this research. The literature review method can be found 
in Appendix A. 
Action research was the data collection method for this research. Prior to collecting data, I had 
spent some time observing the way lecturers facilitated PBL groups with the PGDip occupational 
therapy students. I eventually recruited fourteen students to participate in my research as co-
researchers. 
I set up two research groups made up of seven students and me in each group and these two 
groups ran concurrently. Over a span of one year and one month, there were a total of fifteen 
sessions – seven sessions per group and a concluding session. Each session lasted between one 
hour to one and a half hours. After each session, I transcribed the recordings and thematically 
analysed the transcripts before sending the coded transcripts to the other co-researchers prior 
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to the next session. These analyses became topics for further discussions in the next session. 
These discussions also allowed the research groups to co-operatively analyse their discussions 
from the previous sessions. 
Even though we had started this research with Co-operative Inquiry as the methodology, in both 
groups, I saw that it transitioned into an Action Inquiry mid-way through the research. This then 
later eventually became discussion sessions that were deeply reflective and less structured, 
moving away from Action Inquiry and towards a dialogic reflection.  
This chapter documents the research process as it happened, the successes we had and the 
challenges that we faced. 
5.1. Action Research 
I conducted the Co-operative Inquiry using action research as the method of choice.  
Action research is a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing 
practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a 
participatory worldview which we believe is emerging at this historical moment. It seeks 
to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, 
in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people, and more 
generally the flourishing of individual persons and their communities. (Reason and 
Bradbury 2001a, p. 1) 
Action research embraces the idea that knowledge is socially constructed and recognises that 
all research is conducted within a system of values and encourages some form of human 
interaction. This is the antithesis to the positivistic stance that the rigour and quality of 
knowledge generation can only be demonstrated by research that is objective, empirical and 
value-free (Brydon-Miller et al. 2003).  
There is no single right way of conducting an action research study and the diversity of action 
research allows for a myriad of methods in which it can be used in inquiry (Reason and Bradbury 
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2001b). Nonetheless, first, second and third person research, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, are three broad ways of conducting an action research (Reason and Torbert 2001; 
Torbert 2001).  
The most rigorous of action research engages all three forms and this was something I had 
strived to achieve. My personal reflections as a researcher, learner, participant and as a human 
is an important part of this research, and so are my co-researchers’ reflections. We explored 
dialogic reflection as a topic of mutual interest and concern on how it is part of our everyday 
lives as professionals and as any other social roles we play. This research is then shared with the 
wider community, through publications and the writing of this thesis, not only to convey our 
contribution to new knowledge but also to encourage the use of dialogic reflections in education 
and our everyday lives. The primary purpose of action research is to produce practical 
knowledge that can be used in everyday lives while the wider purpose is to share this knowledge 
with the wider community to improve the well-being of others or what Reason and Bradbury 
(2001a) referred to as human flourishing.  
Action research, as a form of Co-operative Inquiry, was initially used as the method for data 
gathering. It is more than about achieving change and the generation of new knowledge 
(Williamson et al. 2012); it is research in action, bringing together co-researchers who share the 
similar curiosity for the same concept (Coghlan and Brannick 2010). I sought to find co-
researchers who were similarly interested in understanding dialogic reflection. However, I was 
also aware of the difficulty of the organising of an action research with occupational therapy 
students who would potentially be going on placements and would treat their commitments to 
their course-related work as a priority.  
When I considered researching this topic with occupational therapy students, I was concerned 
about having to fit the research meetings around their curriculum. Hence, it was more feasible 
if the co-researchers were from the same course and cohort. I was aware that students on the 
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undergraduate course would have rather long summer, Easter and Christmas breaks which 
would encourage students to return home. This would have been a logistical strain as it also 
meant that the research meetings would have been sparse and irregular. Hence a post-graduate 
cohort was ideal since they do not have long breaks in the accelerated two-year curriculum. 
I used a purposive sample of the first year post-graduate pre-qualification occupational therapy 
accelerated diploma course cohort as the students would have completed two placement stints, 
where they would have developed their own understanding of reflective practice before the 
research started. During the research, the students were in the university for their modules for 
nine months before leaving again for a three-month long placement. The nine months when the 
cohort was in the university was the perfect window for me to fit the research in their 
curriculum. Additionally, the three-month period where they were on placement was a good 
breather for the students to assimilate what they had theorised about dialogic reflection and 
apply it in their practice. Upon returning to the university for a few weeks, they were soon off 
for their elective module where they were away from the university. Fortunately, I was able to 
conduct a final concluding session before they left for their elective modules. After returning 
from their elective module, the students completed their PGDip course. 
I had previously worked very closely with the programme manager of the PGDip course who had 
a great interest in reflective practice. She was aware of the research that I had intended to 
conduct and was very supportive of me getting in contact with her students for the research. In 
addition, she was happy for me to sit in on some of their PBL sessions to observe how the 
lecturers had facilitated the PBL groups.  
5.1.1. Observing the PBL Sessions  
My initial contact with the PGDip occupational therapy students was when I observed the 
facilitation of their PBL sessions. At that point, I was aware that I will potentially be facilitating 
dialogic reflections in the action research hence, I was interested in learning how lecturers 
73 
 
managed these group dialogues, particularly the way they asked questions to trigger deeper and 
wider thinking.  
At these PBL sessions, I purposely made myself as inconspicuous as possible, sitting in the corner 
away from the group. I wanted to be an observer in these sessions as I was very mindful of my 
aim which was to observe the natural interactions between the students and lecturer. However, 
this intent was met with deep curiosity from the students.  
The students were interested in this stranger who was observing their sessions and quite openly 
questioned me on my purpose for being in their sessions. After some introduction, they became 
quite interested in my topic of research and discussed their frustrations about reflection rather 
openly. They seemed quite comfortable with my presence in their groups and it was interesting 
that they had not treated me as an outsider; rather, they treated me as an insider from outside 
their cohort. This was perhaps because of the way I had introduced myself to them; I had 
described myself as an ex-occupational therapy student. Unconsciously, in doing that, I had 
come across more as a senior student than a researcher who was there to study their PBL 
sessions. As much as I initially wanted to be an observer, I was quite warmly welcomed by the 
cohort as a senior student and an acquaintance.  
5.1.2. Getting Them Interested in the Research 
After receiving ethical approval from the university, an email attached with a cover letter 
(Appendix B), information sheet (Appendix C) and consent form (Appendix D) was later sent out 
to the entire cohort occupational therapy student through the programme manager. With her 
help, I had also placed an announcement on their curriculum information portal to inform them 
of my recruitment and an information session about the research which I was hosting. All 
students of the cohort were invited to hear more about the research and to ask any question 
about the research. 
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There were twenty-one students in the targeted PGDip cohort. I had considered that I needed a 
minimum of five students for one research group and a maximum of fourteen students for two 
research groups as Harrison-Paul and Coley’s (2015) research had suggested. The research 
conducted by Harrison-Paul and Coley (2015) explored forming interdisciplinary reflective 
practice groups. They had formed groups of eight to twelve practitioners however a concluding 
survey they had conducted at the end suggested that smaller groups of five to seven would be 
ideal (Harrison-Paul and Coley 2015). As the research groups would be running concurrently, it 
would not have been practical to have more than two groups. I had arranged for the information 
session to be held after their lecture and before lunch to make it as convenient as possible for 
them. Sixteen students attended my information session.  
During the information session, students started getting very excited about talking about 
reflection. This was mostly fuelled by their displeasure about having to write their reflections for 
their educators on the placement that they had just recently done. At this point, the information 
session developed into a discussion about reflection which I ended by telling them to “hold that 
thought” and to revisit the ideas when the research commenced.  
All sixteen students expressed their interest in the study and signed the consent form at the end 
of the information session, however, fourteen students participated as co-researchers while two 
students had pulled out from the research before it began. At the information session, these 
students had requested to be randomly selected as they were familiar with each other and 
comfortable with reflecting in the presence of each other. Two groups of eight co-researchers 
were formed (seven students plus me in each group). Appendix E shows some additional 
demographic information about these co-researchers. Not all the co-researchers were able to 
attend all meetings; while most meetings had full attendance, there was one meeting with only 
five co-researchers present including myself but we decided to carry on with the meeting as it 
was still within the recommended group size as Harrison-Paul and Coley (2015) had suggested. 
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It was relieving not only because I managed to recruit co-researchers for my action research, but 
also because I found people that were interested in understanding dialogic reflection. From my 
experience, talking about reflection was often met with disdain because it reminded some 
people of having to talk about their feelings and thoughts almost in a psychotherapeutic way. In 
some cases, reflection was referred to demeaningly as “navel-gazing” (Finlay 2002, p. 215) or 
“the R-word” (Russell 2005, p. 202). While the discussion during the information session with 
the students was fuelled by frustration and disenchantment, the fact that the students were 
interested in the research showed a desire for change and improvement in the use of reflection 
in the curriculum.  
The research commenced two months later after the students had returned from their 
placement. The two research groups met seven times each over nine months. Each session 
lasted between an hour to one and a half hour and was audio recorded. I transcribed and 
analysed the recordings of each session before sending them back to the other co-researchers 
for member-checking. This was done for triangulation purposes, ensuring that the transcripts 
were credible and accurate hence contributing to the trustworthiness of this research (Lincoln 
and Guba 1985). These analyses then formed the discussion points for the next session and co-
researchers were invited to challenge and debate over the analysis. The cohort then left for their 
three-month placement stint. When they returned, both research groups then convened for a 
concluding session. 
5.2. Conducting the Research 
The figure below illustrates the basic structure of the action research cycle which this research 
was based upon. 
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Figure 2. Action research spiral framework (Lewin 1946) 
With reference to the above figure,  
1. The planning stage was where the co-researchers and I explored dialogic reflection 
relating to our understanding of it at that point and our prior experience. Knowledge of 
the subject was deconstructed at this point to examine areas that require further 
exploration. A plan was the collectively generated to further understand areas of 
interest within the theory (Reason and Bradbury 2006). 
2. The groups chose to develop our understanding through the participation in dialogic 
reflective sessions and discussions about the topic. The absence of a hard and fast rule 
to action research offered a large amount of flexibility in this action phase (Williamson 
et al. 2012).  
3. The dialogic reflection was then evaluated collectively, problems and opportunities that 
arose during the action stage were highlighted and examined (Reason and Bradbury 
2006) 
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4. The reflective phase enabled my co-researchers and I to analyse and question our initial 
assumptions of the dialogic reflection (Reason and Bradbury 2006; Williamson et al. 
2012). Prior knowledge was reconstructed by the group, informed by our experience. 
The groups then returned to stage one with a new understanding of dialogic reflection, 
this time exploring a different aspect of the same subject or taking a different approach 
to developing our knowledge. This phase added to the trustworthiness of the action 
research as the co-researchers analyse their own participation in the research hence 
making the analyses a more accurate reflection of their own experiences. This phase 
also compels my co-researchers and I to acknowledge and challenge our own positions 
in the research hence contributing to a high degree of reflexivity. 
These phases guided the research and the amount of time dedicated to each phase was 
dependent on the groups’ decision. In the first four sessions of each group, dialogic reflective 
sessions were carried out at the end of every meeting and these were evaluated and reflected 
upon at the start of the next meeting. Very quickly, a theory about dialogic reflection was 
developed and in the remainder three sessions, more time was dedicated to understanding the 
value of it and ways of implementing it in curriculum. The groups felt that discussions and 
reflections on our prior experiences of dialogic reflections were the best way to develop our 
knowledge in these areas. At the last sessions of the research, the groups returned to the initial 
theory and restructured it as we understood the value of dialogic reflection better and 
practicality of implementing it in the curriculum. 
As the initiator of this research, I took the responsibility of arranging the meetings, booked the 
venue, and provided light refreshments. The meetings were all audio recorded on two 
dictaphones for back up and cross checking of transcripts. My own reflective logs which I had 
written after the sessions were also used as data to inform not only the analysis but also the 
methodology of the research. I acknowledge my thoughts and feelings about the research as it 
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progressed, and these reflective logs were shared with my supervisors who I also reflect 
regularly with. By reflecting explicitly with others, I could keep track of how my thoughts had 
morphed throughout the research and how they had influenced this research, contributing to 
the reflexivity in this study. Private forums were set up for each group prior to the research 
however they were not used by the co-researchers, except for the organisation of the first 
session. Nonetheless, the forums were left available for the co-researchers as an option for 
communication, before, during and after the research. My co-researchers had preferred to use 
their emails for communications. They were also invited to submit any reflective logs as data on 
their own volition, however, none was submitted. This was done with the intention of adding to 
the trustworthiness of the research. Even though I did not receive any reflections from my co-
researchers this was also left as an avenue for communication throughout the research.   
Fourteen group sessions and one combined concluding session were conducted. Each session 
lasted between an hour and an hour and forty-five minutes. The entire data gathering period 
spanned over a year and one month. 
5.2.1. Overview of Research Process 
In general, each group met separately to discuss dialogic reflection and to reflect dialogically on 
specific topics. After each session, I transcribed the audio recordings, conducted some 
preliminary analysis and then sent it back to the respective group members to member check. 
The preliminary analyses were analyses that were developed from the process of thematic 
analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006). After transcribing the recordings, I coded the transcripts for 
emerging ideas. These ideas from both groups were then iteratively mapped into thematic maps 
after every 3 sessions. Please refer to Appendix F for thematic map for session 1, Appendix G for 
thematic map for session 4, Appendix H for thematic map for session 7 and Appendix I for the 
final thematic map. In the next session, we discussed these preliminary analyses and group 
members had the opportunity to offer their own analysis of the previous session. This led to 
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more topics of interest generated which were recorded, transcribed and analysed, ready for the 
next session for further discussion. 
Even though each research group ran simultaneously, the discussion topics were largely similar 
mostly since new ideas that emerged from one group were brought to the other group for 
further discussion as well. My co-researchers were happy for me do so and anonymity was 
maintained. This was done for investigator triangulation purposes (Guion 2002), to check that 
co-researchers from another group agreed with the analysis. The following table summarises 
the main topics of discussions in both research groups and shows the changes in the 
development of methodology throughout the research. It also shows how the research groups 
have cycled through the four forms of knowing as discussed in the previous chapter. 
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Table 2. Overview of action research 
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Both groups started the research by first setting some group rules which was encouraged by 
Heron (1999). With reference to Table 2, session one was dedicated to establishing what we 
already knew about reflection and dialogic reflection. Both groups started with our fundamental 
understanding of reflection and dialogic reflection. This was also where I had shared what I knew 
about dialogic reflection from my own literature review. I observed that this session 
predominantly featured propositional knowledge as we shared our own understanding on the 
theories and ideas about dialogic reflection. Towards the end of session one, we transitioned to 
developing practical knowledge by discussing how we should conduct dialogic reflection.  
In session two, both groups started a dialogic reflection around the topic of dealing with difficult 
educators. In this session, the groups were engaging in generating experiential knowledge, 
knowledge that is featured in the act of engaging in an activity together. The groups then 
engaged a discussion about their experience of dialogic reflection in that session, trying to make 
sense of it. The groups at this point were generating presentational knowledge. The groups also 
revisited propositional knowledge that was discussed in session one to further build and modify 
our initial understanding of dialogic reflection. 
In session three, the groups continued with some discussions about the presentational 
knowledge as established in session two and propositional knowledge in session one. Dialogic 
reflection as an instinct and natural interaction was of great interest to both research groups 
thus far. This discussion then led both groups to the idea of values and morality and how they 
play a part in dialogic reflection. This became something that the groups were interested in 
exploring further (propositional knowledge). At this point the groups also returned to our 
practical knowledge about how to dialogically reflect and did not find any issue with how we 
had dialogically reflected in session two. We thus affirmed our understanding on how to conduct 
dialogic reflection. We then reflected dialogically on ethical issues they have experienced 
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(experiential knowledge) as we wanted to expand our propositional knowledge on dialogic 
reflections and morality.  
In session four, both groups started to conceptualise their experiences of dialogic reflection in 
this research (presentational knowledge). The idea of worldmaking (Goodman 1978) was 
introduced to the group and adapting that philosophy, the groups then proceeded to theorise 
their experience and coined the process as group worldmaking. Both groups then probed at 
different aspects of group world making to develop this idea further. The topic of trust and 
vulnerability was of great interest to both groups. Both groups also revisited their propositional 
knowledge to discuss the purpose of reflections. Up till session four, there were rather distinct 
phases of propositional, presentation, practical and experiential knowledge and it was clear that 
the groups both kept closely to Co-operative Inquiry as a methodology. 
However, these phases of knowledge cycling were less distinct in session five. The groups started 
moving back and forth between presentational and propositional knowing, and between 
experiential and practical knowing quite naturally in the discussions. However, it was clear that 
the groups were reflecting on their experiences of dialogic reflection previously and considering 
how dialogic reflection can be put into action in their curriculum. There were two distinct phases 
instead in this session, reflective enquiry and action. Therefore, the methodology of the research 
developed into Action Inquiry. This switch in methodology was unconscious and unintentional, 
both groups did not note this change explicitly. However, in hindsight, I attributed this change 
due to the change in discourse generated in the research. 
In session four, the groups theorised group world making which largely answered the theoretical 
objective of this research: to understand the experience of engaging in dialogic reflection. To 
this end, research groups were satisfied with the theoretical discourse that had been generated 
in the research then and were focusing on the next two objectives of the research which were 
exploring the potential of dialogic reflection and proposing a model for its implementation in 
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the curriculum respectively. Exploring the second and third objectives had apparently required 
a change in the methodology of the research towards one which was more fluid and organic and 
true to the nature of dialogue, resembling an Action Inquiry. The groups were less concerned 
about approaching the enquiry systematically as we had done in session one to three, rather we 
preferred a structure which was more dialogic and natural, in other words, resembling more like 
a dialogic reflection according to our theory. Action Inquiry was seen as a transitional 
methodology as the research developed from a Co-operative Inquiry, with clear cycling of 
knowledge, to a dialogic reflection, which is natural and dynamic. Dialogic reflection as an 
approach to enquiry is further discussed in the findings of this research. 
In session six and seven, both groups had tried to contextualise dialogic reflection in 
occupational therapy to understand its potential and come up with a way to implement dialogic 
reflection in the curriculum. However, both groups had little success to these ends. While in 
session six, groups had come up with some ideas on how it could be implemented, these ideas 
were challenged in session seven in both groups. In session seven both groups were quite 
troubled because the ideas they had generated previously did not seem feasible for 
implementation after deeper consideration.  
Since session two when both research groups conducted a dialogic reflection on dealing with 
difficult educators, the contextual discourse about the potential of dialogic reflection had been 
considered. The groups had tried to understand how engaging in dialogic reflection in this 
research had changed their occupational therapy practice but had found limited progress in this 
area. I tried to frame this discussion using professional development frameworks however the 
groups had pointed out that the developments they had experienced were in transferable soft 
skills such as communication, they had experienced little development in their own practice of 
reflection outside the research. These aspects of professional development appeared to be 
more related to personal development. From a Co-operative Inquiry to an Action Inquiry, the 
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research eventually ended up as a meta-dialogic reflection – the understanding of dialogic 
reflection through dialogue and reflection amongst the co-researchers and me. 
This difficulty in exploring the potential of dialogic reflection and the ways of implementing it 
was caused by framing dialogic reflection in something that it was not meant to fit, i.e. education 
and curriculum. In the earlier sessions both groups had concluded that dialogic reflection is a 
natural process. Reflection is a part of life that had its place outside professional occupational 
therapy and in one’s personal life. By contextualising dialogic reflection in occupational therapy 
education and exploring how it can be part of the curriculum was making it esoteric and a skill 
that occupational therapy students should be using. This was contradictory to what the 
theoretical discourse was. In some sense, this was similar to the phenomena that Fish (2012) 
had observed with her model of reflection as described in Chapter Seven. I realised that we were 
trying to force dialogic reflection into becoming a tool that can be used in the curriculum and in 
occupational therapy practice and in doing so, we made it reductive. The theoretical discourse 
that both groups had generated was that dialogic reflection is a form natural interaction with 
one’s environment. By contextualising and implementing it in occupational therapy education, 
we were trying to make dialogic reflection deliberate and unnatural, hence meeting many 
impediments such as module design, reticence and trust issues. These will be further discussed 
in the findings. 
I was initially feeling rather defeated after session seven as it became quite apparent that 
dialogic reflection was something rather tricky to implement in the curriculum, if not impossible. 
However, after seeing the fundamental conflict in the theoretical discourse and other research 
objectives we tried to achieve, I realised that we had to change the way we had perceived 
dialogic reflection and explored the idea of dialogic reflection as something natural and a form 
of organic interaction between one and one’s world. When I presented this to the groups in the 
final concluding session, we agreed that we had indeed been limited by the research objectives 
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and hence found ourselves in a position where we were constantly arguing against our own 
suggestions in session six and seven. There was in incongruence between our beliefs about 
dialogic reflection and what we wanted to achieve initially through the research. Coming to 
terms with the dissonance in our enquiry, I had decided to delineate dialogic reflection as two 
forms: extrospection and introspection, one of which we had deemed possible to implement in 
the curriculum. We had refused to compromise on our theory of dialogic reflection by suggesting 
recommendations that we found contradictory to our theory. These recommendations will be 
discussed later in the thesis. 
5.3. Analysis 
In this research, analysis was two-fold: I first attempted some thematic analysis before bringing 
ideas to the groups for co-operative analysis in the next session. I had initially tried to 
thematically analyse as Braun and Clarke (2006) had recommended but realised that there were 
issues with getting my co-researchers to participate in developing the analyses. Instead, I saw 
thematic analysis as a launch pad for co-operative analysis to occur in the action research. 
5.3.1. Action Research as A Self-Analysing Method   
Participation in Co-operative Inquiry is as important as participation in co-operative analysis of 
the enquiry itself. Co-researchers enquire about a topic through experiencing and understanding 
that experience, hence the analysis of experience is an important component of the enquiry 
process (Reason and Heron 1995; Heron 1996).  
According to Heron (1996), co-researchers are fully immersed in the experience and engaged 
with the enquiry as co-subjects. Whilst in the process of understanding their experience, co-
researchers look at their experiences with a fresh mind. This shared experience is understood 
deeper such that their initial understanding is expanded upon or rejected. The research group 
may be led away from their proposed ideas and decide to explore new areas or they may lose 
awareness of the development of the inquiry. It is this process of understanding experience and 
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the developments of the enquiry that drives the development of experiential knowing (Reason 
and Heron 1995). The original propositions and questions are reconsidered in light of the new 
experience. In this consideration the co-researchers decide to change, further elaborate on 
them, rejected them and suggest new questions or areas of focus for the next cycle of action 
research. The groups may even decide to take a different form of action in the next cycle or 
different ways of gathering data, in response to their new experience of it and the new questions 
the inquiry serves to answer. Presentational knowing here bridges the action and evaluation 
phase (Reason and Heron 1995). Reason and Heron (1995) proposed that this analysis is the 
reflection aspect of the enquiry as it oscillates between action, as in the planning and action 
stages, and reflection, as in the evaluation and reflection stages.  
Participation in actions and participation in reflections on these actions are of equal importance 
for an enquiry in the participatory paradigm (Heron and Reason 1997). In my research, I had to 
initiate the reflection on the actions before the co-researchers felt comfortable to contribute to 
it. Co-researchers then raised or reframed points that I had raised as topics of analysis from the 
action and these are then debated and developed in our discussions. I discuss co-operative 
analysis in more detail in the findings where describe dialogic reflection as an approach to 
enquiry. To initiate reflection, I had to first conduct thematic analysis to elicit some points raised 
in the previous sessions for the groups to reflect upon. Co-operative analysis in this action 
research was a key contributor to the trustworthiness and reflexivity of the findings. While it is 
a form of investigator triangulation where my co-researchers and I confirmed and challenged 
the analysis, it pushed all of us to be explicit with our reflections by doing so at the sessions. We 
all contributed to the reflexivity of this research by evaluating our position in relation to the 
topic and by discussing our feelings and thoughts about the analysis. 
5.3.2. Initiating the Reflection Using Thematic Analysis 
To initiate a reflection, one is required to first recount the experience as illustrated in many 
models of reflection (Gibbs 1988; Driscoll 1994). The action phases in the research meeting were 
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often left to the last thirty minutes or and the next time we met was about a month later. 
Therefore, there was a need for me to provide a descriptive account of the ideas and action 
taken in the previous meeting. This required me to summarise and collate the ideas that have 
been discussed in the session before. This was done through the qualitative research analysis 
method – thematic analysis. 
Action research is still developing and finding ground as a research method. While there have 
been many uses of action research published, there is a remarkable lack of information on how 
researchers had treated their data. How one goes about analysing data is not commonly dealt 
with even in the examples of action research that Heron and Reason (1997) had cited in their 
publication (Traylen 1994; Treleaven 1994; Whitmore 1994). This is perhaps since enquiry in 
action research is an iterative process of action and reflection. Hence in the reflection phase, 
research data is jointly analysed by the co-researchers. Action research, in other words, is a self-
analysing method of research and there is little need for an additional step of analysis because 
reflection phase is part of the process. 
My co-researchers who, despite having an interest in dialogic reflection, saw this research as 
additional to their course. I, on the other hand, saw this research as my PhD study. It was far 
more important to me than it was to my co-researchers who also had assignments and 
commitments to their course. Due to this, as the initiator of the research, I felt responsible for 
conducting an initial analysis of the transcript such that the ideas distilled from it became the 
discussion in the next session, thereby initiating the reflection phase of the research. Despite 
that, I was very mindful of using a method of analysis that was too constricting as the aim of this 
initial analysis was to provide a launch pad for co-operative analysis and not the sole definitive 
analysis of the action phases. Hence, I had turned to thematic analysis, the foundational method 
for qualitative analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006). 
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Thematic analysis is a basic form of qualitative analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006). Thematising 
meanings are considered one of the generic skill that is required in all qualitative analysis 
(Holloway and Todres 2003). Thematic analysis is independent of epistemology and theory and 
hence is applicable to a wide range of qualitative analysis techniques (Braun and Clarke 2006). 
Due to this lack of epistemic grounding, it is arguable if this method of analysis can be considered 
as an approach to understanding qualitative data (Boyatzis 1998; Ryan and Bernard 2000) or if 
should be treated as a tool for other major analysis traditions (Braun and Clarke 2006). However, 
it was because of this flexibility and lack of an epistemic grounding that made thematic analysis 
suitable for this research. 
There are many versions of thematic analysis (Attride-Stirling 2001; Joffe and Yardley 2004; 
Tuckett 2005; Braun and Clarke 2006). I had started with thematic analysis using the method as 
articulated by Braun and Clarke (2006) however I quickly ran into some difficulties with coding 
and over analysing the transcripts, compromising the co-operative nature of the research which 
also affected the trustworthiness and reflexivity.  
I had coded the transcripts of the first sessions of both research groups, however, it generated 
a total of two hundred and sixty-four unique codes and some of these codes were questions 
rather than representations of the data. Whilst rereading my analysis, I was confused as some 
codes were too short to highlight the subtleties that were in the data and hence they were a 
poor representation of the data. As this analysis was meant to be read by my co-researchers, I 
was concerned whether they could follow my train of thoughts that led to the development of 
these ideas in my analysis. Additionally, I was concerned about having analysed the transcripts 
too much by tagging the data with representational codes such that they might appear to my 
co-researchers as a definitive analysis rather than a suggestion of an idea that might be worth 
some discussion. At this point, I felt that coding of the transcripts perhaps detrimental to the co-
operative nature of this research. As there was little emergence of any pattern or trend since all 
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the codes were unique on their own and I was having trouble keeping track of my own train of 
thoughts that led to the codes, I was concerned that my co-researchers would have difficulty 
understanding the analysis and that they may treat my analysis as definitive rather than 
suggestive. This was of the greatest concern as it may limit the degree of co-operation in 
research. I wanted the research to stay true to the participatory paradigm. An action research 
where the co-researchers jointly take part in the action but not in the reflection would alter the 
meaning of dialogic reflection that emerged as reflected in Glazer et al.’s (2004) research. Hence, 
I had decided not to code the transcripts using codes, instead, I had inserted my comments next 
to the respective quotes which were truer to my thought process. I had left most of these 
comments as questions so as so encourage co-researchers to think about them or respond to 
them in the next session.  
After analysing both sets of transcripts for each session of both groups, I wrote a reflective 
summary of my analysis which was a combination of my reflections on the sessions and 
methodological considerations and a summary of ideas raised by both groups. This reflective 
summary then served as an aide-mémoire for the next session and presented to both groups as 
topics to reflect upon. I was mindful to be reflexive, hence I held back my own analysis and 
reflections when member-checking and only brought them to the session for further discussion 
with my co-researchers. An example of such analysis can be found in Chapter Eight. 
5.4. Analysing and Concluding the Research 
Whilst doing the initial analysis of the sessions, I had iteratively mapped the themes to keep 
track of the development of the research according to the objectives we had set out to achieve 
in this action research. As the research progressed, the theory of dialogic reflection was refined 
and reorganised in response to the discussions. These developments will be further discussed in 
the next part of the thesis. 
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To map these themes, I had returned to phases of thematic analysis. Even though I had 
difficulties with the coding phase, themes had emerged from the action research nonetheless. 
Unlike Braun and Clarke’s (2006) or Attride-Stirling’s (2001) articulation, these themes did not 
emerge from codes, rather they manifested as discussion topics. Therefore, despite the 
deviation from coding phases in the thematic analysis, it was nonetheless still suitable for the 
research. The use of the thematic analysis remained the same as before, not to produce a 
definitive analysis of the data but to provide suggestions for discussion. Especially so in the 
concluding session at the end of the research, this thematic analysis was used to organise the 
themes such that I could provide a logical and coherent concept to conclude the research. 
With this in mind, I had utilised the steps to thematic mapping (Braun and Clarke 2006) or 
thematic network analysis as Attride-Stirling (2001) had termed it. While the steps to forming 
the thematic maps are similar in both, Attride-Stirling’s (2001) method of thematic network 
analysis appears more useful as an organisational method as it is based on Toulmin’s (1958) 
argumentation theory. Argumentation theory (Toulmin 1958) is a structured method of forming 
arguments. Data which consists of evidence is used as support for a claim. These claims then 
form a central argument (Toulmin 1958). Using this organisational structure, thematic network 
analysis requires the analyst to build themes which are premises that are supported by data 
(Attride-Stirling 2001). These basic themes are then reorganised in clusters that describe the 
same issues and are represented by an organising theme. These organising themes are then 
described by a representational global theme (Attride-Stirling 2001).  
However, as much as I have tried to use thematic analysis as an organisational structure there 
were situations where I had found myself emerging with an in-depth analysis of the transcripts. 
These in-depth analyses were omitted from the transcript analysis sent to the co-researchers 
but included in the aide-mémoire as a topic for discussion. These in-depth analyses were 
inevitable as themes emerging 
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can be misinterpreted to mean that themes ‘reside’ in the data, and if we look hard 
enough they will ‘emerge’ like Venus on the half shell. If themes ‘reside’ anywhere, they 
reside in our heads from our thinking about our data and creating links as we understand 
them. (Ely et al. 1997, pp. 205–206) 
While I had tried to allow as much of the analysis to emerge through co-operation in the 
reflective phases, I had already engaged in the analysis of the action phases on my own by 
organising the themes and creating links through my understanding of them. In the concluding 
session, I presented to the co-researchers my organisation of the analysis of the research and 
hence, to a small extent my own analysis as well. To limit the impact of this, I had presented my 
analysis on the theory as discussion topics instead for the co-researchers to debate on as I had 
arrived at them on my own and not through co-operative analysis or reflection. 
At the end of seven sessions with each group, the action research came to an end. This was 
because the students were about to go on a three-month long placement and would quickly be 
off on their elective module before they completed their course. An important logistical 
consideration in this research was working around the co-researchers’ curriculum schedule. 
Therefore, it was inappropriate to organise any meetings whilst they were on placement. 
However, both research groups were happy to have a final concluding session together after 
they had returned from their placement and before they left for their elective module. I took on 
the responsibility of reorganising all the themes that had emerged from this research into a 
coherent concept in preparation for this concluding session where all the co-researchers could 
further debate and discuss. 
5.5. Use of Pseudonyms 
The use of pseudonyms in the communication of the research is a common way to ensure 
confidentiality (Silverman 2010). However, when writing this thesis, this was something that 
troubled me. I experienced a certain discomfort and reticence in sharing quotes that were very 
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heartfelt, reflective, and sometimes emotional. Due to this, I was initially reluctant to use 
pseudonyms and used “co-researcher from group one” or “co-researcher from group two” 
because it gave me some distance from them in my writing. Upon some reflection later, I saw 
the hypocrisy in my actions. If I were to argue that dialogic reflectors are individual knowers and 
enquirers, then I should not have treated their contributions as part of a collective, i.e. group 
one or group two. I should have respected their individuality. More importantly, if I were to 
maintain that we were reflective, then I will have to convey this in my writing. By showing our 
reflections, I cannot merely treat my co-researcher’s contributions as a quote from a “co-
researcher from group one”. I am compelled to humanise my co-researchers by giving them 
pseudonyms and through sharing their reflections, convey the deep thinking and emotional 
exploration that had occurred. As an action researcher working within the participatory 
paradigm, I ought to embrace these reflections and not step away from them. This is especially 
crucial since my interest is in dialogic reflection. Hence, I eventually decided to use pseudonyms 
to share these reflections that I had captured during the research. 
5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter documents the process of research as I had conducted it. I first started with a 
literature review where I initially aimed to develop an initial theory about dialogic reflection 
through a structured literature review method. However, after realising that did not work for 
this research, my literature review became guided by on own reflections on what I had read and 
what I did not yet know about dialogic reflection. More information about the literature method 
can be found in Appendix A. 
I then further developed my understanding of dialogic reflection by conducting an action 
research with two groups of occupational therapy students. Even though we had some initial 
success with theorising dialogic reflection, we ran into some issues with trying to develop ways 
of implementing it in the curriculum. After reflecting on our earlier theory of dialogic reflection, 
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we had decided to stay true to our theory that we had developed and thus, we were able to 
move past that block. 
We started the research with Co-operative Inquiry as the methodology which then transitioned 
to an Action Inquiry and finally a dialogic reflection. Dialogic reflection as an approach to enquiry 
is further discussed in the findings later.  
This research was co-operative in a few ways:  
• I was a participant in this research as much as I was a researcher 
• My co-researchers were also involved in methodological considerations of this research 
• We were all involved in analysis of our own experiences and discussions in the action 
research, adding to the reflexivity of this research 
This research was trustworthy in the following ways: 
• Transcripts and analyses of the data were confirmed by my co-researchers  
• My co-researchers and I analysed our own data and provided interpretations that are 
more accurate 
• Findings in this thesis are supported by direct quotes from my co-researchers and I 
• I gave pseudonyms to my co-researchers, but not myself, hence it is clear where each of 
our contributions to the theory lie. 
However, in writing this thesis, I admit that it was unco-operative of me to not have included 
my co-researchers. I agree with Lincoln (1997) that true collaboration would involve all co-
researchers at every stage of the research. Getting my co-researchers to write this thesis was 
neither practical nor appropriate. I expand on this in Appendix J. Nonetheless, I maintain that 
this research was as co-operative as where it was feasible, and I present the result of our 
collaboration in the next part of the thesis. I further expand my reflections on reflexivity of this 
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research in a manuscript that I am currently working on, about the need for researchers to 
embrace reflexivity holistically in Co-operative Inquiry.
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 Part Three: Dialogic Reflection as An 
Epistemology 
This part of the thesis contains the main discussion about dialogic reflection as an epistemology. 
It is a synthesis of the literature about reflection and dialogue combined with the findings of the 
research to present the four core arguments in support of dialogic reflection as an epistemology 
by its own right. 
Chapter Six shows an overview of the findings of this research. It also introduces the key 
principles of dialogic reflections, which will be further developed in the chapters to come. 
Chapter Seven further elaborates, and supports with research findings, the issues relating to the 
confusion about reflection and its use in the academic and professional settings.  
Chapter Eight argues for dialogic reflection as a way of knowing by discussing it as an approach 
to enquiry. It describes dialogic reflection as a collaborative enquiry into oneself through natural, 
yet highly analytical dialogue. 
Chapter Nine features dialogic reflectors - participants of a dialogic reflection - as a community 
of knowers. It adds further weight to the discussion on dialogic reflection as a way of knowing 
by focusing on the social and dialogic aspects of it. 
Chapter Ten argues that dialogic reflection is more than an intellectual analysis of experience 
and that it is also emotional and value-driven. In other words, dialogic reflection is an artistic 
way of knowing. 
Chapter Eleven summarises the four lines of argument as presented in chapters four to seven 
and discusses dialogic reflection as an epistemology by presenting the taxonomy of dialogic 
reflection.
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Chapter 6. Overview of Themes and 
Key Principles of Dialogic 
Reflection 
The following figure shows an overview of the themes that emerged from this research: 
 
Figure 3. Overview of themes 
With reference to the figure above, the overarching theme: dialogic reflection as an 
epistemology is supported by four major themes. 
1. The confusion in the field about the concept of reflection and dialogic reflection can be 
due to a clash in the way they are understood at the fundamental level. In this research, 
I posited that we understood these concepts from different epistemological 
orientations, hence we found different aspects of the reflective process as more 
important than others. This resulted in the confusing messages about reflection as sent 
by educators on placements and other practitioners and theorists. Therefore, to better 
understand dialogic reflection, my co-researchers and I conceptualised it at the 
epistemic level so that we could develop a theory about it and provide 
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recommendations for its application that are congruent and coherent. This will be 
covered in Chapter Seven. 
2. This research can be perceived as a meta-dialogic reflection where we developed a 
theory about dialogic reflection in a co-operative, dialogic and reflective manner. Hence, 
I argue that dialogic reflection is an approach to enquiry that is participatory, democratic 
and reflective. Principles of dialogic reflection will be elaborated upon later in this 
chapter and in Chapter Eight it is further explored as an approach to enquiry. 
3. Reflectors in a dialogic reflection are independent thinkers and bring to the group a 
unique combination of knowledge and experiences. In a dialogic reflection, these 
individuals create a protective environment where they can share their knowledge and 
experiences honestly. Such an environment allows for in-depth analysis and this will be 
described in Chapter Eight. It also allows for multiple perspectives of a singular 
experience to be shared. This is discussed in Chapter Nine. 
4. Dialogic reflection is a way of knowing from experience that is artistic. Experience is rich 
in emotions, intellect, values and action (Dewey 1934). Dialogic reflection embraces this 
aesthetic quality of experience and allows reflectors to understand the experience as 
whole, rather than its individual elements like some reflective models seem to 
encourage (Gibbs 1988). This is expanded upon in Chapter Ten. 
Chapter Eleven draws all the four themes together and presents dialogic reflection as an 
epistemology. In this chapter, I also formally define dialogic reflection in light of our findings and 
delineate dialogic reflection as two distinct forms: extrospection and introspection. 
6.1. Key Principles of Dialogic Reflection 
There are three key principles of dialogic reflection. These key principles appear in each of the 
four themes presented earlier in varying degrees. Like how reflection can be understood 
differently from a myriad of perspectives, dialogic reflection can similarly be conceived 
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disparately and this is evident from Glazer et al.’s (2004) and Tigelaar et al.’s (2008) concept 
which we did not agree with. Therefore, it is important that these key principles of dialogic 
reflection are laid before the discussion in the coming chapters so as to clarify the type of 
dialogic reflection this research is concerned with. In arguing that dialogic reflection can be an 
epistemology, we also believe that dialogic reflection is an approach to enquiry as well. Like Co-
operative Inquiry which is based on the principles of epistemic and democratic participation, 
dialogic reflection is also based on its own principles presented below. 
Dialogic reflection, as an epistemology, is based on three principles: mediating theory and 
practice, democratic dialogue and reflection. These principles were drawn from Co-operative 
Inquiry, Action Inquiry and the participatory paradigm to birth a way of knowing that is grounded 
in experience and reflective dialogue. As this concept of dialogic reflection was part of the 
developing methodology as described in Chapter Five, these key principles were also 
transformed from the methodological considerations of this research. 
6.1.1. Mediating Theory and Practice Through Values 
As part of the methodological consideration, I revisited the research objectives:  
1. To understand the experience of engaging in collaborative (or dialogic) reflection 
from my perspective and that of student occupational therapists. 
2. To explore the potential of its use in occupational therapy education for professional 
development. 
3. To attempt to develop a model for the use of collaborative (or dialogic) reflection in 
occupational therapy education. 
I saw these objectives as three discourses. The first objective was to understand dialogic 
reflection and what happens in it; I called this the theoretical discourse. The second objective 
concerned the value of dialogic reflection in occupational therapy education. It is contextual 
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discourse as it essentially puts the theoretical discourse in the context of occupational therapy 
education and explored its importance, benefits and limitations. The third objective was the 
practical discourse, which explored the implementation of dialogic reflection if the contextual 
discourse reveals that it was valuable. 
While this appeared to be a systematic approach, starting from theory, contextualisation then 
implementation, I had not expected it to be so. With reference to the extended epistemology 
(Reason and Heron 1995), my co-researchers and I cycled through the four forms of knowing 
during the research. The theoretical, contextual and practical discourses would have developed 
simultaneously through the cycling of these different forms of knowing. None of the discourses 
had greater priority over the others because knowledge was generated through experience and 
dialogue. Experiencing dialogic reflection, would not have been possible without knowing what 
it was or the purpose of it. Theorising dialogic reflection would not have been effective without 
experiencing it nor understanding the context. Naturally, understanding the value of dialogue in 
reflection would be dependent on how it was conducted and the theory behind it. In this 
research, I recognised that the second objective, the contextual discourse, is the mediator of the 
two other discourses. 
The traditional doctrine states that knowing how to do something, incorporating dialogic 
reflection in the curriculum, for example, is distinct from knowing about something, the theory 
of dialogic reflection in this example (Ryle 1945). The construction of theory is to reflect truth or 
to create the most accurate interpretation of it while development of practice is to achieve 
success in the reality (Habermas 1973). While theory can inform practice and vice versa, the 
relationship is not a direct one (Habermas 1973). Gustavsen (2001) proposed that the 
relationship between theory and practice is a relationship between three independent 
discourses – a theoretical discourse, a practical discourse and a mediating discourse that links 
the two. 
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The theoretical discourse was knowledge about dialogic reflection; the practical discourse was 
about knowing how to do it and the contextual discourse was knowing why it should or should 
not be done. The contextual discourse offers the value dimension to this research and dialogic 
reflection by questioning the rationale behind it. Habermas (1973) argued against the notion of 
action research because he believed that focusing on action removes the researcher from theory 
development. However, I saw the contextual discourse as exactly the solution to this. In 
consideration of the values of the research, it allowed the fluid movement of the researchers 
between the theoretical discourse and the practical discourse. By constantly returning to the 
value of dialogic reflection, my co-researchers and I move from developing a theory about it to 
developing a way it could be conducted and vice versa.  
Dialogic reflection as an approach to enquiry is value-based and Heron and Reason (1997) had 
argued that it is important to consider the axiology in research. Thus, this makes objective 
empirical research impossible in the participatory paradigm since to consider this value 
question, one needs to make a judgment as the researcher. This is made more difficult in dialogic 
reflection since these judgements are made with the co-researchers. The connection between 
dialogic reflection and values will be discussed in Chapter Ten. Revealing one’s values and 
understanding those of the other reflectors is a key process of dialogic reflection, this will be 
further discussed in Chapter Nine. It is through this value-based exploration that the reflector 
draws the connection between his or her experience and what he or she knows, bridging the 
theory and practice divide. 
6.1.2. Democratic Dialogue 
Apart from allowing the emergence of the three discourses, the methodology required by this 
research was one that enabled democratic dialogue and participation to take place. Participation 
and dialogue were important, not only because of the paradigm of the research, but also the 
fact that the topic of research was about dialogic reflection. And the best way to understand this 
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was to participate in it and to hold a dialogue about it (Schön 1987; Russell 2005; Wong et al. 
2016). 
Gustavsen (2001, p. 19) developed a set of democratic dialogue criteria and some are listed 
below, 
• Dialogue is based on a principle of give and take, not one-way communication 
• All concerned by the issue under discussion should have the possibility of participating  
• All participants have the same status in the dialogue arenas 
• Some of the experience the participant has when entering the dialogue must be seen as 
relevant 
• All participants are obliged to accept that other participants may have arguments better 
than their own 
• The dialogue should be able to integrate a growing degree of disagreement 
These conditions that had been outlined by Gustavsen (2001) indicated to me that dialogic 
reflection needed to allow dynamic and mutual interaction where neither the co-researchers 
nor I have superiority over others. It should be as inclusive as possible for all those who are 
interested in the topic of research. All the researchers bring with them their own experiences 
and opinions and they should all be considered worth further exploration and discussion. At the 
same time, dialogic reflection should allow the conflict of ideas and opinions and the debate 
over them. 
The degree of democratic dialogue is reflected in the following co-researchers’ remarks about 
reflecting dialogically in the research,  
I think, Ken you are a previous student and everything so even though we express 
ourselves in this manner, we feel comfortable with you because of that. [Charlotte in 
group two] 
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You are not marking us, you are not writing a reference for us so we can "you know what, 
I did this and it is not particularly great" without thinking of the consequences of saying 
it. [Alicia in group two] 
These testimonies show that my co-researchers and I had achieved democratic dialogue in our 
dialogic reflection because we could reveal our vulnerabilities to each other. This democratic 
dialogue is the antithesis to the reticence when reflecting with a superior discussed in the next 
chapter, hence once again suggesting that dialogic reflection might be a better way to reflect. 
Nonetheless, achieving this degree of democratic dialogue was rather tricky. In this research, I 
possessed certain characteristics that allowed such a democratic dialogue between the co-
researchers and me to occur, this will be further discussed in the Chapter Eight.  
6.1.3. Dialogic Reflectors as Knowers and Enquirers 
As an extension of democratic dialogue, dialogic reflection also recognises all its participants as 
reflectors who are at once knowers and enquirers. This understanding also means that these 
reflectors are respected for the knowledge they bring to the research and their interest in the 
topic of research, regardless of how similar, different, or even contradictory and contentious.  
Epistemic participation in Co-operative Inquiry means that co-researchers have a part in creating 
knowledge about themselves (Heron 1996).  
The researchers as knowers participate and get involved as subjects in the experiences 
that are to be known and that are the focus of the inquiry. Furthermore, the subjects’ 
experiences involve forms of knowing that participate in that to which these forms 
relate. (Heron 1996, p. 20) 
As knowledge generated from Co-operative Inquiry is from the participation of the researchers 
in the experience, the researchers are also the subjects of research. Heron (1996) reasoned that 
knowledge is generated in this manner because of the human condition, 
The researchers can’t get outside, or try to get outside, the human condition in order to 
study it. They can only study it through their own embodiment, through the full range of 
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their human sensibilities, in a relation of reciprocal participation and dialogue with 
others similarly engaged. (Heron 1996, p. 21) 
The understanding of the topic of research is crafted through the embodiment of the experience 
by the researchers themselves. Enquiry in this nature is experiential and intersubjective and the 
researchers share an understanding of the world that is created through a shared lived 
experience. In dialogic reflection, this understanding is not only crafted from a shared lived 
experience. To respect researchers as knowers, it is also imperative to accept that these 
researchers bring with them knowledge and experience prior to the enquiry. While in Co-
operative Inquiry, this epistemic participation is from the point of the start of the enquiry, 
dialogic reflection goes beyond that and accepts prior experiences and knowledge that 
reflectors bring to the enquiry group as their contribution to epistemic participation.  
By accepting that reflectors in dialogic reflection are knowers who bring with them to the 
research their own lived experience, dialogic reflection also accepts that reflectors may have 
differing interests and beliefs about the topic of research i.e. enquirers with different 
motivations. Hence knowledge generation in dialogic reflection is not valued by how well it can 
be generalised to the population outside the research group but what it means to each reflector 
in the group in relation to their interests, values, experience and knowledge. 
Therefore, this principle of dialogic reflection recognises each researcher or reflector as different 
knowers and enquirers who may have different purposes of engaging in the enquiry. They are 
nonetheless important specifically because of these differences.  
We don’t see all sides of the same thing, unfortunately, as much as you try to, you are 
limited to what know, value and our prior experiences which is why we need each other 
to reflect with us so you get multiple perspectives and you get a more holistic picture of 
the experience. [Me in group one] 
These differences between researchers are the reasons behind the multiple perspectives in the 
reflective group which is of great importance. Consensus is not the goal of dialogic reflection 
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and it is conflict that drives passionate dialogue and hence a deeper form of analysis. It is those 
multiple perspectives that enable dialogic reflection to be a multi-dimensional form of enquiry.  
Early in the research, I had used term “collaborative reflection” to refer to what I now call 
dialogic reflection. This change was in response to my realisation of the purpose of dialogic 
reflection.  
I am wondering the word ‘collaborative reflection’ is a misnomer for what we are looking 
at because collaborative reflection implies that all of us are contributing to produce 
something in the end. [Me in group one] 
Collaboration implies that there is a product to be developed, such as a presentation or a report. 
However, this is not the case in this research. In dialogic reflection, each member takes home a 
new understanding that they have crafted for themselves. In line with constructivism, this newly 
constructed knowledge will differ depending on how the individual had experienced the dialogic 
reflection. Additionally, coming from different knowledge and experiences, each member joins 
the dialogic reflection with different motivations and perspective, therefore would also arrive at 
different learning points at the end. Dialogic reflection on the other hand, shifts the focus from 
production to participation in the enquiry.  
6.2. Conclusion 
Dialogic reflection in this thesis is understood by its three key principles: 
1. It is a value-based way of knowing that allows the reflector to better understand his or 
her experience in relation to what he or she knows and what he or she has observed in 
that experience. 
2. Democratic dialogue in dialogic reflection is about allowing reflectors to speak honestly 
and openly. Only through this can the dialogue be reflective. 
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3. Dialogic reflectors should be respected as individual thinkers with their own unique 
experiences. 
These three principles are evident in the four themes of this research covered in the following 
chapters. Dialogic reflection is about bringing together a community of knowers and enquirers 
and engaging them in an artistic and natural dialogue about their own experiences. Fundamental 
issues in dialogic reflection call for a need to conceptualise it at the epistemic level in the first 
place. This will be covered in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 7. The Epistemic Conflict in 
Reflection and Dialogic Reflection 
This chapter expands on the issues as discussed in Chapter Three: the nebulous nature of 
reflection and problems it caused. From the findings of this research, I argue that some of the 
confusion about reflection and dialogic reflection are a result of the different ways they are 
perceived. I believe these issues stem from a fundamental epistemic clash in these perspectives 
of reflection and dialogic reflection. 
Reflection can be understood from different epistemological positions as discussed in the 
paradigmatic considerations in Chapter Four. Consequently, the focus of reflection is also 
understood differently. This becomes an issue when it confuses students as they try to 
understand the role reflection plays in their own practice. An implication of this epistemic clash 
is that students can become reticent about sharing their reflection with educators or clinical 
supervisors, giving rise to contrived, sterile and even false reflection. 
By exploring these problems my co-researchers and I concluded that there are issues in the 
perception of reflection in education and practice, as a learning tool or a method of professional 
development. Therefore, we believe that there is a need to rethink our understanding of 
reflection and reflective practice at the fundamental epistemic level. Before we could 
understand how dialogic reflection can fit in the occupational therapy curriculum, we had to 
answer the antecedent question which was “what is dialogic reflection” at the epistemic level. 
7.1. Confusion About Reflection 
The confusion about the understanding of reflection and dialogic reflection, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, was evident in my research. The struggle to understanding dialogic reflection in 
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this research started with some difficulties in differentiating between the terms analysis, 
evaluation, and reflection. These terms were used in many models of reflection however, they 
were also used in very different contexts which resulted in confusion within the research groups. 
Research group one initially differentiated between analysis and reflection, however this was 
something that we struggled on later as the research progressed. I explained this initial 
difference below. 
I think analysis sounds very academic and very technical, looking at skills and how things 
have worked whereas reflection has got a deeper meaning to it because you question 
yourself and your beliefs about your own practice, so there is an additional depth. [Me 
in group one] 
Eve from the same group gave an example of this. 
When I think about it, a lot of the time on placement, it is more analysis and evaluation 
of my own actions. For example, my own reflection would look something like I brought 
that patient to the toilet but he didn’t seem to be able to walk back on his own, what I 
have done wrong. And so it was analysing that very action or that very incident of bring 
the patient to the toilet and that’s where the analysis ended … What lacks is the 
additional layer of questioning myself in the sense where I question what does it mean 
for my own practice … a lot of the time it is missing ... Of course, I analyse it as a therapist 
would or as a student would but then if feels a little superficial. [Eve in group one] 
Reflection was considered to a deeper form of analysis. Analysis was considered to be a more 
superficial and impassive process of looking at the experience while the reflective process was 
a deeper, more emotional and perhaps spiritual exploration of one’s experience. However, this 
was quickly challenged by other co-researchers in the same group: 
Can you not analyse your feelings and thoughts though? [Nicola in group one] 
I am thinking of a football manager and I am like surely they reflect because they go over 
games but is that analysing or is that reflective? [Eve in group one] 
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To save ourselves from this confusion, we turned to an example of a reflective model. With 
reference to Gibbs’ (1988) reflective model (which can be found in Chapter Ten), we discussed 
the meaning behind the terms analysis, evaluation and reflection. To our dismay, we became 
even more confused with what these terms meant. The following exchange between my co-
researchers and I captures this confusion: 
It says here that evaluation is what was good and bad about the experience whereas 
analysis is what sense you can make of the situation. It is a bit vague. [Me in research 
group one] 
A lot of them overlap, it is quite repetitive. [April in group one] 
See the way I would make sense of the situation would be looking at the good and the 
bad of that situation. [May in group one] 
We were even more confused when referring to a theory of reflection which was meant to aid 
the understanding of the reflective process. This confusion was evident in group two as well who 
was confounded by the terms “evaluation” and “reflection”. The following dialogue illustrates 
this: 
Is there a difference between evaluation and reflection? Evaluation, to me, is about 
making a decision about something either way, was it good or bad. Reflection is about 
exploring things and thinking about things. [Sophie in group two] 
Would that mean evaluation is part of reflection? [Me in group two] 
I think evaluation is a product of reflection … Sometimes when you reflect, you come up 
with an answer or outcome. That’s why evaluation is not reflection, evaluation is 
something that comes out of reflection sometimes. [Sophie in group two] 
Olivia from group two questioned if this debate about evaluation and reflection was even of any 
importance: 
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We have done so much talking about thinking and changing all the time, are we 
reflecting? I don’t know. Does it really matter? [Olivia in group two] 
We got around this confusion by reconceptualising dialogic reflection as something more natural 
and organic. This is further elaborated in Chapter Eight. 
Schön (1983), despite being considered the lead thinker of reflection, had provided very little 
explanation about how to go about doing it (Kinsella 2009). He meant for the concept of 
reflection to be deliberately nebulous, however, this led to many other theorists attempting to 
clarify the concept in different ways, ironically adding to the confusion about the topic. 
7.2. Epistemic Conflict 
Reflection, as an un-unified concept, is problematic because theorists theorised it from a myriad 
of different philosophical positions. Consequently, their theories of reflection came from 
disparate epistemic stances. As discussed in Chapter Four, reflection can be constructivist, 
empiricist or rational. These different epistemologies of reflection result in very different 
approaches to reflection and foci of the reflective processes.  
Besides the theorists, this epistemic clash is also evident in the ways educators teach about 
reflection and the way practitioners use it. My co-researchers and I found that these different 
interpretations of reflection were evident in practice settings. These educators on placement 
appear to have different expectations regarding reflection and demonstrating reflective practice 
thus sending rather confusing messages to students. 
7.2.1. Approaching Reflection from Different Epistemic Stances 
In occupational therapy practice, reflection can be treated differently in different settings, 
When I was on my placement they did regular reflection, it was quite militant in the way 
it was done. It was like "I must do a reflection because I haven’t done one" [Eve in group 
one] 
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I remember being on a placement where they have not brought it up or anything. It’s 
quite different on different placement and how people feel about it and approach it. [Lea 
in group two] 
I think my educator viewed it [reflection] as when we are talking through supervision, 
she would be able to tell if I am being reflective. Some of it would occur just naturally 
and that’s how she gauged it. [Sophie in group two] 
While there are settings that are more relaxed in the need for reflection to be overtly 
demonstrated, there are also settings that perceive demonstrating reflection as a “must”. 
Perhaps, the difference here lies in how reflection is being understood by the reflector, whether 
it is an internal process that can be evident through daily professional practice or if it a process 
that needs to be made through explicit through writing and verbalisation. The difference in the 
focus of the reflection also hints at what is more important in reflection thereby suggesting the 
epistemic stance that is being taken. 
Though not made explicit, a focus on the explicit demonstration of the reflective process 
through writing or verbalising suggests that the analytical process was of great importance, 
perhaps taking a more rational stance towards reflection. On the other hand, an appreciation of 
the internal processes of reflection and that it translates into one’s professional practice 
suggests that knowledge constructed from the reflective process becomes inherent in the way 
the occupational therapist conducts his or her practice. This would suggest a more constructivist 
approach towards reflection. 
These epistemic stances were more apparent when educators guided students on their 
reflection. While a few co-researchers noted that they had educators who wanted objective 
reflections, reflections that do not include any emotional consideration, the following co-
researcher noted a more extreme case of such an approach as adopted by her educator. 
I did a couple of Gibbs reflection which she [educator] was like “I am not really interested 
in how you feel, I want to see the analysis". So, she recommended that I did S.O.A.P. 
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notes … I tend to be a little waffle-ly so that's why I think she wanted me to use an 
analysis framework. [Ava in group two] 
S.O.A.P. is an acronym for subjective, objective, assessment, and plan. It is a report writing style 
that occupational therapists may use commonly in writing case notes about interactions with 
service users. Being a report, it does not involve the analysis of feelings or thoughts. It serves as 
an objective record of the interaction between the occupational therapist and service user. 
Using such a format for reflection reduced the process to a factual recount of the experience 
which led co-researchers in group one to question “what is the point of it then?” Such an 
approach to reflection suggested a reductive version of the empirical stance where the focus of 
reflection is the sensory experience. Observations take priority over the analysis or even the 
recognition of emotions and thoughts that the reflector experiences.  
Ava also noted a difference in the attitudes towards reflection in her prior placements. 
My last educator loved Gibbs’ model of reflection and she was like "I am so happy to 
know that you are feeling content" and I thought: oh, this is very different from the last 
one who said "don’t tell me, I’m not interested, take this out." She crossed out my 
feelings in my reflection. [Ava in group two]  
This difference in epistemic stance towards reflection contradicted the student’s own 
perception of reflection. I asked Ava if she agreed with her first educator’s attitude towards 
reflection, to which she replied, 
I didn’t. I did those for her and I did some Gibbs’ ones for myself, I valued them more but 
she definitely wanted to see that she had evidence that I was paying attention to what 
she was talking … I think she used it as a measure to see how much I understood from 
what we did… [Ava in group two] 
Ava saw a conflict between her educator and her in the approach towards reflection. She 
preferred a reflection which appreciated the thoughts and feelings that she had experienced 
and Gibbs’ (1988) model of reflection had encouraged her to explore them further. However, 
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she believed her educator perceived reflection to be evidence of her understanding from the 
fact that her educator had requested her reflections to be devoid of her emotions. While Ava 
was more certain in her own understanding of reflection and saw this difference as a conflict, 
there were other co-researchers who were confused about it.  
My educator on my last placement, I had written two reflections and the first one she 
said I was being too general about the situation and what happened and I was being 
more true to the facts whereas the second one I got into more detail about what I have 
learnt from the situation and that was more what she wanted to see. But at the same 
time, she also said reflection shouldn’t be too much about how I felt and it was not 
perhaps what the situation was so there was a little bit of confusion really. [Geri in group 
one] 
This suggested that perhaps educators themselves were confused about what reflection was. 
This can be expected if reflection was perceived differently from a fundamental epistemic level. 
These differences thus manifest themselves in the way educators guide students on reflection. 
Students hold a certain perception of reflection and it becomes confusing to them when it 
conflicts with that of educators.  
Reflection is contested at a fundamental level and theorists debate over how once can know 
from experience. This conflict manifests in the students’ and educators’ different expectations 
of what reflection should look like. While some were able to see this as a conflict, some were 
left confused about the mixed messages. This confusion is perpetuated when confused students 
become educators and have to guide others on reflection.  
7.2.2. Reflection and Dialogic Reflection as More Than a Rational Process 
Another example of the epistemic clash is in our disagreement with Dewey’s (1933) rational 
perspective of reflection. We believed that while reflection is rational, it is also an emotional 
process. In Chapter Ten, I add to this discussion by arguing that dialogic reflection is an emotional 
and moral process as well. 
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As discussed in Chapter Three, Dewey (1933) wrote about reflection as form of rational thought 
which is triggered by a state of perplexity and an enquiry directed at revealing facts to challenge 
or support the suggested belief. Reflection requires one to challenge one’s beliefs and thoughts, 
thus, it is a painful process. 
Reflective thinking is always more or less troublesome because it involves overcoming 
the inertia that inclines one to accept suggestions at their face value; it involves 
willingness to endure a condition of mental unrest and disturbance. Reflective thinking, 
in short, means judgment suspended during further inquiry; and suspense is likely to be 
somewhat painful. (Dewey 1933, p. 13) 
Reflective thinking requires a disciplined mind that is willing to challenge what is being taught 
or observed. A disciplined mind thus allows one to be intellectually independent due to its ability 
to self-manage and develop. The purpose of education is thus to develop a disciplined mind 
which Dewey (1933) perceived to be positive and constructive. However, he also acknowledged 
that discipline is painful because it forces the mind away from congenial concepts and at times 
challenges them (Dewey 1933).  
We felt this difficulty as well and this suggested that it was not always easy to be as disciplined 
or be as rational as Dewey (1933) had expected. 
I know I might be a bit of a perfectionist and I want to be able to do it right and 
sometimes admitting to yourself that you could have done better. I do it but it is not nice. 
[April in group one] 
I find it hard to admit to certain mistakes or shortcomings as a therapist. It is hard, do-
able but I think it is hard. [Me in group two] 
However, we disagreed with Dewey’s (1933) rational perspective of reflection. We thought of 
reflection and dialogic reflection as more than rational; it is also an emotional process. This pain 
that Dewey (1933) referred to was not only a result of suspending beliefs but also a consequence 
of the fact that reflection is inherently emotional. Reflection requires one to bare oneself: faults, 
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vulnerabilities, and all. It requires a great degree of openness and acceptance (Fay 1987) and it 
is even more challenging when done dialogically. 
He [educator] was analysing like it [written reflection] was an essay and he was pulling 
faces … Actually, it made me feel quite raw and quite exposed and even though I had 
written it in a way where I didn’t really say what I truly felt. [Sarah in group one] 
I am not so keen on other people seeing my reflection, because it’s like identifying a 
problem in the way I work and do things. [Nicola in group one] 
Another reason why reflection can sometimes be difficult and painful is the fact that it requires 
one to take apart experiences that, often, are negative in nature. 
I find that with the [reflective] models and even on placement, an individual reflection 
seems to push in more of a direction of looking at things that you have not done so well 
rather than things that you have done well. [April in group one] 
Personally, I think it encourages us to look at negative experiences. There is more to 
analyse, there is more to evaluate and there are more learning points [Me in group one] 
There were some negative things but there were also some positive things as well but it 
is funny how the negative things stick … [Lea in group two] 
We justified our concentration on adversity with the belief that there is more to learn from 
them, alluding to our instinct to problem solve. Reflection shares an intimate relationship with 
problem-solving. Dewey (1933), whose work served as a foundation for many reflective 
theories, defined reflection as a problem-solving method. In the same vein, Jarvis (1992, p. 180) 
stated that reflection “seeks to problematise many situations of professional performance so 
that they can become potential learning situations”. While reflection can be seen as rational in 
this sense, the interest in negative experiences inevitably evokes some emotions in the reflector. 
Reflecting on negative experiences breeds negative emotions (Vachon and Leblanc 2011) which 
in turn lead to the narrowing of the mind and the fear of new experiences (Isen 1987). Reflecting 
on positive experiences lead to more creative solutions, greater motivation and more positive 
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emotions which consequently lead to a greater willingness to try new experiences (Fredrickson 
2002; Isen 1987). In addition, this perpetuates a negative interpretation of the nature of 
reflection where the critical evaluation of practice is the focus, i.e. concentrating on what was 
done poorly and how to change in the future, instead of figuring out what was done well and 
how to do that even better (Wong et al. 2016). 
I saw this difficulty in negotiating our own reflections as sign that my co-researchers and I 
perceived reflection beyond rational problem-solving. We found it emotionally difficult because 
we were treating reflection as an emotional process as well. While we agreed that problem-
solving is a component of reflection, we were reflecting on more than the descriptive reality of 
the experience. When we chose negative experiences to reflect upon, we were also reflecting 
on how we had felt during that experience. Reflection for us became beyond analysing and 
evaluating the factual occurrences of the reflection, an approach which can be deemed more 
rational. At that point, I was unable to pin point a specific epistemic perspective of reflection 
that we had agreed upon. However, it was clear that there are many approaches to reflection 
which contributed to the confusion that we faced. 
7.3. Implications of Epistemic Conflict 
Aside from the confusion in practice that it has caused, the epistemic conflict also resulted in 
some problems in the education, where students are expected to demonstrate their ability to 
reflect and be assessed on it. This gives rise to false reflection, which is contrived, sterile, and in 
certain extreme cases, fabricated (Russell 2005; Wong et al. 2016). 
7.3.1. True and False Reflection 
My co-researchers and I negotiated the epistemic differences between us and our educators 
and supervisors by being admittedly less than honest in our own reflections. 
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Dialogic reflection is not an easy process and requires one to reveal weakness and to prod at 
unpleasant experiences. When dialogic reflection is conducted in the form of supervision, it adds 
an additional layer of difficulty because the student is expected to reveal himself or herself to a 
superior. In many instances this resulted in some reticence where the reflection that was 
presented was, to a certain degree, false. 
It is hard when you are reflecting with someone to offer a true reflection, I don’t know, 
sometimes I find that when I look at my own practice, it is also hard to be completely 
honest to yourself that you have done something wrong or you lacked knowledge in 
certain areas. [Me in group one] 
You are not going to do a true reflection or be really honest about what you are feeling 
and thinking deep down if someone is going to read it. [May in group one] 
I feel like you need to get it all down out on paper and then edit it, I feel that is the most 
natural way, be totally honest with myself, get it all down there and then depends on 
who is reading it, then alter it. And that almost feel like a refined version for whoever is 
gonna read it. [Isabella in group two] 
There is always a truthful reflection behind an untruthful one. [Alicia in group two] 
These false reflections were edited versions of a true reflection, often impassive and devoid of 
the rich emotions and deep thought that occurred. To a certain extent, it was a more objective 
version of reflection where we felt protected by not revealing too much or only revealing what 
that cannot be contested, i.e. a factual descriptive account of the experience.  
Writing reflection is often a common method of measuring a student’s ability to practice 
reflectively. However, assessing this writing, as indicative of an ability to reflect, has resulted in 
reflection being treated as an artificial and superficial process of demonstrating professional 
competence.  
My reflections are quite private, almost personal, because I was reflecting on the 
educators or on the setting and they did read them. And I was a bit like "oh god, can’t 
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remember what I have written now or if I have offended them" … I felt like I wanted to 
write one for me and then one for them. [Isabella in group two] 
Isabella had stated that her reflections were private and personal in nature hence resulting in 
her apprehension about sharing them with her educators. Such reticence had caused her to 
want to write one for her own private use and another more acceptable version for her 
educators that would be less personal. She had also insinuated that her private thoughts and 
feelings may be deemed as offensive to others and by feeling this way, she had felt that a more 
sterile version of her own reflection was more suitable for assessment. This showed the effects 
of assessing reflection which reduced the rich and emotional process of reflection to something 
more rational and logical which students considered more acceptable to educators. 
Sophie in group two shared an experience she had on her placement where she had not gotten 
along with her educator. A particularly bad incident had resulted in an altercation between her 
and her educator. 
I felt that she was shouting at me and then the next day morning she was like "I want 
you write a reflection on what happened yesterday" and I felt like saying everything 
about her but instead I made it all about myself. [Sophie in group two] 
The group reacted with sympathy and I pointed out the potentially damaging consequence of 
her false reflection. 
It could be quite self-destructive writing something like that blaming yourself for 
everything, I mean it’s one thing to point out your flaws but it another to ... internalise 
everything … to make it all about you, putting all the blame on yourself, that could be 
quite damaging to your own practice. [Me in group two] 
While this was a one-off case that emerged from this research, it is possible that false reflections 
may have rather damaging consequences to a student’s development. Group one however 
noted that since a false reflection is a façade for the true reflection, the learning process has not 
been discounted as the true reflection still occurs.  
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When reflection is to be conducted dialogically, it is often better; however, finding the right 
reflective partner is an issue (Boniface 2002). Supervisors tend not to make the best reflective 
partners due to their superior position, because they are judging the reflector’s progress and 
assessing their practice, which makes the reflector reticent. The difficulty of expressing oneself 
honestly under this circumstance stems from the vulnerability that one experiences. Therefore, 
the presence of a superior in a reflective environment may be overpowering and may prevent 
one from being able to fully analyse oneself (Harvey and Struzziero 2008) due to the fear of 
vulnerability. There had been cases where students had fabricated experiences to reflect on to 
demonstrate their prowess rather than reveal their fallibility (Russell 2005). The intense 
pressure to do well academically had led to reflective assignments to be unrepresentative of a 
student’s analytical and evaluative abilities. It had perpetuated a culture where students feel 
the need to demonstrate their abilities through their reflections. Consequently, reflective pieces 
produced are often contrived and sanitised of the messy reality of the true experience, just to 
achieve a better grade from the supervisor (Wong et al. 2016). 
In addition to privacy, I saw that these false reflections were coping mechanism that my co-
researchers and I had developed to defend our epistemic position on reflection while fulfilling 
our academic requirements. When educators impose their perspective of reflection on the 
students through assessment criteria or assignment marking rubrics, students can become 
unwilling to express their reflections from their own perspective of what reflection means to 
them. This is a result of the fear of being judged or being corrected as shown by the data that 
we had generated. These false reflections protected us from others who may view reflection 
differently, such as Ava’s educator who “crossed out” her reflections on her feelings about the 
experience. As we saw reflection as an emotional process as well, a judgement on our reflections 
was also a judgement on how we felt. These false reflections, being edited and ready for review, 
are decoys of the true reflection. Assessments or critiques on them do not emotionally affect 
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the reflector as much. In other words, it is safer to produce false reflection because it does not 
bring to question our perspective of reflection. 
False reflections were not always intended. Some co-researchers found that in order to be 
graded on reflection, they had to express their reflective process which they find very difficult. 
I find it hard to express myself on paper, particularly with written reflection, I really 
struggle with it. I find it very superficial because if I am reflecting verbally with somebody 
or in a conversation with my educator, or even driving home like having a chat, I find 
that you can reflect on these little things naturally but as soon as I have been told to 
write it down, it becomes so bit-ty. [Eve in group one] 
Assessing reflection is essentially assessing the cognitive processes that go on behind 
professional practice. It is expecting the student to express, in writing, these implicit processes 
and knowledge that is often beyond what words can describe (Polanyi, 1967). Assessing 
reflection in this way is essentially assessing how well the student is able to express his or her 
reflection not the reflection itself. 
Gilbert (2001), drawing on Foucault (1980), noted that reflection can be perceived as a form of 
confessional however from what these research groups had noted, it is only so when one is 
completely honest when reflecting. Both research groups noted that true reflection was often 
not being shared. The confession of truth requires overcoming great resistance (Foucault 1981) 
and as these co-researchers have noted, a false reflection was the easier way out.  
I think it defeats the purpose, doesn’t it? If you can’t be truthful when you reflect then 
what is the point of doing it. [Me in group one] 
A false reflection is a carefully crafted confession, both of which are oxymoronic in nature. As I 
had noted here, what is a point of a false reflection? What is the purpose of a confessional if it 
is not true? If what was being assessed by educators was a false version of the true reflection, 
then to what extent was this assessment a true measure of their reflective ability?  
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Assessing reflection suggests that there is a good way to reflect and a bad way to do so. It often 
is a measure of a student’s analytical abilities which can allude to a belief that the rational 
perspective of reflection is more important (Wong et al. 2016). This was troubling to both 
research groups because of our understanding of reflection as more than a rational process. 
The false reflection is a product of the reticence that students face when engaging in reflection 
and expressing it. This reticence is often from a fear of judgement by others.  
You are afraid that whatever you say may have an impact on your image socially and 
professionally which is why certain things are being brought up because you don’t want 
to come across as being too critical. [Karen in group one] 
I would leave out services as well, like how the services are being run and how I don’t 
agree with how things are being done …. I just don’t want them to see that I am criticising 
the service. [Oliva in group two] 
My reflections are personal but I have had educators asking to read my reflections and 
very rarely would I say “I am wrong” … part of me knows that at the end of the day, they 
will be reading it and they are judging my ability to be a professional therapist. [Charlotte 
in group two] 
My co-researchers were very aware of how they were being perceived by others when they 
shared their reflections, leading them to edit, falsify or even refuse to share anything. Geri in 
group one noted that there were professional ramifications to writing a reflection as well. She 
found herself in a situation where she could have implied that a member of staff was negligent 
if she reflected truthfully. 
I was trying not to drop the member of staff in it ... so I had to go around those things 
and not to make it like they had not done their job properly. [Geri in group one] 
Karen from group one noted that sharing an honest and truthful reflection could be perceived 
as whistle-blowing which could have impacted her professional image. Hence there needs to be 
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a certain level of care when sharing reflection especially in the professional milieu and an 
awareness to “protect yourself” as Karen had put it.  
While they are aware of the potential judgement others might make, some co-researchers also 
noted that they are concerned about the audience of their reflections and how they might feel 
when they read or listen to them.  
How do you reflect effectively without making it personal to somebody? I don’t think 
anyone had figured out a good way to do that. [Eve in group one] 
I personally would not feel confident raising negative issues or things that we need to 
work on without thinking "how am I going to say this without causing offence?" [Nicola 
in group one] 
False reflections, were defensive tactics that my co-researchers and I employed to protect 
ourselves from judgements by others on our reflections, our feelings and thoughts about the 
experience and our own perspectives of reflection. Amidst the epistemic differences, we 
decided to produce a reflection safe for reviewing. These false reflections were for the educators 
or supervisors rather than for ourselves. 
7.3.2. Fish, Twinn and Purr: Strands of Reflection  
The implication of this epistemic difference is also evident at a more macro level. This is best 
exemplified by Fish’s work with Twinn and Purr (Fish et al. 1991). 
In response to the positivist idea of Technical Rationality that was prevalent in the medical, 
health and care practice, Fish, Twinn and Purr developed Strands of Reflection (Fish et al. 1991). 
Strands of Reflection helped the practitioner delineate four aspects of an event which he or she 
can reflect upon. It was purposed to facilitate a better understanding of the clinical experience 
by pushing the practitioner from the technical rational perspective of the event to explore the 
artistic elements in practice (Fish 2012). To do so, Strands of Reflection required the practitioner 
to analyse and synthesise the following four aspects of the experience (Fish 2012, p. 40): 
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1. The Factual Strand – Recount the facts of the event 
2. The Retrospective Strand – Identifying key patterns that emerged in the event 
3. The Sub Stratum Strand – Uncovering and exploring critically the personal theory that 
underlies the piece of practice 
4. The Connective Strand – Considering how present theory and practice might relate to 
future theory and practice 
The Connective Strand highlights the fact that knowledge from an experience cannot be freely 
applied to another situation as practice situations are unique. Experiences are worth reflecting 
upon insofar as they offer learning points hence reflection should not be limited to the negative 
aspects of practice (Fish and de Cossart 2007; Fish 2012). 
Fish (2012) noted that while Strands of Reflection garnered some popularity amongst 
occupational therapy and other healthcare professionals, it failed in diverting the focus of 
professionals to further explore themselves as a practitioner. While it encouraged one to probe 
at the artistic elements of practice in the Sub Stratum Strand, it was not successful at doing so. 
Fish (2012) felt that due to practitioners passing on Strands of Reflection from educator to 
student through a reductive method that can be perceived as instrumentalist. Instrumentalism 
is the idea advanced by Dewey (1916) that theories are useful to the extent of its ability to serve 
a practical purpose. However, when applied indiscriminately, it can strip theories of their rich 
philosophical and theoretical underpinnings to become tools of practice, a reduced version. This 
distortion resulted in Strands of Reflection becoming an instrument for general use by 
practitioners, when it was initially intended for supervisors to use with supervisees (Fish 2012). 
Strands of Reflection was reduced to be a rigid structure for practice, instead of a theoretical 
model which is to be used to supplement and guide the practitioner and his or her supervisor to 
better practice.  
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Despite the change in context, Fish (2012) found that professions still preferred a more reduced 
version of reflection - a method of critical analysis - despite it not being used critically. As a 
structure for practice, Strands of Reflection was used partially: often, the Sub Stratum and 
Connective Stands were neglected even though they are the most critical and challenging 
strands. The focus is placed solely on the Factual and Retrospective aspects which were more 
comfortable (Fish 2012), objective, straightforward and less artistic, once again reverting to the 
positivist perception of professional practice, Technical Rationality. The reductive use of the 
Strands of Reflection is because of the way some practitioners perceived reflection. When 
practitioners favour the Factual and Retrospective Strands, it suggests that they believe that 
they are sufficient for their own reflective practice. It can be interpreted that they build their 
reflective practice around facts and descriptive reports of their own experience of practice. This 
suggests that reflection, to them, is perhaps perceived from a more empirical and positivist 
stance. This is reductive, not because of their epistemic stance towards reflection but because 
of their use of their use of the theory which appears to stem from a constructivist position.  
7.4. Conclusion 
Reflection can be viewed from many epistemic orientations, these different positions value 
different aspects of the reflective process. However, educators may unconsciously project these 
epistemic stances onto students by attempting to teach them what reflection should look like. 
To students who had firm beliefs about reflection, these differing stances appeared to be 
conflicts; students who are still conceptualising reflection in the context of their own use were 
bombarded with mixed messages about reflection which resulted in some confusion about what 
reflection was to them. 
The use of reflection can sometimes be reductive. Some professionals see reflection as an 
analytical tool or a method of problem-solving. In these instances, reflection can be reduced to 
an objective analysis of an experience, stripped of the emotions and thoughts that occur behind 
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it. Fish (2012) saw this as reverting to the Technical Rational model where the focus was on 
problem-solving rather than problem framing. 
Reflection is nebulous however, that was how Schön (1983) had meant it to be. The lack of 
guidance on how to reflect has resulted in many other theorists to appropriate this concept in 
the context of various professional spheres to provide some clarity on the reflective process 
using different philosophical concepts. This thus caused further confusion about the process 
however as these theories are being applied out of context by other professions. 
A disciplined and open mind is required for reflection to be successful (Dewey 1933). However, 
as there is a propensity to reflect on experiences that are negative in nature, it is harder to 
challenge oneself or even admit to being wrong. My co-researchers and I faced some difficulties 
emotionally when reflecting because we saw reflection as something more than a rational 
problem-solving process. 
Reflection requires a great degree of vulnerability and this is even more difficult when done 
dialogically with someone in authority who may sit in judgement. False reflections, a façade of 
the true reflection, is often easier to share. Being edited, sterile and contrived, these false 
reflections are not accurate depictions of elaborate process that the reflector undergoes. They 
are a defensive mechanism that one may employ to protect one’s perspective of reflection. 
This chapter has illustrated some of the confusion about reflection and difficulties of conducting 
it in a monological and dialogical manner. This led us to question its use as a pedagogic tool, a 
method of professional development and a problem-solving technique. Considering that there 
are some fundamental differences in the theories and use of reflection, it was worth exploring 
dialogic reflection at the epistemic level. To do so, we had understood dialogic reflection at the 
epistemic level, leading us to eventually conceptualise it as an epistemology by its own right.  
 
127 
 
Chapter 8. Conducting an Enquiry 
Through Dialogic Reflection 
Another finding of this research was that dialogic reflection can be perceived as an approach to 
enquiry in this research. I started the research using action research as a method of investigation 
and expected the research groups to follow the cycles of action research as Lewin (1946) had 
described. With reference to Chapter Five, I expected the groups to start from diagnosing what 
was worth enquiring in dialogic reflection, formulate a plan to do so, take action then evaluate 
and reflect on it. However, as the research progressed, the groups had indicated a preference 
for a less structured method which allowed for more natural discussions. This then eventually 
became a something I call a meta-dialogic reflection where the groups were reflecting 
dialogically on the topic of dialogic reflection.  
Dialogic reflection as an approach to enquiry is distinct in its lack of structure however this is not 
to say it lacks analytical acumen. In fact, analysis is a strong feature because it is centred around 
an iterative process of reflection and experiencing reflection, both arguably one and the same. 
While I had noted that the change in method of enquiry in this research was most apparent in 
session six, there were indications that this research can perhaps be considered a dialogic 
reflection from the outset.  
This chapter concludes that since dialogic reflection can be considered as an approach to 
enquiry, it stands to be therefore considered as a way of knowing, as an epistemology. In 
Appendix K, I expand on this discussion by describing the roles that exists in dialogic reflection. 
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8.1. Dialogic Reflection as An Approach to Enquiry 
The key principles of dialogic reflection are the mediating discourse, democratic dialogue and 
its participants as individual knowers and enquirers. The mediating discourse grounds the 
reflectors in value dimension. It emphasises the need to understand the purpose and use of the 
research. Grounding the reflectors in this dimension, reflectors then depart to develop the 
theoretical and practical discourses. As enquiry of this nature is value-based, its purpose is not 
to develop a completely consensual theory amongst the researchers rather it is about 
developing an understanding that is meaningful and valuable to the individual reflectors. These 
reflectors bring to the enquiry their own knowledge and experiences hence they should be 
respected as unique knowers and enquirers and not as a collective. Due to these differences, 
knowledge can only be constructed in dialogic reflection if democratic dialogue is present. While 
like Co-operative Inquiry, dialogic reflection can be hierarchical, members should feel 
comfortable enough to actively share their thoughts and feelings and through that, participate 
in the knowledge construction that is meaningful to them. These are the key principles of 
dialogic reflection and they are evident in dialogic reflection as an approach to enquiry 
Even though in Chapter Five I had mentioned that dialogic reflection was not a method of 
enquiry until session six, it was suggested in session one. 
… what do you think a collaborative reflection would look like? [Me in group one] 
Well … this! [Sarah in group one] 
Sarah was referring to the research session being a dialogic reflection. This possibility of dialogic 
reflection as an approach to enquiry was already introduced very early in the research however 
both groups did not explore this until much later in the research. At that point of the research 
we were still theorising what dialogic reflection was and were rather focused on exploring what 
it was like to reflect dialogically, not realising that there were already doing it in the process. I 
had revisited this idea in my own reflective logs for both groups: 
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It is also very interesting to note in relation to methodology, both groups have exhibited 
signs that they are reflecting on the topic of reflection and collaborative reflection ... 
Perhaps this very act of participating in this reflection is also “action” in this action 
research. [My reflective log of session one] 
The previous groups meeting seemed rather reflective in the sense that the members 
were reflecting on reflection and their experience of its use in practice and university 
hence I thought that by allowing the discussion to go where the group members take it 
would encourage them to reflect naturally … [My reflective log of session three] 
When writing this, I was still perceiving dialogic reflection as a technique that featured in the 
interactions between the co-researchers and me, not as a method nor as a methodology. In my 
mind, we were still conducting a Co-operative Inquiry using action research where reflection is 
a technique and a phase within action research. I was still able to see very clear cycles of 
knowing, which was characteristic of a Co-operative Inquiry (Heron and Reason 2001). Perhaps 
it can even be argued that the groups had started the research using dialogic reflection since the 
beginning except this cyclic structure of knowing eventually dissolved in the later sessions. 
8.1.1. A Preference for a Free-Flowing Discussion 
Since the start, both research groups had expressed a preference for free discussion in the 
research and dialogic reflection. 
I kind of like it free form, just chuck it out, because it is not forced then… [Karen in group 
one] 
I think if it is more natural, it is usually something that you feel strongly about reflecting 
on so being less structured would allow for a more real reflection … more natural, more 
meaningful. [April in group one]  
This discussion was about how we should structure the research and it was rather clear from 
the start that both groups desired a relaxed and candid environment for sharing their reflections. 
Co-researchers in group one believed that such an environment would allow “real reflection” to 
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emerge, alluding to the idea of true reflection as described in Chapter Seven. This true reflection 
is characterised by being more meaningful and natural.  
When you reflect on your own do you think of "I think I am going to use Gibbs today, I’m 
just going to run the Gibbs’ cycle in my head very quickly" it doesn’t happen that way … 
what’s more important is what you take home from the reflection … it is less to do with 
how many theories you are aware of or use. [Nicola in group one] 
Nicola noted that reflection does not necessarily follow a structure like models of reflection may 
recommend. Similarly, in the research about dialogic reflection, it would have been unnatural 
to structure it using a model of reflection. Once again, this hinted that at the idea of dialogic 
reflection as a method of natural enquiry.  
I had introduced both groups to the research conducted by Tigelaar et al. (2008) where a 
structured way of conducting dialogic reflection was used. Alicia quite sharply critiqued that: 
Is that to avoid all the dialogue? Is that why they are doing it like that? To make it more 
efficient? Because when you reflect there is a lot of a lot of input whereas this sounds 
like very rigid, there is no cross analysis. [Alicia in group two] 
This critique of Tigelaar et al.’s (2008) work indicated two possible points of conflict when 
structuring dialogic reflection: dialogue and efficiency.  
Firstly, it is important to consider how a structure in a dialogic reflection affects the democratic 
dialogue in the reflection. While structures may be useful in encouraging participation, it is also 
a double-edged sword that may limit democracy and emancipation in the reflection.  
Enforcing a structure for reflection can help include those who may find it hard to take part in 
discussions.  
If you have got somebody who feels that he or she can’t contribute for all sorts of reasons 
I think having structured questions makes things easier … I used to be very shy and I think 
in my undergrad, it took me a long time to come out of my shell and take part in group 
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work because I could not feel like I could jump in and having a structure, having someone 
say, "alright it’s your turn, answer the question" just got me to do it. [Sarah in group one] 
Both groups agreed that structuring dialogic reflection can aid in getting the group started with 
sharing reflections especially early stages when group members are not as comfortable in doing 
so. Structures may allow equal space for each member to contribute however it may also limit 
those who choose to share more.  
In doing that you are forcing participation at the same time people who share too much 
would be limited … Structures can’t last forever and can become too awkward to move 
on with. [Me in group one] 
Both groups felt that while structures are useful to start with, they are nonetheless antithesis to 
natural dialogue hence it is not sustainable in the long run.  
If you got those quieter figures or people who can’t think of anything to say then having 
a structure especially at the beginning at the start of the group would perhaps encourage 
other people to contribute. But going back to it, I think it is quite an unnatural. [May in 
group one] 
It was recommended by both groups that a dialogic reflection starts with a structure, using a 
model of reflection to get over the initial reticence and eventually transition to a more free-
flowing discussion.  
Secondly, it is also important what the purpose of these structures and how they support the 
purpose of a dialogic reflection. In the discussion about Tigelaar et al.’s (2008) research, Isabella 
in group two noted it seems like a “more productive” way of reflecting however may appear to 
be more detached. An unstructured dialogic reflection, on the other hand, was described by 
some co-researchers as “in the moment” [Sarah in group one] and “impulsive” [April in group 
one]. However, I questioned if reflections were even meant to be productive in the first place. 
Reflection is inefficient and requires one to halt to think and experiment way of doing things 
which are only sometimes better, it is a process of trial and error (Schön 1983). In this vein, 
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reflection is anathema to organisations that prioritise efficiency. Reflections are perhaps 
productive in the long run as improvements are made as a result of it however these require a 
certain acceptance that some inefficiencies are required. If a dialogic reflection was structured 
such that it would be a more productive or efficient way of reflecting, then it would be arguably 
contradictory to what dialogic reflection is. 
I had noted in my reflective log, 
I have started this group where the members have already spent approximately nine 
months with each other in the curriculum, hence they are comfortable with each other 
and trust each other to a certain extent. It would be very different if I were to do this 
research with a new group of students who just joined the course. At present discussions 
about structures being useful for new groups and building trust through a structure are 
purely speculative and theoretical as we have not experienced it in the research. [My 
reflective log of session four] 
Heron (1999) classified a highly structured group such as Tigelaar et al.’s (2008) research as 
Apollonian, which is characterised by having a detail pre-defined programme. This research, 
which was loosely structured, on the other hand would be considered as Dionysian where 
decisions on activities or topics of discussions are dependent on the feel and motivations of the 
group (Heron 1999). This Dionysian planning that the research groups had used was heavily 
influenced by what we found of interest for discussion. For example, in first session, both groups 
decided that we wanted to better understand dialogic reflection and at that time, my co-
researchers had just returned from a placement. Hence, separately and incidentally, both groups 
arrived at the same decision to conduct a dialogic reflection about dealing with difficult 
educators in session two. Later in the research, my co-researchers were more predominantly 
involved in PBL modules, dialogic reflections on PBL became more topical. I had noted in my 
reflective log, 
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Despite all the redirection and discussion about the differences between PBL and dialogic 
reflection, I have noticed that PBL experiences still remain the main topic of discussion 
during the dialogic reflection sessions. While we have had interesting reflective sessions 
about placement experiences earlier, they have not been recurring nor have they been 
as stirring as the reflective sessions about PBL. I think it is time to acknowledge this 
phenomenon … that in a dialogic reflection, it is more natural or perhaps even helpful to 
talk about something that is affecting the members at that point in time. [My reflective 
log of session five] 
I had tried on a few occasions to draw the differences between PBL reflections and dialogic 
reflections however I still noticed that the groups tended to veer towards talking about PBL 
issues. By session five, I had come to accept that this was an effect of Dionysian mode that the 
research groups found themselves in. My co-researchers in both groups agreed that dialogic 
reflection is rather naturally about what is topical. It appears that a dialogic reflective group 
prefers the Dionysian mode of enquiry and this corroborates with the recommendations that 
both groups had arrived at: to have a natural and free-flowing dialogue. The Dionysian mode is 
important for learning that features “strong emotional and personal growth dimensions” (Heron 
1999, p. 80) and this is certainly true for dialogic reflection. The emotional and personal growth 
dimensions of dialogic reflection will be elaborated in Chapter Ten. 
8.2. Facilitation 
Facilitation was an important feature of dialogic reflection as an approach to enquiry. Heron 
(1999) described three modes of facilitation: 
• The hierarchical mode – where the facilitator has absolute power over the group 
processes and he or she leads the group by thinking and acting for the group 
• The co-operative mode – where the facilitator share power with the rest of the group 
and he or she makes decisions with the group. 
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• The autonomous mode – where the group has the freedom to find their own way 
without any intervention by the facilitator. 
In this concept of group functioning, I saw my facilitation of the groups starting from the 
hierarchical mode and developing into a combination of co-operative and autonomous mode.  
The hierarchical mode was important to start the research. To obtain ethical approval to initiate 
the research, I had to review the literature around dialogic reflection, identifying the gap in 
knowledge and propose a research question and a method to answer this question. I made these 
decisions on the behalf of the research groups. This was also important to recruit the co-
researchers as they needed information about how the research would proceed before 
consenting to participating in it. 
However, as the research progressed, the co-operative and autonomous modes became the key 
feature as the research groups started making decisions jointly such as deciding on what to 
enquire and analyse. While in this mode, I had given up the power of decision making as the 
research progressed however I kept the responsibility of transcribing and making analytical 
notes about the session. This is further elaborated in the next section of this chapter. Though I 
was responsible for booking a venue, the arrangements were largely dependent on the co-
researchers and I had to work around their curriculum times. An example of the autonomous 
mode was when the co-researchers directed the enquiry especially in the later sessions. In my 
reflective log, I noted: 
I … allowed the group to guide the methodology of the research … this has allowed a 
truer form of Participatory Inquiry, a method of inquiry directed purely by participants. 
[My reflective log of session four] 
Nonetheless I was apprehensive about giving up some power over the methodology. I noted in 
my reflective log of session four, “I fear we may have deviated from action research”. However, 
I justified this at that time by returning to the principle of democratic dialogue and the 
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participatory paradigm as described in earlier. It was only through the autonomous mode that 
we arrived at the conclusion that dialogic reflection can be perceived as the approach to enquiry 
in this research. 
8.2.1. Being the Facilitator and a Researcher 
Mediating my roles, as the facilitator of the research and as a participant in this research, was a 
struggle at times. Like Heron (1999) had recommended, I found myself prompting the co-
researchers in the group by playing roles such as the devil’s advocate in the group. However, in 
doing so, I lessened my participation as a member of the research as I had to manage the 
discussions. 
I have found it quite a struggle to manage my role as the devil’s advocate whilst trying 
to participate in the discussions as I had listen to what the others are saying, analysing 
on the spot and driving the discussion, often I find myself missing the opportunity to do 
so as well due to the pace of the discussion. I risk allowing the research to turn into a 
focus group by doing so. Since group think is not much of a problem in this research as 
participants have such diverse experiences that they do not often all agree on something, 
I believe I do not need to pay as much attention on being the devil’s advocate and allow 
the discussion to run naturally. In addition, there are occasions where other group 
members assume the role as well. [My reflective log of session two] 
Negotiating the roles of the facilitator and reflector became easier after arriving at the above 
realisation. There were occasions when I had to assume a role of power in the research for 
example when I proposed that we evaluated the research progress in relation to the initial 
research objectives in session four or when I introduced topics for discussion that the other 
group had raised or when I concluded the research at the end. In these instances, it can be 
argued that I had adopted the hierarchical mode of facilitation however for most of this 
research, it was the co-operative and autonomous modes that were predominant. 
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8.2.2. The Perfect Facilitator 
The key role of a facilitator in the research was to “drive reflections” and get group members to 
“think deeper and consider other aspects” of their experience as a co-researcher in group two 
had summarised. The facilitator of a dialogic reflection is also a guard from an agony aunt 
situation. 
… where people voiced problems and nothing was done about it, no further analysis of 
the experience or what could have been done. [Olivia in group two] 
Other major responsibilities include ensuring confidentiality and setting up group rules. 
However, the groups also mentioned that the groups had the ability to self-regulate and prompt 
each other to think deeper therefore there was potential for the groups to self-facilitate rather 
than requiring a specific member to solely play the role of the facilitator. In this research while I 
played the role of the facilitator, I was also a member in the dialogic reflection hence the 
research groups themselves were self-facilitating already. 
The perfect facilitator for a dialogic reflection possesses six conflicting characteristics: 
8.2.2.1. Possess Shared Experience but External from the Group 
With reference to me, Eve made the following remark, 
I think it helps not only you have similar experiences, but you have similar experiences in 
terms of your awareness of the people that we talk about and it makes it very relatable. 
[Eve in group one] 
However, Sarah also noted, 
Having an external person there I think you are right, when you are in a group, you need 
that person outside to talk about it … when you all are in the same group, talking about 
the same thing going around the circle. [Sarah in group one] 
The groups saw a need for the facilitator to be to a certain a part of the group but still 
maintaining a different perspective. The shared experiences were required to assimilate with 
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the rest of the members however, the members still appreciated a fresh eye on situations that 
they are discussing. This shared experience is elaborated in the next chapter. 
8.2.2.2. More Knowledgeable but Not Superior 
Referring to me, some co-researchers noted, 
Because this is about reflection and you have done so much research about it and you 
have got a lot that you can offer us and guide what we are talking about, I think that is 
needed for something like this. [May in group one] 
I think, Ken you are a previous student and everything so even though we express 
ourselves in this manner, we feel comfortable with you because of that, so I think not an 
educator who assesses our work but somebody who have been in that situation. 
[Charlotte in group two] 
You are not marking us, you are not writing a reference for us so we can go "you know 
what, I did this and it is not particularly great" without thinking of the consequences of 
saying it. [Alicia in group two] 
The groups appreciated my input and observations based on my interest and knowledge in the 
topic area. They had also appreciated the fact that I was not a superior to them and had no 
bearing on their grades hence they were able to trust me and be honest with their reflections. 
In the discussion of facilitators, both groups generally referred to lecturers however they also 
noted that, 
I don’t know how true that reflection would be with the lecturer around. [Eve in group 
one] 
Both groups found it hard to trust lecturers who may sit in judgement of their reflections and 
thus we would rather err on the side of caution and protect ourselves by providing false 
reflections as discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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8.2.2.3. Confident but Sensitive 
Often the facilitator was mentioned to have to take on the role of the metaphorical bad cop to 
address the issues that group members may be reticent about. This is a theoretical discussion 
that we had within the group and did not emerge as a requirement in our groups. 
You need someone to be harsh to ask the right questions, as hurtful as it may be, and as 
damaging as it is to the group, it needs to be raised. [Me in group one] 
We are not as direct as we should be, we beat around the bush a bit, a little woolly, 
because we don’t want to offend or hurt anybody, so that is the way that we are, so you 
need that stronger figure to reflect deeper so these reflections are actually useful. [May 
in group one] 
The research groups felt that because of the reticence they face about certain topics such as 
those that may be perceived as personal attacks, the facilitator could help them overcome this 
by addressing these issues. Hence to do so the facilitator needs to be someone with great 
confidence. However, this has to be done with tact as these issues are tricky to address in nature. 
I had my reservations about empowering the facilitator with the task of addressing the difficult 
issues because of how it takes that responsibility away from the reflector. The sense of 
ownership of the reflection is removed when anonymised through the facilitator in this case, 
therefore, the reflection may be less relatable to the self.  
In discussion of the perfect facilitator to guide the dialogic reflective group, I found myself in a 
unique position in both groups. While having shared experience of being an occupational 
therapy student, I was also not part of the co-researchers’ cohort; while being familiar with the 
theories of reflection, I was not superior to the co-researchers and had no bearing on their 
academic grades; since I am not part of their cohort, I was able to address the difficult issues 
that they are reluctant to discuss but at the same time in a sensitive way as I was aware of the 
difficulties based on my prior experiences as a student. This had led us to discuss who else would 
be best to facilitate a dialogic reflection. The best solution was to have a senior student to 
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facilitate these reflections however this was not a feasible suggestion due to the time-tabling 
differences. This issue is further discussed in Chapter Twelve. 
In summary, the perfect facilitator essentially requires a careful balance of three sets of 
contradictory qualities and this perhaps may not be feasible in the context of occupational 
therapy curriculum. 
8.3. Dialogic Reflection for Enquiry and Analysis 
I saw dialogic reflection similar to Co-operative Inquiry where it is also self-analysing. The 
analysis process in dialogic reflection is interpretational however, these interpretations are 
drawn not by a lone researcher from his or her observation of the data but drawn by group of 
dialogic reflectors from their multiple perspectives of themselves, of each other and of each 
other’s experience. When placed in juxtaposition with models of reflection, the analysis method 
in dialogic reflection stands out as being more dynamic and rich in its consideration and 
knowledge construction and reconstruction. This is partly because dialogic reflection is not only 
constructivist but also demonstrates elements for rational and empirical influences as well. 
8.3.1. Types of Analysis and Enquiry in Dialogic Reflection 
I observed six different ways dialogic reflectors analysed and enquired in a dialogic reflection in 
this research: 
1. Commenting – This was the basic form of analysis that where a member stated his or 
her analysis of the issue 
2. Prompting – This could be asking questions to clarify or asking questions to prompt 
deeper or wider considerations. 
3. Suggesting – This was where a member suggests solution or an alternate perspective of 
the situation. 
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4. Comparing – This form of analysis was where a member compared the situation with his 
or her own experience. Sometimes this was also how members contribute their own 
experience to the reflection. 
5. Speculating – This was a powerful form of analysis where a member generated new 
possibilities by changing certain elements of the situations that was being discussed. 
This was often initiated by the phrase “what if …” 
6. Role Reversal – This form of analysis was dynamic in the sense that members offer 
multiple perspective to the situation by swapping roles with the reflector or view the 
situation from another point of view. 
These six forms of analysis and enquiry were indicated in the excerpt of a transcript below. In 
this excerpt, group two recounted difficult situations they had experienced with their educators 
on their placement and reflects dialogically with the group. The purpose of this excerpt is to 
exemplify the multiple analytical methods adopted in a dialogic reflection. 
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These analyses were offered through an unstructured interaction between the researchers in 
the group, nonetheless they were useful in prompting deeper and broader analysis in the other 
group members about their own experience and their perspective of the experience of others. 
It validated dialogue and reflection as a method of enquiry and analysis. 
In comparison to reflective models that structure the analysis of the experience using prompting 
questions, dialogic reflection offers a more dynamic and multi-dimensional analysis. In Johns’ 
(2013, p. 37) model for structured reflection, he utilised the following prompts for reflection: 
1. What issues are significant to pay attention to? 
2. How were others feeling and why did they feel that way? 
3. What was I trying to achieve, and did I respond effectively? 
4. What were the consequences of my actions on the patients, others, and myself? 
5. To what extent did I act for the best and in tune with my values? 
6. What knowledge did or might have informed me? 
7. How does this situation connect with previous experiences? 
8. What assumptions govern my practice and what factors influence the way I feel, think, 
and respond to the particular situation? 
The model for structured reflection (Johns 2013) appeared to be similar to the analysis in dialogic 
reflection. Question four suggests some role reversal where the reflector explores the impact of 
his or her actions on others. This is however limited as it does not prompt further thought into 
the feelings and thoughts and reasoning behind the action of others in the experience. Some 
elements of comparison of experiences is evident in question seven. However, this only prompts 
the reflector to compare his or her experience with his or her own prior experiences, not with 
that other reflectors in the group. 
The language which Johns’ (2013) model uses suggests that it is meant to prompt the reflector 
to converse with himself or herself (Johns 2013). While this conversation between the reflector 
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and himself or herself may be deemed as dialogic, it remains monologic. This is also similar to 
Gibbs’ (1988) cyclical model. There is no accommodation for any external input from a peer or 
supervisor, even though Johns (2013) had developed the model based on his experience as a 
guide for reflection. In developing this model, Johns (2013) hoped to spur reflectors to think 
more critically about their work though a reflective conversation between themselves and their 
practice. This method of analysis lacks the multiple perspectives that dialogic reflection, as 
described in this chapter, has to offer. While there are some similarities, dialogic reflection 
stands unique from these models of reflection (Gibbs 1988; Johns 2013) because of the dynamic 
method of analysis that occurs in the reflective dialogue. This is especially so for the comparing, 
speculating and role reversal analytical methods. 
8.3.1.1. Comparing 
By using this method of analysis group members place their own experience in juxtaposition 
with that of others. A good example of this is illustrated in the excerpt when Olivia compares 
her experience with that of Sophie’s, indicating that the difference in circumstances resulted in 
her being unable to think positively about her own experience with her difficult educator. In the 
monologic form of reflection, we noted that there usually a constant comparison with prior 
experiences that we had to better understand how the new experience is different and to make 
a judgement on it. However, in the dialogic form, this comparison also occurs with experiences 
that other people had. These further builds on the wealth of experience upon which the reflector 
is able to draw learning from. 
8.3.1.2. Speculating 
Speculating in a dialogic reflection refers to postulating the implications if certain elements were 
to change in the experience. In the excerpt, Alicia and Lea speculated what might happen if the 
student of the difficult educator was someone who was less emotionally resilient. In doing so, 
they had suggested certain modifications of the experience which produced a new experience 
upon which the group can reflect on. This method of analysis is powerful in the sense that it can 
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produce countless imaginative scenarios that the reflectors in the group may not have even 
experienced themselves.  
8.3.1.3. Role Reversal  
Role reversal analysis is an extension of speculation. Reflectors slip into the someone’s shoes in 
the experience to offer their perspective of the situation. This is exemplified by Lea’s response 
to Aria’s experience where she speculated the weakness and reticence she would have felt if 
she were Aria in that situation. This is a powerful method of analysis since it places the member 
in the reflector’s experience and allows the member to picture what his or her thoughts, 
emotions and actions might have been. 
8.3.2. Natural Dialogue as Analysis 
While I have categorised the interactions in the dialogic reflection as commenting, prompting, 
suggesting, speculating, comparing and role reversal, my co-researchers perceived these 
interactions as natural in their own dialogue. 
I think that it something that you naturally do when you reflect, I mean we instinctively 
compare it to existing experience and I think that’s what reflecting is. … I think it is more 
explicit when you do it that way where we all sit round and bounce off each other and 
go yea, I have something similar and this is what happened in my head, but I think it 
brings it out. [Sarah in group one] 
Whenever anybody says, "I’ve done this" I would think like "what would I do". [Sophie in 
group two] 
Its human to compare yourself, inevitably, to others. It’s hard not to. [Ava in group two] 
The analysis methods used in dialogic reflection was not intentional, it was a result of a natural 
dialogue and reflective process. However, they also suggest that these analytical methods are 
also used in monological sense, the dialogic reflection provided an environment where these 
analyses can be made explicit through dialogue. Therefore, it also suggested that dialogic 
reflection can make explicit the implicit processes reflectors experience but may find tricky to 
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express (Polanyi 1966). As enquirers in a dialogic reflection, these analysis methods legitimised 
dialogue as a method of conducting enquiry and constructing or reconstructing knowledge.  
Knowledge is often defined as “objective and analysable” (Halling et al. 1994), Palmer (1983) 
argued that this is because the pursuit for knowledge is driven by curiosity and control (Foucault 
1980). However, as a result knowledge from human experience is often deemed as unreliable 
as it is subjective and unquantifiable (Palmer 1983). This thus detaches us from the natural 
world, since knowledge is not elicited from experiencing the world but studying it from outside. 
Dialogic reflection here challenges this by asserting that knowledge can be generated through 
understanding ourselves and our experience of being in the world. This form of knowledge, 
though subjective, abstract and unmeasurable, is valuable because it situates us in the world. 
Knowledge creation of this form is active in the sense that we are actively engaged in creating it 
through epistemic participation and meaningful because we are part of the process of 
knowledge creation (Heron 1996). 
8.4. Conclusion 
As an approach to enquiry, dialogic reflection does not require a structure however models of 
reflection can help kick start a group into sharing their reflection. It was recommended that the 
discussions were eventually allowed to flow naturally and develop organically. Facilitators are 
useful to prompt and guide however they are tricky to pick because of the seemingly conflicting 
characteristics that they should possess. The dialogic reflectors have also noted that they were 
able to self-regulate the group hence a facilitator may not be that crucial. The analysis methods 
demonstrated naturally in a dialogic reflection are in some ways more dynamic and richer than 
what some models of reflection can offer, hence it may suggest that it could be a better way to 
reflect.  
Knowledge creation in dialogic reflection is subjective, abstract, and unquantifiable. Unlike 
action research or Co-operative Inquiry, this knowledge creation is not procedural. Unlike 
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models of reflection, this knowledge is created through dialogue with others. Knowledge 
creation in dialogic reflection is in the messy, organic, multi-dimensional dialogue about the 
researchers’ experience and does not take on a procedural approach of knowledge cycling like 
in Co-operative Inquiry. Therefore, I saw dialogic reflection being an approach to enquiry distinct 
from Co-operative Inquiry. Despite being unstructured and dynamic, the analysis afforded 
through the reflective process gives it rigour in its process of knowledge generation. Like Co-
operative Inquiry, knowledge generated is grounded in the reflectors’ embodiment of the 
experience and deep reflections about that experience. In addition, this approach to enquiry is 
also a social process which affords it multiple perspectives. This is further elaborated in the next 
chapter.
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Chapter 9. A Community of Knowers 
and Enquirers 
In Chapter Six, I have introduced the key principle where dialogic reflectors are knowers and 
enquirers who possess different experiences and knowledge. Dialogic reflectors are 
independent thinkers with their own motivations for engaging in dialogic reflection. This chapter 
discusses how these independent minds can work together in dialogic reflection.  
I start this chapter by discussing this individualism and uniqueness through the idea of 
worldmaking. Worldmaking was not something that emerged from my initial literature review, 
but it was an idea that was considered by the two research groups. After sharing with the groups 
what I had read about worldmaking, I found that we could use the same ideas to understand 
what was happening in a dialogic reflection. We applied this idea of worldmaking in the dialogic 
reflective environment and developed it into something I called group worldmaking. Group 
worldmaking is about creating an environment for group members to share their reflection. This 
is largely dependent on one’s willingness to trust and show one’s vulnerability, therefore, 
confidentiality in the group world is an important factor. As a result of confidentiality, a group 
world is highly protective of the individuals within it. While the group world is inclusive of these 
participants that contribute to its creation, it also excludes those who are not willing to 
participate. A group world is rather unforgiving in this respect and the way to re-include 
excluded members is to break the natural flow of the group world by introducing some 
structure. The group world is a gathering of multiple world versions; thus, it provides dialogic 
reflectors with multiple perspectives that enrich their reflection on their experiences. 
Knowledge drawn from the dialogic reflective process by the individual is assimilated into his or 
her world version, changing the way the way he or she perceives the world. 
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9.1. Worldmaking 
The theory of worldmaking which dialogic reflection is built on is drawn from oriental and 
occidental philosophies, from works namely by Wang Yang Ming (Henke 1916) and Nelson 
Goodman (1978). Wang (Henke 1916) was a Chinese Neo-Confucian philosopher whose work 
was centred around ethics and morality. He believed that understanding the self in relation to 
the world is the solution to social problems and the path to self-actualisation (van Norden 2014). 
Goodman’s (1978) work, on the other hand, was focused on logic and epistemology which then 
led him to theorise about constructivism. Despite the stark differences in the philosophical 
backgrounds, they both arrived at a similar idea about world construction. Worldmaking here 
refers to the construction of individual versions of the world based on the different perspectives 
that we may have (Goodman 1978). These different versions are how we perceive the world 
through our experiences and they are no more or less important than another (Goodman 1978). 
As a scholar in the Confucian tradition, Wang believed that the true purpose of learning is to 
build morality rather than to accumulate external knowledge such as literature and science (van 
Norden 2014). This moral knowledge is innate and leading a good life is all about allowing this 
innate moral knowing guide one’s actions (van Norden 2014). Learning is about eliminating 
selfish human desires that cloud the guidance by one’s innate moral knowing, and a good life is 
about trusting this moral guidance. Therefore, understanding the external world is of less 
importance, relative to understanding one’s mind. This led Wang (Henke 1916, p. 307) to 
conclude that “the principles of things and affairs are not to be found external to the mind”. 
Wang (Henke 1916) believed that the external world does not exist, and the world is actually a 
construction of the mind (van Norden 2014). Kim (2017) explained this more clearly below: 
This redefinition of the external world is based on the insight that everything we can 
know about the world is mediated by experience. This experience is made possible by our 
sense organs. The activity of these sense organs is associated with the mind. Thus, all 
things that we encounter in our lives are necessarily associated with the mind. The world 
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so conceived is no longer an independent entity external to the mind, but an inseparable 
part of the mind. According to this picture, the external world exists always in reference 
to the self. (Kim 2017, p. 1) 
Wang’s redefinition of the world essentially means that the perception and understanding of 
the world is a product of the operations of the mind (Henke 1916). Thus, the world as seen 
through one’s perspective is built on one’s understanding of one’s world. In Wang’s work, there 
was an acceptance of multiple different worlds, based on our individual understanding of our 
interaction with the world (Henke 1916).  
Goodman’s (1978) work on worldmaking was born from his attempt to reconcile the logic in the 
two seemingly contradictory statements below: 
1. The earth is at rest. 
2. The earth moves. 
To clarify, they should be understood as: 
3. The earth is at rest, according to the geocentric system 
4. The earth moves, according to the heliocentric system 
Statements three and four give more explanation to statements one and two respectively. The 
earth is at rest, relative to the earth in the geocentric system, but moves when relative to the 
sun in the heliocentric system. However, statements three and four do not tell us about the 
world as they only inform us of what is true according to either the geocentric system or the 
heliocentric system. Therefore, if statements one and two are considered true in the same 
world, then there is a contradiction. Goodman (1978) resolved this contradiction by claiming 
that both statements are true but they are truths about different versions of the world.  
As shown in the example above Goodman (1978) argued that there are contradictions that 
cannot exist in the same world. Puzzled by this, Goodman (1978) reconciled this illogical 
situation by postulating that there are many versions of the same world, and in each of these 
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versions, there are certain truths that may conflict with each other. In other words, these truths 
can only be true to that version of the world. Because there is a need for these multiple versions 
of the world to accommodate these multiple truths, then there is no need for an objective real 
world (Cohnitz 2016). These versions of the world would suffice because we can only have access 
to them (Cohnitz 2016). The existence of a neutral real world is perhaps an assumption; 
however, it is not worth discovery since it does not tell us how true or false each version of the 
world is (Cohnitz 2016). 
Like how theories are built on other theories, world versions are made from other world 
versions, not made from scratch (Goodman 1978). Our world versions are made from our 
understanding of philosophy, science, art and all other disciplines that we study. Worldmaking 
is a complex process that requires constant remaking as new theories are accepted, old theories 
are rejected, or new discoveries are made as part of our understanding of the world (Goodman 
1978; Cohnitz 2016). As these theories-in-use change with more experience (Argyris and Schön 
1974), so do the world versions. Therefore, with this understanding, it can be concluded that we 
all have different world versions that we believe to be true.  
Synthesising the works of Wang (Henke 1916) and Goodman (1978), it is concluded there exist 
multiple versions of the world that reside in our minds. These are worlds built on our 
understanding of our experience with the world and the theories that we use to arrive at them. 
Therefore, these world versions can be very different or similar to one another. However, they 
all are nonetheless true in relation to themselves and no more or less important than one 
another. Dialogic reflectors are reflectors that have different world versions in their minds. They 
see things differently from one another, have different values and interests from one another. 
This hence led to the conclusion that dialogic reflectors are unique knowers and enquirers and 
dialogic reflection should respect them as so. However, having unique knowers and enquirers in 
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the same dialogue can be seen as rather problematic when conflict arises. My co-researchers 
and I had resolved this with the concept of group worldmaking. 
9.2. Group Worldmaking 
The concept of group worldmaking is built on Wang’s (Henke 1916) and Goodman’s (1978) 
works. Philosophies such as empiricism presuppose a real external world which we try to 
understand. Worldmaking, however, does not deem the external world, whether it exists or not, 
as important (Henke 1916; Goodman 1978). It is the world version or the world as we perceive 
it that is of main concern here (Henke 1916; Goodman 1978).  
The key assumption in group worldmaking is that as dialogic reflectors, our contributions to the 
dialogue influences the way others construct their world versions. A dialogic reflection is a 
gathering of multiple different world versions and perspectives. Through the methods of enquiry 
and analysis as described in the previous chapter, dialogic reflectors influence each other and 
hence change the way they may have perceived the world.  
The idea of group worldmaking emerged as a theme from my observation on how reflectors 
questioned, challenged and protected each other within the group, how and why they 
developed trust and showed vulnerability and offered multiple perspectives to each other 
through reflection. The purpose of this chapter is to show how reflectors interact in a group 
context, as a community and the following sections on trust, confidentiality, inclusion and 
multiple perspectives demonstrate how this community forms, its mechanics and its value. 
Referring to the research sessions, the co-researcher below made the following observation 
about engaging in dialogic reflection: 
I would say though, we got to know more about each other from these groups ... we 
have done social things and that, but I feel like in these sessions as well, we have got the 
opportunity to bare ourselves and trust each other more. [Isabella in group two] 
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Dialogic reflection creates an environment where reflectors are safe to reveal a part of 
themselves for others and in doing so, allow others to get a better understanding of them. 
Every time you talk about something, share your experience, question your friends on 
their experiences, you give other people a glimpse of what you value and what you see 
as important in life. [Me in group one] 
Dialogic reflectors reveal in their discussions about their experience a part of the world that they 
have conceived in their mind, and along with that, their own values and knowledge. In sharing 
these personal insights, a group world is formed. 
Unlike the world versions that Goodman (1978) had theorised, this group world is not an 
understanding of the external world. Rather, this group world refers to a protected, safe 
environment for co-operative analysis of experience and knowledge generation. Unlike a version 
of the world, it is not about conflating what the group knows to be true, rather it is an arena 
where knowledge is permitted to contradict or corroborate, and reflectors can question and 
debate with each other. The knowledge that one elicits from this process then inform one’s 
world version, reaffirming it or deconstructing it. The group world is contentious yet 
compassionate; it is rich with shared knowledge and questions about the world. It is not about 
proving truths but about understanding opinions and differing perspectives, and through that, 
enrich one’s own world version. 
9.3. Vulnerability and Trust 
There are some conditions to group worldmaking. To share personal experiences with someone, 
not to mention sharing a glimpse of one’s world version, requires a certain degree of 
vulnerability. In group one, I questioned if it was possible for a group of strangers to reflect 
dialogically. The co-researchers responded that they think that it would not be as “honest” or 
“safe” to do so and “would be pretty shallow”.  
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You would be like “how much can I share?” or “are other people going to be judging?”, 
“what is their role in this reflection?” [April in group one] 
The degree of trust directly affects how much one is willing to share in one’s reflection. In 
contrast, in this research, a co-researcher noted that: 
We have got an idea of each other’s values and boundaries. [Eve in group one] 
Hence, the co-researchers are more inclined to trust each other to reveal their vulnerabilities 
through sharing of their own experiences and their world versions. 
However, trust is not only required for sharing one’s world version but also to question another’s 
experience. 
You have to really trust people in the group to say, “hang on a minute, stop and think 
about that again” without making them defensive about it. It would have to be 
somebody who knew me really well, who is calling on me, for me to stop and go “oh yea 
you are right”. Otherwise, it would feel like an attack. [Sarah in group one] 
Not only are reflectors trusting each other to share experiences, they also need to trust each 
other to be open to being questioned about their thought process. This trust goes two ways 
between the reflectors and analysers in the group. 
This led me to question why my co-researchers had trusted me enough to reflect dialogically 
with me. While my co-researchers had known each other for about six months before we started 
the research, I did not have that same amount of contact with them. It was puzzling to me that 
they were comfortable with reflecting me since the start of the research. Ava noted, 
I think it helped that we met you before we started too because we became aware of 
you, more familiar and that led us to trust you then. [Ava in group two] 
My observation sessions prior to the recruitment and information session were crucial in this 
trust-building process between my co-researchers and me. In that sense, when the research 
started, I was no longer a stranger to my co-researchers. By then, they felt comfortable enough 
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to open up to me. Throughout the research and even before, there were moments where my 
co-researchers asked me about my life and my own experience as a student. Occasionally, these 
questions jolted me mildly. Was I playing the role of the facilitator and the devil’s advocate too 
often and was not being a reflector? It was clear that my co-researchers wanted to include me 
in the dialogic reflection, in these cases, it felt like they were facilitating and prompting me to 
reflect with them. Like in Whitmore’s (1994) research, my self-disclosure help bridge my role as 
the researcher and the researched, as the facilitator and reflector in the group. In her work with 
oppressed groups, self-disclosure helped humanise her, such that her participants saw her “not 
as a fantasy” (Whitmore 1994, p. 94) and capable of mistakes. To a small extent, I felt this was 
happening in my research as well. Isabella noted the following about dialogic reflection, 
You feel more human in a way when you discuss it, when you talk about things that you 
have done wrong or could do better … it confirms your feelings are OK … maybe it 
appeared that others are off being professional and amazing when if they were honest 
about it, they still have hang-ups or they were still worried about things. [Isabella in 
group two] 
Building trust in dialogic reflection is about dropping barriers (Whitmore 1994) and revealing 
vulnerabilities. My co-researchers noted that there was often an assumption that they were the 
only ones who make mistakes and have had a hard time with practice. It is not until someone 
shares a negative experience or a difficulty when the “floodgates open” and they can have an 
honest discussion about their true experience. 
Initially, everyone is very positive and then the first person says something negative 
about their placement, initially they tip toe around it a little bit ... "is anybody finding 
this difficult?" and then the floodgates open and they start discussing. But you need that 
because it is reassuring. [Sarah in group one] 
The process of building truth is a chicken-or-the-egg dilemma: 
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For me to reveal myself to build this group world, I need to be able to trust the other 
members of the group, if I don’t, I won’t say anything. But then for the trust to be present, 
I need to reveal myself to start with. [Me in group one] 
The thing is that I don’t think you can trust each other if you don’t bare a little bit of 
yourself. It is like with clients, they won’t trust you unless you allow a little bit of yourself 
to come through, so, therefore, it is the same in any group dynamic. [Alicia in group two] 
One needs to be able to trust the group before one can reveal one’s vulnerabilities. However, 
to build that trust, one needs to be willing to be vulnerable enough for others to see one’s world 
version. Both research groups felt that to solve this dilemma, some sort of structure may be 
helpful in providing a protected space that one may need to share one’s vulnerabilities. Once 
there is a certain level of trust in the group, it snowballs as reflectors become more comfortable 
to share more with each other. 
I think if you have a reflective bit, you might put out some stuff just to see what kind of 
response you get. If that is a group that you reflected with all the time, by the third time 
you do that in the group, you would somehow build up that kind of trust. [Isabella in 
group two] 
9.4. Confidentiality and Protection 
One way to build trust in dialogic reflection is ensuring confidentiality, such that dialogic 
reflectors are comfortable with sharing without thinking about the consequences of doing so. In 
this research, confidentiality was rehashed repeatedly. Confidentiality was stated in the 
participant information sheet, consent form, information session and at almost all the meeting 
sessions. Confidentiality was also in the list of group rules that both groups had set.  
During the meetings I found myself repeating that the supervisors of this research would not 
see the transcripts of the meetings and if quotes were to be shared, they will not be identifiable. 
Occasionally I had repeated this because I could sense some reticence amongst the research 
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group members as they spoke about their experiences. This was often when the reflectors were 
reflecting on their university experiences where they voiced their thoughts on their lecturers.  
When sharing their experiences, my co-researchers had been very aware of the confidentiality 
especially about the identity of their patients and educators. No identifiable information had 
been shared in the groups. There was a shared experience that was often the topic of discussion 
in the sessions. My co-researchers were rather frustrated about a student in their cohort who 
they felt was not pulling his or her weight and another student who was brash in the way he or 
she raised certain issues in their PBL groups. While their experiences with these two individuals 
were repeated often, my co-researchers were very careful to not let slip their names to me. In 
group two, they had decided to use the pseudonyms “Betty” and “Parsnip” when talking about 
these two individuals which led to some humorous exchanges when they started to confuse 
themselves with the pseudonyms. The following quotes are from separate reflections on the 
experience of working with these difficult individuals: 
I am wondering if you have internalised anything from that interaction with that person. 
Have you picked up any sort of reflections on yourself and your own beliefs and what it 
means to be a good PBL member? [Me in group one] 
Do you think that that person reflects? On how he or she affects the group? [Alicia in 
group two] 
While confidentiality was important in dialogic reflection, I saw that the identity of the people 
in the reflection was not of great importance. The focus is on the self and how one understands 
the situation.  
There were situations where the groups felt that it would be necessary to break confidentiality, 
with the permission of the group. These are situations where the group would have benefitted 
from some external aid. An example of such a scenario is when a member is extremely distraught 
and some counselling by a professional would be helpful. While this did not happen during the 
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research, both groups agreed that it would be useful to break confidentiality but only if the 
group agrees to it.  
It also appears that in a group world, group members are protective of each other. I observed 
this when a lecturer made a remark about a co-researcher being too quiet in her PBL session. 
During the dialogic reflection session with me after that happened, all the group members leapt 
to defend that co-researcher. I also pointed out to both groups that I would not allow new 
members to join the group or anyone external to sit in, not only because of confidentiality but 
also because I felt responsible for protecting the co-researchers. This level of protection did 
concern me as I wondered if it could have limited the perspectives and the depth of reflection. 
Sarah responded, 
I only see it as a positive because what we need to get out of it is personal reflection, I 
think it is a good thing that we are protective. [Sarah in group one] 
Sarah saw that this protective environment was more important because of the need for 
democratic dialogue. Therefore, confidentiality generally superseded the value of any external 
input. 
It would be interesting how outside that world, individual lecturers interpret, some might 
think that we are doing really well yet someone else might have a different opinion, like 
trying to understand the dynamics of that group world. [Eve in group one] 
There was some value in having external input in the group world, however, some of us 
contended, 
But do the opinions of an external person matter? Because we function as we want to, 
it is our reflection, so someone outside might say that we are not working properly, that 
we need to be more structured, but this works for us. [Me in group one] 
I am quite protective, like for this group if someone were to come in and say, "we are re-
jiggling it, we are going to do this" and I would be “no, this is how we do it”. [April in 
group one] 
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In a group world, I saw that we felt the need to protect the group world from external influences. 
This is also evident in the tone that some of us had used when discussing this, it was almost as 
though external input is treated as a form of critique on the group, something threatening to 
the group function rather than something constructive.  
Confidentiality and protection are of great importance in the creation of a group world for they 
are prerequisites for democratic dialogue, a key principle of dialogic reflection. Confidentiality 
is not only about keeping the discussions within the group and protecting the identity of the 
group members. It is also about keeping the identity of the people they reflect on hidden. The 
key purpose of dialogic reflection is about understanding the experience hence the identities of 
the people in those experiences were not crucial. In a group world, members are protective of 
each other from those outside the groups and this is important for democratic dialogue to take 
place. 
9.5. Inclusion, Exclusion, and Re-Inclusion 
This protectionism also means that the group world can include and exclude members. The 
group world that is created is inclusive to the extent of the level of participation of each group 
member. In other words, if a member is reluctant to contribute his or her experience, then the 
group world would potentially be created while excluding that individual. Due to the protective 
characteristic of the group world, it is not easy to re-join the group world as this individual would 
be deemed as an external member. This section is a theoretical discussion that both groups had. 
There was no exclusion of any members during the group and all members were included in the 
group discussions throughout the research. 
You get out what you put in and at this level, we should be responsible and mature 
enough to know that if we don’t say anything we are not going to get anything out of it. 
[Isabella in group two] 
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The group can go on without that person, so it is a personal issue I feel and it is to the 
detriment of them if they don’t engage [Sophie in group two] 
The group world that is created is only inclusive of those who contributed to creating it. Group 
members open themselves so that others can see a bit of their world version, but when someone 
is reluctant to do so, the others are not aware of how that person perceives the world or what 
he or she values. Thus, it is possible that the group world can be created can be exclusive of 
individuals who are not willing to participate in its creation. 
I think it goes back to what we said about the trust, if you don’t trust that person you are 
not going to be open to their ideas and vice versa, and maybe they are not sharing their 
ideas and you can’t trust them. [Isabella in group two] 
Maybe they are not including themselves in the group world so because we cannot see 
any of their worlds, they are not seeing any of ours either. [Sophie in group two] 
The reluctance to share one’s world version affects the degree of trust. When one does not trust 
the other members enough to share, then the other members would not trust one to include 
one in their group world.  
Some co-researchers noted this exclusion is dependent on the individual and how he or she 
deals with the difficulties of opening up to the group. To a certain extent, it is a personal issue. 
The group functions better if people bare themselves and try to understand other people. 
If that person is not understanding everyone else and they can’t engage in the group 
because they can’t contribute to the group world and they self-isolate themselves. [Alicia 
in group two] 
Maybe they are trying to understand their own world, their position in the group and 
their actions. [Olivia in group two] 
This suggested that the group world creation requires a degree of openness and also some 
awareness of one’s world version and values. There needs to be a certain level of maturity and 
self-awareness to be able to participate effectively and constructively in the group world. 
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However, if the reluctance to participate is due to one’s personality then perhaps dialogic 
reflection is not suitable for one. 
Sometimes it is breaking through that to get comfortable but if you have got deeper 
issues about sharing stuff, like if you are a very private person and you have trouble 
expressing something like that in a group, maybe there is not a way of forcing that, 
maybe group reflections is not for you, if you can’t get pass that. Some people will never 
feel comfortable. [Sarah in group one] 
To re-include an excluded member, both research groups believe that it would be necessary to 
break the natural flow of the group world to allow it to be recreated again to include the 
excluded individual. Re-introducing structures such as that which was used in Tigelaar et al.’s 
(2008) research can help this process. A degree of democratic dialogue would have to be 
sacrificed for this process of re-inclusion. 
Perhaps if you allocated time so that everyone can get to speak as well. [Geri in group 
one] 
I think that would be a good idea to allow a group to use a structure when reflecting 
without it being too structured, just to ensure that everyone has got a fair opportunity 
to contribute. [May in group one] 
The allocated opportunity for individual contribution in Tigelaar et al.’s (2008) research was 
thought to be inclusive and could be helpful in re-including an excluded member. 
In the discussion about using a structure for re-inclusion, group one explored a passive method 
of participation where members pass around a written reflective piece to contribute to it 
anonymously. This was suggested to overcome the reticence about participating in a dialogic 
reflection. However, April noted that there would be an issue of ownership of the reflective 
contribution. 
But then you don’t take ownership of that with that paper if we talk about bringing in 
individual experiences … how would you know that person has had an involvement in 
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creating this reflective world? I think they have to take ownership because that way you 
have an insight into what they are thinking. Perhaps anonymously doing it, it doesn’t 
work. [April in group one] 
I added to this point by noting that participating in a reflection in this way does not contribute 
to the creation of a group world because of the lack of ownership of one’s participation.  
Because you are not openly saying or reflecting, and you are doing it behind certain 
barriers or walls and you hide behind them. While protecting yourself, you are also hiding 
away from letting other people understand you, so in that sense, if you are passing a 
piece of paper around then you are not showing people your world and it doesn’t create 
that group world then. [Me in group one] 
Anonymous passive participation does little to contribute to the group world formation. 
Dialogue reflection is only dialogic insofar as the participants are taking part in the dialogue. 
Such participation necessarily requires one to take ownership of what they say and contribute 
to the dialogue. By doing so, the other members can understand the individual’s world version. 
This would be crucial to building trust and creating the group world. 
The group world creation is also inclusive because individuals that participate in creating it have 
a shared value and interest. This shared value, such as appreciating confidentiality in dialogic 
reflection, bring dialogic reflectors together. Isabella made the following observation about the 
dialogic reflection group sessions that we have conducted. 
I think it also depends on what you value … the people that have engaged in your 
research Ken, we all value reflecting, we come to this because we are interested in it, 
whereas there are several people in our cohort that haven’t come to you, your groups. 
Maybe they do not see reflecting in a group as important to them, they don’t see a point 
in it. [Isabella in group two] 
Dialogic reflectors in my research were interested in reflection hence this brought the co-
researchers together because of the motivation to collaboratively explore it. While this quote 
referred to this research, it also suggested that for a dialogic reflection to be successful, there 
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needs to be a shared purpose for that dialogic reflection. For example, for a dialogic reflective 
group on exploring creative teaching methods to be successful, participants in that group need 
to share an appreciation of the value of creative teaching methods. The group world builds on 
these shared values and interest and in the process, it also automatically excludes those who 
are not interested in it through their lack of participation in its creation.  
9.6. Multiple Perspectives 
Despite the shared interest and values, the main value of dialogic reflection is the multiple 
different perspectives that it offers. These multiple perspectives come from bringing together 
multiple world versions built from unique combinations of interests, values, and morals. This 
allows a reflector to explore his or her experience through different world versions hence 
enriching the reflection by many folds. While having multiple world versions may seem 
problematic, it is precisely the value of dialogic reflection. Dialogic reflection is not about 
achieving consensus, rather it is about gaining a better understanding of the experience which 
can only be achieved through accepting conflicting and differing perspectives. 
The group world is extremely accommodating of differing world versions and thus it allows very 
broad analysis of an experience through the contributions of the other group members. Isabella 
described this as: 
When we all met up after placement, we've all coming from lots of different areas, so it 
really broadens your thinking. Everyone had brought other experiences and different 
educators and different settings. [Isabella in group two] 
I explained the value of multiple perspectives below: 
We don’t see all sides of the same thing, unfortunately, as much as you try to. You are 
limited to what know, value and our prior experiences which is why we need each other 
to reflect with us so you get multiple perspectives and you get a more holistic picture of 
the experience. [Me in group one] 
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Sophie noted the following after reflecting dialogically with the group: 
I think I am seeing it more rationally and not so emotionally now. Because I have been 
through it now, it doesn’t seem as scary as it was at that time ... I mean you look, your 
face looks absolutely horrified when I’m talking about it, but, I have been through it now, 
it didn’t feel that it was that bad even though your face tells me it was. [Sophie in group 
two] 
During her reflection, I noted that she was rather rational as she talked about her experience 
and what she had learned from it. However, this experience that she described was particularly 
emotional and distressing for the other members. This led to the members to react rather 
passionately in their analysis of the experience. Sophie, however, remained rather composed. 
In the above quote, she noted that the group members brought up an emotional dimension to 
her experience which she did not seem to be able to recall. The co-researchers below reflected 
on their contribution to this emotional dimension: 
Because you were living the experience and you sort of knew you have to get on with it 
for placement sake, you sort of dulled down how inappropriate how an educator may 
have been, and I think we relived it back to you and say that it’s not OK. I remember you 
saying, "hearing you say that now makes me realise it was not OK" and it was quite a 
brutal. [Olivia in group two] 
I think after time passed after an event though you forget how bad or how powerful 
something is … On placement, you were thinking “oh my god” but when reflecting with 
us you were like "I’ve got through it" but it took us to relive how bad it was for you. [Ava 
in group two] 
The multiple perspectives in this case caused by the time at which the reflection was conducted. 
The reflector had been through the experience a while ago, reflected on it herself and came to 
certain conclusions of her own. When recounting this experience, she presented to the group a 
reflection on a distressing experience. In doing so, she had softened the emotional dimension 
of her reflection because it was already dealt with at that time. The other members, however, 
were listening to the experience for the first time. The emotional reaction to her experience 
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suggested some degree of role reversal where they started to see and feel the experience 
through the perspective of the reflector. As a result, this led to their powerful and passionate 
response in the dialogic reflection. The fact that Sophie previously said, “hearing you say that 
now makes me realise it was not OK", suggested that these emotional responses from the other 
reflectors had offered her a side of her own experience that she did not see. 
Another cause of multiple perspectives in dialogic reflection is different morals and values that 
group members have. April noted the following when reflecting about a situation where a group 
member in her PBL module was repeatedly absent. 
I don’t find some things morally right ... or my values don’t agree with something, it does 
come down to that and what people place more importance on. So, like not turning up 
and not telling anyone, to me I would not personally do that, it depends on your morals. 
If I did do what she did, I would have thought “how would that make other people feel”, 
“how did could I have done this differently”. I think morals and values have a lot of deal 
with it how people think about the same issue. [April in group one] 
In response, I suggested that, 
Perhaps our morals and values guide our reflections and ultimately drive us to take 
certain actions over others. [Me in group one] 
Values and morals guide the creation of the world version and frame one’s judgement of right 
and wrong. Hence, they would have an impact on how one reflects in the dialogic reflection.  
One’s wealth of experience is another reason for different perspectives, 
There is a big age range between us sat here right now and even people doing their GCSE 
or their A levels have their way of reflecting. [Isabella in group two] 
I think it can work both ways though you can have people who are really experienced 
but become quite narrow in their thinking and maybe they need this fresh set of eyes to 
make them think differently. Because the way you think is something created from years 
and years of practice. [Olivia in group two] 
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The co-researchers felt that as people reflect, they change their world versions as they learn and 
unlearn ideas. According to Dewey (1933), this process of construction, deconstruction and 
reconstruction changes the way people reflect and think. The process of reflection is always 
evolving because the reflective process is often done in comparison to what one knows and have 
experienced prior (Schön 1983). Therefore, the same person may reflect differently at different 
ages. A dialogic reflective group of members from a range of ages, such as this research, would 
provide multiple perspectives partially because of this. 
While dialogic reflections can cause conflict because of the multiple perspectives, we valued this 
conflict over consensus. 
If you are saying each time you share, you share a little bit of your world I think it comes 
back to that fact that everyone is different … you will never truly agree completely. [Eve 
in group one] 
The sharing of one’s world version through dialogic reflection ensures that each contribution is 
unique. Therefore, in this vein, the purpose of a facilitator in a dialogic reflection to play the 
devil’s advocate to prevent group think, where the group members agree and reinforce each 
other, is perhaps redundant. This was pointed out by Sarah below: 
I can see the purpose of the facilitator in that case, but you are always going to have 
views that are conflicting. I can see the danger especially if everybody agrees on 
everything and you just reinforce each other's ideas and nobody challenging you on 
anything and that is probably not healthy reflection. [Sarah in group one] 
This further suggested that the role of the facilitator is perhaps rather limited in a dialogic 
reflection since group members may find it difficult to achieve group think. Group think is an 
issue in Co-operative Inquiry (Heron and Reason 2001) which led to Heron (1999) to stress the 
importance for the facilitator to play the role of the devil’s advocate in the group. This is perhaps 
another way dialogic reflection differs from Co-operative Inquiry.  
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Tuckman (1965) theorised four developmental sequences for small groups: 
1. Forming – Where the group orientates itself to the task, understanding the parameters 
within which it must work to complete the task. 
2. Storming – Where group member expresses their individuality and resist the formation 
of a cohesive group 
3. Norming – Where the group members accept each other for their unique qualities. The 
group achieves harmony. 
4. Performing – Where the group becomes effective at problem-solving and group 
members take on specialist roles in the team when working towards the completion of 
the task. 
It is, however, important to note that these group development sequences refer to task-oriented 
groups where problem-solving is the main purpose (Tuckman 1965), unlike dialogic reflection. 
Nonetheless, we found that Tuckman’s (1965) work was useful in helping us conceptualise group 
worldmaking. In our dialogic reflections, April noted that: 
Performing is lovely but if you want to reflect, you need to be able to take a little step 
back and talk about of difficult things. [April in group one] 
I pointed out that, 
I think there is a danger when you start norming because people start to think the same 
way … then there is no point in having so many people reflecting. What we want to 
achieve here is to get as many multiple perspectives as possible. So, I think the best place 
to be is the storming, so we have people with different ideas, conflicting but that is fine 
because that is what we want. [Me in group one] 
In dialogic reflection, the gathering of multiple world versions to create a group world ensures 
that consensus is hard to achieve because these multiple world versions differ in values, 
experiences, knowledge; they differ at very fundamental levels. Dialogic reflection requires 
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reflectors to share their own values and experiences with each other because of the nature of 
the enquiry requires such a level of intimacy. It is rare that reflectors would share completely 
identical world versions hence it is also rare for reflectors to think identically. The group world 
that forms in dialogic reflection is able to accommodate these multiple world versions because 
the purpose of dialogic reflection is not to arrive at a consensus or to collaborate on creating a 
common product such as a report or a presentation. Rather, it is about what the individual 
reflector takes away from the process of reflecting with others. The knowledge generated by 
the individual through this collaborative exploration of the experience is assimilated by the 
individual, informing, and transforming his or her understanding of the world, therefore, 
changing his or her world version. 
9.7. Conclusion 
According to Wang (Henke 1916) and Goodman (1978), individuals see the world in different 
ways. Hence, they have a perception of the world that may often be different from other people. 
Dialogic reflection, however, creates an environment where these world versions can meet, 
forming a group world. A group world is an arena where experience is shared and compared, 
and knowledge is generated and debated. It is not about achieving a collective agreement on 
something, rather it is about what each individual takes from the dialogic reflective process. 
Group worldmaking is a delicate process that requires reflectors to bare themselves and trust 
each other to do so. Only through honest and democratic dialogue can reflectors create this 
group world. However, group worldmaking is an unforgiving process that punishes those who 
refuse or are reluctant to trust others or share their vulnerabilities. Re-entry into a formed group 
world is rather difficult due to the confidentiality and high level of protection. Re-inclusion would 
require the group world to be broken by introducing a structure which disrupts the natural flow 
in the group. In doing so, the structure invites all members to join in the remaking of the group 
world. 
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A group world is a safe environment for differing world versions to collide and transform each 
other through dialogic reflection. The multiple perspectives proffered by each world version 
helps provide the reflector with a multi-dimensional analysis of his or her experience. 
Knowledge elicited by the reflector during this process then informs his or her world version. 
Knowing from experience in dialogic reflection is supported and enriched by multiple 
perspectives of the world. Therefore, knowledge in dialogic reflection is created by a community 
of unique knowers and enquirers.  
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Chapter 10. The Art of Knowing 
from Experience Through Dialogue 
The previous chapter discussed the different elements of dialogic reflection as a method of 
enquiry. This chapter furthers this argument by asserting that dialogic reflection is not only 
about enquiry into propositional knowledge about a subject matter. In fact, dialogic reflection 
is about understanding oneself and one’s world version. Dialogic reflection goes beyond testing 
one’s intellect, it also motivates one to question the emotional and moral dimensions of one’s 
experience. Therefore, dialogic reflection is about appreciating the interaction between these 
different dimensions of one’s experience. These different dimensions of one’s experience 
influence and inform each other. 
This chapter starts with a discussion about the nature of experience and its artistic nature. As a 
way of knowing from experience, dialogic reflection appreciates this artistic nature of 
experience and thus, is an artistic way of knowing. Dialogic reflection for moral and emotional 
knowing is explored in this chapter to further add weight to this argument. Since dialogic 
reflection is about knowing and understanding one’s experience, it is a natural form of enquiry 
about the world. However, it is made esoteric by theorists and its application in the professional 
setting. 
10.1. Experience as Art  
The final argument for dialogic reflection to be considered as an epistemology is the fact that 
dialogic reflection is an artistic way of knowing about the world though one’s experience of it. 
This argument is built on Dewey’s (1934) work on the artistic nature of experience. Experience 
is more than an itinerary of happenings, it is a mixture of intellect, actions, emotions, and morals 
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that influence each other. While there are many dimensions to an experience, they are ill-
defined because of how closely they relate to each other. Experience, therefore, must be 
understood as a whole, and not treated as a sum of these dimensions (Dewey 1934). 
Dewey (1934) believed in the artistic and fluid nature of experience. To have an experience, one 
has to allow the material experienced to have completed its course (Dewey 1934). In this sense, 
the experience is whole and has its own individual quality. Dewey (1934) believed that we 
experience life in its various episodes of activity. However, each individual episode flows freely 
from one to the other, without pauses or blanks.  
In experience, flow is from something to something. As one part leads into another and 
as one part carries on what went before, each gains distinctness in itself. (Dewey 1934, 
p. 36) 
This leads to Dewey’s (1934) argument that experience is artistic. In a piece of art, different 
objects and scenes blend into unity, however, each still holding on their individual character. 
Similarly, these various episodes of activity flow into each other in succession however, they still 
retain their distinct individual characteristics. That is what that makes the experience unique to 
the individual due to the distinct nature of these episodes such as what the individual is thinking 
and feeling as he or she walks the patient to the bed or how the individual has observed the 
patient behaved throughout this activity. This experience inherently belongs to the individual 
who is experiencing, and all thoughts, feelings and observation are from the perspective of the 
individual.  
Each experience is unique in its own emotional, practical, and intellectual components. 
However, Dewey (1934) believed that these components are not separate or independent of 
each other. They are in fact “subtle shadings of a pervading and developing hue” (Dewey 1934, 
p. 37). The components fade in and out of each other; emotion, the activity and intellect do not 
exist in isolation. One cannot feel angry without something to be angry about; similarly, one 
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cannot have any thoughts not tied to an activity or emotion. The emotions, activity and 
intellectual components make up the individual episodes which are the constituent parts of the 
entire experience. In parallel, the colour, paint quality and brushstrokes make up the objects or 
scenes which blend harmoniously to make up the painting. Hence, experience has an artistic 
quality (Dewey 1934). 
Reflection can be viewed as a sequential examination of the individual qualities of an experience 
(Gibbs 1988). Gibbs (1988) proposed that the reflective process should be used as a more 
elaborate way of debriefing after an experience. In his model, he urged the user to consider his 
or her feelings especially when reflecting as this is often neglected and to follow the steps that 
he had outlined in the cycle procedurally. His reflective cycle included the following processes 
and some instructions for each process. 
 
Figure 4. Gibbs' (1988) reflective cycle 
With reference to figure four,  
1. Description – Describe what happened, however, do not make attempt to judge or 
make conclusions. 
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2. Feelings – Note the reactions and feelings, however, do not analyse them yet. 
3. Evaluation – Make judgements on the good and bad aspects of the experience. 
4. Analysis – Utilising ideas outside the experience, make sense of the situation 
5. Conclusions (general) – Draw general conclusions from the analysis 
6. Conclusions (specific) – Draw specific conclusions on your unique and personal way 
of working. 
7. Personal Action Plans – Show how the situation can be approached differently in 
the future. This loops back to a new experience and then leads to another cycle of 
reflection. 
Gibbs (1988) warned the user to not make judgements prematurely and to move logically from 
one step to the next. He believed that that the practical, emotional, and intellectual aspects of 
an experience can be isolated from each other in the Description, Feelings, Evaluation and 
Analysis steps respectively (Gibbs 1988). 
However, from Dewey’s (1934) concept of experience, it could be concluded that it is futile to 
examine the emotional, practical, and intellectual component of an experience in isolation for 
they exist because of each other. In other words, experience must be examined as a whole and 
not its constituent parts.  
Dewey’s (1934) concept of experience was built on James’ (1912) radical empirical view of the 
universe. James believed that everything, whether objective (physical) or subjective (mental) 
matter, is made of a single primal material he calls pure experience. They are immersed in “the 
great continua of time, space and the self” and all “flow together without interfering” (James 
1912, p. 94). Therefore, everything, even though it can exist in parts, is conjunct, continuous and 
in constant flux and flow (Kolb 2014). This was echoed in Dewey’s (1934) work. However, James 
(1912) adopts a differing view on reflection. 
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Experience in its immediacy seems perfectly fluent … When the reflective intellect gets 
to work, however, it discovers incomprehensibilities in the flowing process. 
Distinguishing its elements and parts, it gives them separate names, and what it thus 
disjoins it cannot easily put together. (James 1912, p. 92) 
Conjunctive transitions are the most superficial of appearances, illusions of our 
sensibility which philosophical reflection pulverises at a touch. (James 1912, p. 70) 
To James (1912), reflection abhors the flow and continuity of the experience. It intellectualises 
the difficulties of the experience by dissecting and compartmentalising elements of the 
experiences, hence rendering the experience disjointed. Reflection severs pure experiences 
from the flow of time, space and self for intellectual analysis; in doing so, the reflective product 
makes little sense because they no longer flow like before. 
Hence it was concluded from his argument that because experience is all-encompassing and 
flows continuously, it should be treated as a whole and not taken apart or intellectualised out 
of its context of time, space and self, i.e. the artistic nature of experience needs to be 
appreciated. This is similar to the conclusion that can be drawn from Dewey’s (1934) concept of 
experience. 
10.2. Artistry in Dialogic Reflection 
Dialogic reflection is a way of knowing from experience. Since experience has an artistic quality, 
then dialogic reflection, by association, is an artistic way of knowing. Aside from exploring the 
intellectual aspects of the experience, dialogic reflection also explores emotional and moral 
dimension.  
10.2.1. Dialogic Reflection for Moral Knowing 
Dialogic reflection pushes one to explore one’s morals as one questions one’s experience. In this 
research, my co-researchers had occasionally verbalised this process. 
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Like not turning up and not telling anyone, to me I would not personally do that, it 
depends on your morals like if I did do that how did that make other people feel, how did 
I make other people feel differently? [April in group one] 
In this instance, April was reflecting using the role reversal method as described in Chapter Eight. 
In her reflection on a PBL group member who was constantly absent without notice, she 
explored how she would have behaved differently if she was that group member. She also 
identified that this potential difference in behaviour would be related to the difference in their 
moral values. 
How do you frame morality of the profession so that everybody is fully aware of the 
morality of what they should be doing? When they reflect, it would be like " I have done 
something wrong". It has to have that frame of reference doesn't it. [Alicia in group two] 
Alicia explored the need for the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (COT 2015) as frame of 
reference for practitioners. She described the code as moral values of the profession and it is 
important for ethical practice. She also discussed how this set of professional moral values can 
be different from personal moral values and it should supersede the latter when it comes to 
practice. 
The above examples show some ways we had conducted this moral exploration of their 
experience in practice and in the university. This moral exploration follows the same analysis 
methods as described Chapter Six. Role reversal and comparison methods of analysis are 
demonstrated in the examples above. 
Moral exploration of an experience is not always considered in theories of reflection. Gibbs’ 
(1988) cycle of reflection does not explicitly state any moral consideration in its analysis and 
evaluation. Johns’ (2013) model for structured reflection does prompt the reflector to explore 
the congruency between the actions in one’s experience and one’s values. The moral 
exploration is insinuated by the exploration of values but not explicitly prompted. 
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Fish’s and de Cossart’s (2007) work on The Invisibles of practice, conversely, is a theory of 
reflection built around morality and moral practice. In response to the Technical Rational school 
of thought in the practice environment, Fish and de Cossart (2007) sought to counter it with the 
moral mode of practice. Fish (2012) argued that practitioners when operating in the technical 
mode view practice as episodic, merely requiring a combination of knowledge and skills. 
Drawing on Carr (2004), Fish (2012) noted that a profession can become prescriptive, being a 
professional becomes a matter of checking off a checklist of skills and knowledge, in other 
words, tools of practice. Professionals become technicians and professional effectiveness is 
measured by their range of skills (Carr 2004; Fish 2012). 
Such practitioners are in fact not in control of their own practice but merely agents of 
practice as set down by others. They are obedient to convention and do not engage in 
critiquing it (Fish 2012, p. 43). 
Practising with such a mindset implies that reflection carried out is not critical of the conventions 
of practice. This corroborated with Gilbert’s (2001) critique of practitioners of reflective practice 
being uncritical of the practice traditions of the setting or profession, hence becoming agents or 
mouthpieces of the professional body who carry out their agenda without being clear of how it 
applies to their practice.  
Fish and de Cossart (2007) introduced the moral mode of practice as the antithesis to Technical 
Rationality. In contrast, the moral mode of practice, through appealing to the practitioner’s 
moral sense, encourages practitioners to become their own agents. This transcends the personal 
and social agenda; in carrying out morally right practice, practitioners acquire virtues which 
become the rewards of the moral mode of practice themselves. Gilbert (2001) on the other hand 
viewed this as a moral regulation of professional practice however it was hard to find fault in 
this approach to practice. Occupational therapy is an ethical profession; in fact, as professional 
practice is about helping other achieve a good life (Dige 2009), ethics and morality serve as the 
boundary, guarding moral practice against hedonistic practice. While Gilbert (2001) painted this 
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moral regulation as conspiratorial, the thought of an unethical, an amoral profession is far more 
terrifying than one that is bounded by its moral duty to society. Society, in consideration of the 
knowledge that professions possess, expect professionals to submit to a higher code of conduct 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001) and perhaps this should extend to an even higher ethical 
standard. Johns and McCormack (1998) defined an effective professional in accordance with 
his/her ability to self-monitor his practice thereby ensuring his/her efficacy in practice. Fish and 
de Cossart (2007), via the moral duty of the practitioner, sought to encourage the practitioner 
to take on the responsibility to better their practice and to become more effective practitioners. 
To train reflective moral practitioners (Ferrell 1998), Fish and de Cossart (2007) developed The 
Invisibles. 
The Invisibles referred to the “deeper characteristics of professional practice as enacted by a 
practitioner recognised widely as a wise clinician” (Fish 2012, p. 44). In contrast to Strands of 
Reflection discussed in Chapter Seven, The Invisibles was designed to encourage rigorous 
reflection about the practitioner in practice. It brought into question the integrity and wisdom 
of the practitioner’s thought process and their clinical judgements and reasoning (de Cossart 
and Fish 2005; Fish and de Cossart 2007; Fish 2012). This opposed the technical mode of practice 
and directed the professional to a more reflective and moral mode of practice. 
Wareing (2017) similarly developed a valued-based model of reflection for use in healthcare 
settings. He argued for a need for models of reflection to be value-based because of the need 
for practice to be well reasoned, clinically, and ethically. Practice in healthcare is inherently value 
driven and these values are manifested in a practitioner’s decisions and actions (Cody 2006). 
Therefore, the examination of practice experience will unavoidably be value-laden (Wareing 
2017). Wareing (2017) argued that values are built on morals, experience, religion, education, 
and social background thus, his model of reflection was focused on exploring the experience and 
its relationship with these faculties of the reflector. In his model, he prompted the reflector to 
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consider his or her own values as a person, the impact of these values on others in the 
experience and what other values needed to be explored to better his or her practice (Wareing 
2017). 
10.2.1.1. Dark Reflections 
While reflection explores morality, it does not always lead to moral goodness. This was an 
interesting theoretical discussion that we had in both groups, no dark reflections were raised as 
part of the reflective process. 
I posed the following questions to both research groups, 
Is reflection always good? Does it mean always aspiring to be a better person? Is 
reflection always for a more ethical practice? [Me in group one] 
Both groups rejected the notion that reflection is always about being morally good. Two co-
researchers explained, 
Reflection can be looking at something wrong and justifying to yourself for all sorts of 
reasons and continue to do it [Sarah in group one] 
You can reflect on something really bad and think of worse ways to do it … you could 
think “I left a fingerprint that time, I would get caught. I will wear gloves next time.” 
[April in group one] 
This idea that even thieves reflect is what I refer to in this thesis as dark reflection. Both groups 
agreed that reflection, despite being a moral exploration, is separate from moral righteousness. 
In the above context, the co-researchers were referring to monological reflections, where the 
reflector reflects on his or her own.  
Dark reflections, though can be considered evil, are perhaps still true to the world version that 
reflector has. As world versions are constructed based on moral principles, it is perhaps the 
moral principles upon which these world versions are built upon that are evil rather than the 
reflection itself. A dark reflection is perhaps considered morally sound to the reflectors because 
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it is congruent to morals as applied in the reflector’s world version. Therefore, the dark reflection 
is not evil but the morals and world version of that reflector are.  
Because reflection is so subjective our reflections are skewed according to what we know 
and what we value so there is a need for us to reflect in group, in fact it is important for 
us to reflect in groups because we morally check each other. [Me in group one] 
They might not be intentionally do it, when we talked about somebody reflects and then 
when they talk to other people, they consider other aspects they have not before, may 
be that is what happens maybe they are reflecting, they don’t talk to anyone else they 
can’t see what they have done and the way they have been reflecting to themselves, it 
seems like it is alright. [Sophie in group two] 
Dialogic reflection is more beneficial than monologic reflections because of the ability to morally 
check against other reflectors. When reflecting monologically, dark reflections are not identified 
as evil because the reflection remains in the same world version, built on the same poorly 
constructed morals. However, dialogic reflection is an arena where multiple world versions 
come together and reflectors can question each other on all aspects of the experience. Dark 
reflections become easier to identify because of the dialogic aspect of dialogic reflection and the 
degree of exposure the reflectors need to exhibit.  
“Moral catastrophes” (Roberts and Ion 2014, p. 673) that happened in Stafford and 
Winterbourne view hospitals have been attributed to habitual thoughtlessness and a lack of 
reflection (Wareing 2017). In the case of the Nazi regime, Arendt (1971, p. 417) argued that evil 
was a result of a “curious, quite authentic inability to think” critically about one’s actions, and 
not always a result of malice and acrimony. Dialogic reflection however argues the reverse. 
Reflection cannot guard against evil intent and actions because reflection is not always 
righteous. The moral quality is dependent on one’s world version and dark reflections can be 
considered acceptable because they are morally congruent to one’s immoral construction of 
one’s world version. It is the world version that is evil. However dialogic reflection can help 
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identify dark reflections because they are being questioned and judged by other reflectors with 
different moral constructions. It is perhaps not thoughtlessness that causes evil as Arendt 
(1971), Roberts and Ion (2014) and Wareing (2017) have argued. Rather it is dark world 
perspectives that have been left morally unchecked. Dialogic reflection is, therefore, perhaps a 
better way to guard against unethical practices. 
10.2.2. Dialogic Reflection for Emotional Knowing 
The crux of the issue with reflection lies in the epistemic differences as discussed in Chapter 
Seven. One of the problems as discussed was a hyper-rational version of reflection where the 
focus of reflection is on the objective reporting of the experience. This results in the reduction 
of the experience to a single dimension, trimming away the other potentially rich sources of 
learning found in the other aspects of the experience. Dialogic reflection however reopens the 
reflector’s mind to these other dimensions because of how other reflectors interpret the process 
of reflection. 
Group worldmaking, while bringing together different world versions, also gathers reflectors 
who perceive reflection in their own disparate ways. Reflectors through the different methods 
of analysis identified in Chapter Eight question and prompt each other to explore the different 
dimensions of the experience. Aside from being a moral exploration, dialogic reflection is also a 
process of emotional exploration.  
In Chapter Nine, I discussed an example where Sophie, having reflected on an incident that 
passed a while ago, assumed a more rational composure. This cool-headedness was challenged 
when other reflectors in the group reminded her of the emotions that she had felt in the 
experience. With time, it appeared that this reflector had forgotten these emotions she had felt 
then but after reflecting with the group she was reminded that the way her educator had treated 
her “was not OK”. This suggested that after her initial reflection on her experience, she had come 
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to accept the way her educator had treated her. She reflected on having heard what the other 
reflectors had pointed out: 
I don’t know, I feel a little differently now. I did not see that, at that time it was a lot for 
me. Actually, at some point, especially towards the end because it turned out well, I 
didn’t feel that she was as harsh as perhaps she was .... I think that it prepared me for 
the next placement definitely. I think that you have to try to do the best that they want 
you to do and its hard to find your own way through that. [Sophie in group two] 
On reflecting again, Sophie had elicited a few positive points on her particularly difficult 
experience. The value of dialogic reflection here lies in the opportunity to look at an emotive 
experience calmly. While the cool-headedness is from having distanced oneself from the 
experience, the emotional dimension is not lost as it is once again brought up by the other 
reflectors. Doing so allows one to draw important understanding about the experience which 
one may not be able to previously. In Chapter Seven, reflection was described as a painful 
process that sometimes encourages one to look at experience in a negative light rather than to 
approach it with optimism. Dialogic reflection offers the reflector to revisit an experience but 
this time with more clarity and positivity. 
Other co-researchers have noted similarly about their dialogic reflections: 
From other people's reactions, you either feel better about it or you realise "no, that’s 
definitely a problem"… I did a reflection on it … and then I felt better about it. [Isabella 
in group two] 
Isabella noted that she felt that there were times when she was aware of a certain discomfort 
in how she felt about some of her experiences. However, it was after she reflected with others 
when she was more aware of what this discomforting feeling was in her experience which then 
triggered her to conduct a reflection on it. 
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I’ve reflected on something from the last placement with some friends and actually I was 
down playing it and they were like "that’s terrible!" When I started to think about it, 
"actually it was quite horrible isn’t it?" [Alicia in group two] 
This co-researcher noted that it took other reflectors to make her realise the gravity of her 
experience. The above examples showed that dialogic reflection transported the reflector back 
to the experience, stirring up the emotional dimension that was often forgotten, “downplayed” 
[Alicia in group two] or “dulled down” [Olivia in group two]. This allowed the reflector to revisit 
this emotional dimension and elicit new understanding that he or she might not have been able 
to at that time. 
This new understanding generated from the emotional exploration of the experience was 
particularly useful in the way Olivia had understood the nature of practice: 
I think I have learnt that it is ok to admit that you had a bad placement and you felt like 
crap. After the first placement we all probably felt that we quite liked it, I don’t know if 
that was because we were quite naive, we would come back on Fridays sharing and all 
quite excited and I think I feel like I had to keep up with all of them. But now I am 
admitting that I don’t like the placement and that’s fine. It doesn’t mean that I don’t 
want to be an occupational therapist, but that is just not what I where I want to work. I 
think my last placement has made me be honest to be myself and tell everyone else, I 
don’t hide if it has not been great then. I think it had a knock-on effect on my attitude 
towards this year. [Olivia in group two] 
Olivia explained how she had changed her perspective of a bad experience in practice. Initially 
she felt the need to tip-toe around the issue, only talking about how great her experience on 
placement was. But after reflecting with others, she had realised that she did not have to keep 
up the façade as it was common for someone to feel unhappy about his or her placement. 
Beyond this acceptance, Olivia had also learned to embrace her experience for what it was and 
started to be more honest about it. This then made her more positive about her course and 
practice. 
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The following dialogue between two co-researchers depicts this process of emotional 
exploration and how a negative experience can be made positive through dialogic reflection. In 
this example, the co-researchers in group one were reflecting on the experience where they had 
a PBL group member who was not contributing to the group, resulting in some frustration. 
It is kind of frustrating for you guys because it was an issue about one person and it 
wasn’t that we were working better than you guys. It wasn’t that we had some magical 
thing it was because you had just that one person and … if you swapped that one person 
into our group we would be the ones with the issues so it is just normal. [Sarah in group 
one] 
I think it is really sad how one person can impact so much, I had been with that person 
the entire time and I think it had really impacted my university experience and makes it 
really negative … I do have to internalise it and think how I could have done things 
differently. [Karen in group one] 
You know what we often lose sight of? We get so caught up with one person and I think 
like from the very start of this course I found everyone is very dedicated … it felt different 
and felt like everybody knew why they were here, what they want to do and I have been 
inspired by that ... I am a little bit of a slacker but I don’t want to let people down… when 
I know other people are counting on me, I will do it. PBL is part of it and all those different 
personalities are part of it. [Sarah in group one] 
Sarah provided some comfort to Karen, who described her experience with this particular PBL 
group member. Sarah acknowledged her frustration and elaborated that it was natural to feel 
that way as the problem perhaps lay in that particular group member rather than in Karen. This 
led to Karen to look back at how her feelings about this experience had affected her wider 
experience of the course, recognising that there was need to accept the experience and proceed 
beyond her frustration about it. Sarah then assumed the role of the reflector to reflect on how 
her obsession with one group member had clouded her perception of the other students on the 
cohort. Recognising that she had been distracted, she saw with greater clarity how inspirational 
the other students were in juxtaposition. She went on to describe how the other students had 
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motivated her in her studies. At the end of her reflection, she returned to her experience with 
that group member and accepted the experience along with the fact that it was this acceptance 
that had led her to this new realisation in her reflection. 
10.2.2.1. The Motivation for Dialogic Reflection 
Dialogic reflection is not only an emotional exploration because it brings up the emotional 
dimension the experience. It is a process of reflection that is driven by empathy and compassion 
for each other in the dialogic reflective group. Therefore, dialogic reflection itself is emotionally 
motivated.  
For the reflector, dialogic reflection can be rather emotionally liberating: 
I felt that it was very cathartic. There were so many things I could not have said to my 
supervisor nor could I have written it down in a reflection, knowing that she would look 
at them. [Me in group two] 
Group reflection is quite helpful because I remember you and [another student on the 
course] outside the placement. She like off loaded onto you and it was useful to share 
experiences because ... you feel better about it after. [Isabella in group two] 
For the other reflectors, their motivation for dialogic reflection is driven by the need to support 
each other. 
Perhaps we were doing it as a form of support and we are showing interest by asking 
further questions, we are showing that we are listening and supporting them. [April in 
group one] 
This support through dialogic reflection was particularly useful in role-emerging placements 
where the role of the occupational therapist in the setting is not clearly identified. Students on 
these placements are not always supported by an occupational therapist at that setting, in some 
cases their educators are lecturers who provide supervision but are not based in that setting. 
Students may feel lonely and detached in these placements. 
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They were travelling home together so they were constantly reflecting in the car about 
their days and what they potentially could do and what they were learning it was vital 
in that setting because we had no other support. [Alicia in group two] 
Because dialogic reflectors want to show their support for each other, the process of reflection 
itself is emotionally charged and empathetic. 
That is what you do when you empathise isn’t it, where you put yourself in that situation 
and think how you would feel. You are right it is pulling it away from their perspective, 
you are not trying to get into their heads you are trying to put yourself in the experience, 
I think that is something that we do instinctively. [Sarah in group one] 
The analytical process of reflection is not about trying to see what the reflector sees, but about 
embodying the someone else’s experience and understanding what one might feel in that 
scenario. Understanding what the reflectors feels hence naturally becomes part of this process. 
Dialogic reflection is a process that requires a great degree of intimacy and it is perhaps not 
suitable or as effective for a group of strangers. 
We are friends we are all on the same course, same level of development … we want to 
support our colleague and help each other feel better. If we were all strangers, it might 
be quite different, if we were to come to a group reflection for the first time. [Isabella in 
group two] 
Lea below expressed the same point when talking to Sophie who reflected on her bad 
experience with her educator. 
Other people may not have been as passionate as we were. We are your friends and we 
really wanted to help you, we have put our guard down. We would not have if we didn’t 
know you or it would have taken a lot to get to that stage. But here, immediately we 
were there for you! [Lea in group two] 
Because dialogic reflection is an emotional process, it is perhaps not something that can be done 
easily amongst a group of people. There are many factors that come into play in dialogic 
reflection such as trust, democratic dialogue, power dynamics and multiple perspectives. It is 
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more than about getting the right number of people in a group. There is a strong human aspect 
to dialogic reflection and getting the right people in the group is more important and perhaps 
the hardest task of all. This goes on to suggest that dialogic reflection is not a deliberate process. 
While dialogic reflection is rich and immensely useful in developing one’s understanding of the 
world, it not something that can be forced or used instrumentally. The human aspect supersedes 
any organisational or logistical considerations, in other words, it is not about setting aside time 
and a venue for dialogic reflection to take place. Reflectors must first know each other and care 
for each other for the dialogic reflection to be effective. This is further expanded upon in Part 
Four of this thesis which discusses the implementation of dialogic reflection as an epistemology 
in education and professional settings. 
10.3. Dialogic Reflection as Natural Enquiry About the 
World 
Dialogic reflection appreciates the multiple dimensions of experience. It was established earlier 
in the thesis that it is a method of enquiry that features the experience as the key source of 
knowledge, exploring the intellectual, emotional, moral, practical aspects of it. While it is a 
powerful method of enquiry, it is not something that can be forced. Fostering democratic 
dialogue is tricky and when forcibly used, it results in the confusions and difficulties as raised in 
Chapter Seven.  
The previous chapters of this thesis have hinted at the idea that dialogic reflection is a natural 
enquiry about the world. In Chapter Six, I have discussed the key principles behind dialogic 
reflection. While democratic dialogue is key in dialogic reflection, it is not something that can be 
achieve through deliberate methods, such as a rigid structure as in Tigelaar et al.’s (2008) 
research. Reflectors in a dialogic reflection should be respected for their knowledge and 
experience that they bring, knowledge in dialogic reflection is generated with reference to these 
prior knowledge and experience. In Chapter Eight, it was noted that while structures and 
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facilitators can be helpful, they serve very little purpose in a dialogic reflection. Structures 
disrupt the natural flow of conversation and affects the degree of democratic dialogue. The 
facilitator is not a necessary role as the group is capable of self-regulating. In Chapter Nine, it 
was discussed that the group world that forms in dialogic reflection is a space where reflectors 
can question each other about their experiences. The purpose of this is not to test the reflector 
or to prove one’s knowledge but to construct one’s knowledge of the world and to understand 
how other reflectors perceive it. In this chapter, dialogic reflection appreciates the experience 
as a whole, its intellectual, emotional, moral, practical aspects. The impetus to reflect 
dialogically is from the desire to support and help other dialogic reflectors. This research had 
revealed a rejection of dialogic reflection as a deliberate action, rather it is a process that is part 
of everyday life as reflectors experience the world and try to understand these experiences. 
In this research, reflection and dialogic reflection were noted to be something that one does as 
a part of everyday life and not only part of professional practice. Dialogic reflection was 
occasionally confused with over thinking and worrying. 
I think I am reflective but I am not sure if that is a good thing sometimes I play stuff over 
and over again and that can lead to anxiety. [Sarah in group one] 
We all have the ability to worry about what we have done, should I have done that or is 
there something else I could have done in that situation. That’s reflective isn’t? [May in 
group one] 
That’s because I’m a woman, but I like to you know getting that, bouncing ideas from 
people, verbally talking it through, as well as like constructively writing. [Isabella in 
group two] 
The co-researchers also described their dialogic reflective process with their family members on 
personal life experiences as well. This suggested that reflection and dialogic reflection are 
perhaps not just about understanding professional practice experiences. Part of the reason the 
process of reflection is nebulous is because of Schön’s (1987) work. He noted reflection to be 
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same process as how a jazz musician knows what notes to play or how a baseball player knows 
how to pitch the ball during a match. He referred to daily conversations as a process of 
reflection-in-action as one listens to the dialogue and reacts to it (Schön 1987). While other 
some theorists have written about reflection as used in professional practice (Johns 2013; de 
Cossart and Fish 2005; Fish et al. 1991), other writers about reflection have looked at it as a 
more natural form of enquiry about the world, as a philosophical idea. Plato wrote about 
understanding from experience to learn about the truths of the world (Jowett 1980); Locke 
(1690) understood reflection as the internal process which allows us to understand the 
sensations we experience from interacting with the world; Dewey (1933) saw reflection as a 
better way of thinking.  
Some co-researchers also felt that reflection and dialogic reflection were made esoteric by the 
theories and the profession. 
I am not sure if I have met anyone who have said "a model really made me become a 
reflective practitioner". [Sarah in group one] 
I know we all do it naturally anyway but someone said at the beginning of the course 
"you have to be a reflective practitioner, you have to put reflection in your CPD"… it can 
be quite a scary concept. [Nicola in group one] 
Theories about reflection were often disregarded in the reflective process. The co-researchers 
noted that reflection was a natural part of their everyday activities, a few noted that it was 
something they did when driving home. It was not an academic process of applying models and 
referring theorists. Ava from group two mentioned that her educator told her “models are a 
load of nonsense” when she was on placement. There is a rejection of the use of models in the 
reflective process, however, they can be useful for those who find reflection to be difficult: 
I think the theories are there for guidance for people who find reflection difficult … if 
you’re a naturally reflective person, then perhaps those theories are not necessary, how 
I think of them is like they are tools. [Nicola in group one] 
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Nicola looked at theories of reflection instrumentally however this was because she felt that 
reflection is a natural process. These theories serve as guidance rather than direction for the 
reflector. 
Because reflection and dialogic reflection was seen as a natural process, the following co-
researchers feel that the way reflection is encouraged in education and practice seems to be 
rather deliberate. 
I have always said that I feel reflection is quite natural … when on placement we have to 
do a written reflection for evidence, I go on and naturally reflect on this and something 
it just feels like a tick box exercise because we are already naturally reflective. [April in 
group one] 
I know we all do it naturally anyway but when someone at the beginning of the course 
"you have to be a reflective practitioner, you have to put reflection in your CPD" … it can 
be quite a scary concept. [Nicola in group one] 
The reflection as for the educator and it was not for me. I don’t get anything from writing 
it, it is only proof. [Alicia in group two] 
Reflection for evidence appears to be a redundant exercise when it is a something one naturally 
does. The second co-researcher notes that when the profession encourages reflection through 
reflective practice and CPD, it created some apprehension about something that was already 
naturally occurring. April recounted: 
My last educator said, “why don’t you do one reflection every week”. But I said, “if I have 
got nothing to reflect on, then I don’t see the point”, and she agreed with me in the end. 
It took me quite a lot of guts to be able to say that. [April in group one] 
The members from both groups agree that they are naturally reflective individuals: 
I don’t think you can be completely switched off, some are more reflective than other but 
you cannot completely be unreflective. [April in group one] 
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I reflect in my mind all the time on everything, everyday all the time and I only write it 
down because I have to. [Alicia in group two] 
Additionally, reflection was also thought to be part of life and survival: 
I think it is natural to do it, you have got to do it. I don’t see how you can survive in the 
world without it … you will just be constantly be running into walls because you don’t 
register that it is wrong. [Me in group one] 
It would be risky if you don’t reflect on things at all because if you keep going through 
the same process, you put yourself at risk of losing everything. [Karen in group one] 
As dialogic reflection is driven by empathy, the desire to contribute to the analysis is altruistic 
and at times, an unconscious process of taking part in natural dialogue: 
We weren’t consciously trying to take the experience apart nor were we thinking that "I 
need to help her analyse it" I don’t think it was conscious on our part with the questions. 
[Me in group one] 
It was the desire to support other reflectors that drove the dialogic reflection rather a deliberate 
need to get something out of the reflection. This suggested that dialogic reflection is natural 
because it is like taking part in a dialogue with someone. Issacs (1993) described dialogue as: 
… a movement towards creating a field of genuine meaning and inquiry where people 
can allow a free flow of meaning and vigorous exploration of the collective background 
of their thought, their personal predispositions, the nature of their shared attention and 
the rigid features of their individual and collective assumptions. (Issacs 1993, p. 23) 
Dialogue itself can be reflective because reflectors explore world versions, experience and 
knowledge, both individually and collectively. This exploration is part of natural interactions 
between humans. Dialogue is an individual and collective endeavour to understand the world. 
It is not applied as a unique skill that belongs to certain professions. It is inherent in one’s 
everyday life, at work, with one’s family and friends. 
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10.4. Conclusion 
Experience is multi-dimensional. The intellectual, emotional, practical, moral aspects of an 
experience are closely related to each other and influence each other. However, they still each 
hold distinctive qualities, much like elements in a work of art. This gives experience its artistic 
quality. Dialogic reflection appreciates this artistic quality of experience by looking at experience 
as a whole. When reflection is viewed from a specific epistemic stance as discussed in Chapter 
Four, reflection and experience lose their artistic quality as they are not appreciated as a whole 
and reduces reflection and experience to a singular dimension. A re-conception of reflection and 
dialogic reflection is therefore necessary. 
Apart from being a method of enquiry, dialogic reflection is also an exploration of morality and 
emotions. The moral exploration of experiences is important for occupational therapy as an 
ethical profession. Dialogic reflection provides a space for reflectors to morally check themselves 
and hence it is perhaps a more effective way to ensure ethical practice in occupational therapy. 
Dialogic reflection motivates reflectors to explore the emotional dimension of the experience 
which can be often forgotten over time. This emotional exploration allows reflectors to explore 
their emotions while having distanced themselves from them, often resulting in a reflection that 
is clearer and more positive. Dialogic reflection itself is an emotionally driven process. Reflectors 
engage in it, galvanised by their desire to support each other, express their feelings and help 
each other. It is more than an intellectual pursuit. 
Dialogic reflection is deeply motivated by empathy. It appreciates the natural flow of dialogue 
and thrives in a democratic environment and one that lacks structure. It is something that one 
engages in as part of everyday life and everyone can reflect dialogically. It is a natural process 
that had been made esoteric and contrived by theorists and professional bodies. This chapter 
concludes that dialogic reflection is an art and way of life. The next chapter summarises the 
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findings and discussions of this research and presents dialogic reflection as an epistemology by 
its own right. 
197 
 
Chapter 11. Dialogic Reflection as an 
Epistemology 
The five chapters preceding this have laid out four arguments for dialogic reflection to be 
reconceptualised as more than a learning method or a way of proving growth or a way of 
assuring ethical practice. 
Chapter Seven discussed the major issues in the practice of reflection when done monologically 
and when done with someone else. Reflection, when practised and taught, can be rather 
confusing because of how nebulous the process is. Educators sometimes add to this confusion 
by teaching and guiding reflection from different epistemic stances. Reflection is also a process 
that demands one to be vulnerable. When done dialogically, it requires the reflector to lay bare 
and open up himself or herself for scrutiny. This thus makes dialogic reflection difficult in the 
presence of an educator who may sit in judgement of the reflector. Some of the issues regarding 
reflection and dialogic reflection stemmed from the most fundamental question “what exactly 
is reflection?” Therefore, this suggested that there was a need to conceptualise reflection and 
dialogic reflection at the epistemic level.  
Chapter Six and Eight discussed dialogic reflection as an approach to enquiry. In this discussion, 
I have elicited three key principles of dialogic reflection: mediating theory and practice through 
context, democratic dialogue, and reflectors as unique individuals. These three key principles 
guide the dialogic reflection as an approach to enquiry. Chapter Eight expanded on this by 
exploring the practical considerations for conducting a dialogic reflection. Dialogic reflection as 
a method of enquiry embraces natural, unstructured, unregulated dialogue. However, this is not 
so to say that dialogic reflection is a casual conversation. It is a deep collaborative exploration 
of experiences that features unique methods of analysis. 
198 
 
Chapter Nine focused on the dialogue reflection as a communal approach to developing 
knowledge about the world. It demonstrated that dialogic reflection is a platform where 
reflectors can share their world perspectives. Dialogic reflection itself is a safe yet open 
environment where reflectors can question and prompt each other and offer their analysis and 
understanding of the world. These multiple perspectives give dialogic reflection its breadth as a 
way of developing knowledge from experience. However dialogic reflection is not about 
achieving agreement, rather it is making use of the dialogic reflective environment to develop 
one’s individual understanding and knowledge of the world. 
Chapter Ten discussed dialogic reflection as a method of exploring experience. Dialogic 
reflection embraces the artistry of experience by offering deep analysis of the intellectual, 
moral, and emotional aspects of the experience. It is a method of self-discovery through 
understanding how one interacts with the world. Because of the different perspectives offered 
in dialogic reflection, it does not take a specific epistemic stance where an aspect of the 
experience or reflective process is favoured. It is a holistic and an artistic way of knowing. 
From the four lines of arguments in the previous chapters, it was concluded that dialogic 
reflection does not belong completely to a single epistemology. It stands strong on its own, 
rooted in its three key principles, offering one a way of knowing through experience that has 
incredible depth and breadth. While it is something that can be conducted practically as a 
method of enquiry, it would be reductive to limit its use to just improving practice. Rather it 
should be recognised in its full potential, as a way of knowing about the world. Dialogic reflection 
is an epistemology by its own right. 
This chapter discusses dialogic reflection as an epistemology and presents a taxonomy of 
dialogic reflection and discusses how existing theories of reflection can help assist in 
understanding this epistemology. In Appendix L, I expand on dialogic reflection as a 
philosophical concept by juxtaposing it with experientialism and constructivism. 
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11.1. Defining Dialogic Reflection 
Synthesised from the findings of this research presented in the previous chapters, I provide the 
following definition: 
Dialogic reflection is a theory of knowledge. It argues that individual knowledge about 
the world can be elicited from a co-operative exploration of experience. It is an artistic 
method of enquiry about the world that embraces multiple perspectives and 
vulnerability. 
Dialogic reflection is a philosophy of knowledge based on experience and dialogue. Unlike 
classical empiricism, experience here does not refer to sensory data. Experience here is the 
intellectual, sensory, moral, emotional interaction with the world (Johnson and Lakoff 1992; 
Dewey 1934). When experience is subjected to dialogic reflection, the dialogue amongst 
reflectors about it elicit knowledge, new and old. The experience is not taken apart like some 
theories of reflection may suggest (Johns 2013; Fish et al. 1991; Gibbs 1988). In dialogic 
reflection, experience is framed and reframed by multiple world perspectives that reflectors 
have. In doing so, different aspects and elements of the experience become apparent. 
Drawing knowledge from experience in dialogic reflection is done from the reflectors’ world 
perspectives. Each reflector has a different world perspective hence he or she elicits and 
contributes different knowledge to the process. Knowledge here refers to knowledge about the 
world and self. 
Dialogue is more than an exchange of words. It is an enquiry about the world where individuals 
in the dialogue create meaning by exploring their own values, thoughts, feelings and action 
(Issacs 1993). It requires one to respect others engaged in the dialogue (Freire 1970), for the 
knowledge and experience they bring. It is a co-operative approach to human flourishing (Heron 
and Reason 2001). 
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These concepts about dialogic reflection are arguably similar and dissimilar to other philosophies 
that perceive experience as the ultimate source of knowledge, such as empiricism, 
constructivism, and experientialism. Classical empiricists define experience rather differently, 
however. I place dialogic reflection as close relatives of constructivism and experientialism. 
Nonetheless, dialogic reflection is still distinct from them. Appendix L elaborates on this and 
discusses the ontological argument in dialogic reflection. 
11.2. Taxonomy of Dialogic Reflection 
Epistemic conflicts in theories of reflection exist because there is no one clear epistemology of 
reflection as discussed in Chapter Seven. I postulate that this epistemic confusion in the field is 
because reflection is being framed as a method, used by different epistemologies. This results 
in myriad theories about how it can be used in education (Kolb 2014; King and Kitchener 2004; 
Moon 2004; Gibbs 1988; Dewey 1933), practice (Wareing 2017; Johns 2013; Fish and de Cossart 
2007; Fish et al. 1991), research (Torbert 2001), philosophy (Locke 1690) and professional 
development (Johns 2013; Fish and de Cossart 2007). However, these theories each have their 
place and are less confusing in dialogic reflection. 
It was not useful to describe dialogic reflection as sequential steps of internal processes because 
of how varied it can be. Moreover, there is a risk conveying that dialogic reflection is a step by 
step process like Tigelaar et al.’s (2008) research. It is natural, dynamic, organic and sometimes 
even messy when reflectors get excited about their own reflective discussions.  
However, it is possible to distinguish dialogic reflections according to their purpose and content 
of reflection. Dialogic reflection can be about topics external to oneself. These reflections are 
external in the sense that reflectors are more engaged in understanding the world than 
understanding themselves in the world. These reflections are about anything topical to the 
reflectors such as management of a difficult educator, dealing with a group member who is not 
pulling his or her weight or resolving ethical dilemmas in practice. I term dialogic reflections of 
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this nature as extrospection. Dialogic reflections can also be understanding oneself in the world. 
These are discussions about the internal workings of one’s world version. These dialogic 
reflections tend to be related to one’s values and morality, spirituality, beliefs, personal 
assumptions, interests and priorities. These dialogic reflections require one to reflect on oneself 
and understand where one sits in relation to the world. I call these dialogic reflections 
introspection. The following figure illustrates this relationship between extrospection, 
introspection and dialogic reflection. 
 
Figure 5. Taxonomy of dialogic reflection 
Dialogic reflection is about constructing knowledge from experience. While extrospection and 
introspection may suggest that almost all dialogue is a dialogic reflection, they both must be 
about exploring experience and gaining some knowledge from it.  
11.3. From Extrospection to Introspection 
As extrospection is about topics external to oneself, some theories of reflection explicate this 
branch of the epistemology. Gibbs’ (1988) work appears to be about extrospection, with its 
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procedural exploration of the experience that focuses on making sense of the experience, rather 
than understanding oneself. Johns’ (2013) model of structured reflection achieves the same goal 
through thought-provoking prompts instead. However, it is arguable that some prompts relating 
to personal values may push the reflector into introspecting instead. Locke’s (1690) use of 
reflection to understanding sensation is also extrospective in nature as it serves to develop an 
understanding of the world through experience.  
Fish et al.’s (1991) Strands of Reflection, however, is a theory that transitions the reflector from 
extrospection to introspection. The Factual and Retrospective Strands are focused on 
understanding the experience, however, the Substratum Strand and Connective Strand push the 
reflector to consider how his or her personal theories affect his or her actions and how they are 
related to each other. In the concluding session of the research, a few co-researchers were 
confused about the idea of introspection. One co-researcher felt that introspection is about 
personal values while another felt that introspection could also be about values that are evident 
in one’s practice. Both co-researchers argued that both are related to oneself, one as a 
professional and one in one’s personal life. It is important to make this distinction because: 
Values of the profession are not necessarily internalised by the person. Even though 
someone can practice what the profession teaches very well, it does not mean that she 
is going to live her life guided by the values of the profession. [Co-researcher in the 
concluding session] 
Hence, we have decided that it is useful to further differentiate professional introspection from 
personal introspection. Fish and de Cossart’s (2007) The Invisibles of practice encourages the 
reflector to perform professional introspection. It focuses heavily on one’s practice experience 
and prompts the reflector to consider themselves in the practice experience. It then gradually 
leads the reflector into extrospection by widening the reflection to consider how this experience 
have changed their knowledge of their practice. Another theory of reflection that is useful for 
introspection is Wareing’s (2017) Me, My, More, Must model of reflection.  
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Figure 6. Me, My, More, Must model of reflection (Wareing 2017, p. 271) 
This model of reflection is heavily focused on personal and professional values. With reference 
to the figure above, it starts with personal introspection by asking the reflector who he or she is 
as a person, starting the reflection with understanding the reflector. It then gradually guides the 
reflector from self-discovery to making sense of oneself in one’s practice, a professional 
introspection. 
In the earlier chapters, I have discussed in detail about dialogic reflection as a form of natural 
enquiry about the world. In showing how reflective theories relate to dialogic reflection as an 
epistemology, I am showing how dialogic reflection can be understood as extrospection, 
professional introspection and personal introspection using these theories. Dialogic reflection 
should be natural and is best left unstructured. The above theories are not structures which one 
should use in a dialogic reflection, rather, they show how this epistemology can be understood 
when applied in education (Gibbs 1988), practice (Wareing 2017; Johns 2013; Fish and de 
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Cossart 2007; Fish et al. 1991) and professional development (Johns 2013; Fish and de Cossart 
2007). It is also important to note that the theories of reflection above refer to reflection 
conducted in the monological sense. Hence, they cannot be used as structures for dialogic 
reflection because they do not accommodate multiple perspectives and dialogue. 
11.4. Conclusion 
Dialogic reflection is an epistemology where knowledge is constructed from the co-operative 
exploration of experience. It is an intellectual, value-laden, moral-driven, artistic way of knowing 
from experience. Dialogic reflection shares a close relationship to other philosophies such as 
experientialism and constructivism, however, it has a rather different perspective of the process 
of knowledge construction. It is useful to further understand dialogic reflection as branching out 
into extrospection, the exploration of the world, and introspection, the exploration of oneself. 
Introspection can be about oneself as a professional or as a person. The existing theories of 
reflection can provide us with some understanding of what it means to extrospect or introspect, 
however, it is important to note that they are not theories of dialogic reflection. 
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 Part Four: Implications and 
Applications of Dialogic Reflection 
The chapters in Part Four are discussions about significance of the findings in relation to the 
application of this theory of dialogic reflection. The chapters in Part Four explore the application 
and implication of this epistemology in education and professional practice. In this part of the 
thesis I discuss the uses of dialogic reflection as an epistemology in these settings and I am 
careful not to convey that dialogic reflection should be applied solely as a learning method or a 
tool to prove professional development. To support these discussions, I draw on information 
from the literature review I had conducted, my further readings as the research developed and 
where appropriate, I support the discussion with some data from the research. 
Chapter Twelve discusses the implications and applications of dialogic reflection in academic 
settings. It provides suggestions on how dialogic reflection can be taught and learned. It also 
explores some suggestions for the assessment of dialogic reflection. 
Chapter Thirteen discusses the implications and applications of dialogic reflection in 
professional practice settings. Occupational therapy practice is the focus here as an example of 
a profession that can benefit from dialogic reflection. Through an exploration of the professional 
philosophy, this chapter looks at the importance of professional and personal introspection. It 
also explains a theory of professional development that was developed in this research, as part 
of understanding the role of dialogic reflection in professional practice.
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Chapter 12. Learning, Teaching, 
Guiding and Assessing Dialogic 
Reflection 
In Part Three, some issues surrounding reflection and dialogic reflection have been discussed: 
1. Reflection can be perceived from different epistemic stances 
2. The process of reflection is nebulous 
3. Reflection is sometimes seen as a tick-box exercise and can be made excessively 
academic 
4. Reticence is often present when it comes to sharing one’s reflection, hence the 
reflection that is presented is also often a false version or an edited version of the true 
reflection 
5. Dialogic reflection similarly demands a great degree of vulnerability on the reflectors’ 
part 
6. Reflecting and dialogically reflecting is tantamount to sharing a part of one’s world to 
others 
This chapter addresses these issues about reflection and dialogic reflection. It discusses the 
implications of this reconceptualisation of dialogic reflection in education and how it impacts 
learning about, teaching and assessing reflection and dialogic reflection.  
The curriculum can be seen as a triadic relationship between epistemology, pedagogy and 
assessment (Knight et al. 2013). Therefore, learning, teaching and assessing dialogic reflection 
should be in line with the epistemology itself. It is important to note that this chapter is about 
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how dialogic reflection can be taught, learned and assessed, as an epistemology, not a skill for 
professional practice or a method of learning.  
During this research, both groups had some discussions about placing dialogic reflection in the 
curriculum. However due to the issues that we had faced as described in Chapter Seven, most 
of the suggestions were deemed inappropriate. These discussions had a great influence in my 
writing of this chapter nonetheless. Therefore, where appropriate, I also refer to some 
conversations that my co-researchers and I had, to further support the discussion. 
12.1. Epistemology, Pedagogy and Assessment 
Katz (2000) described competency, pedagogy, and epistemology as the holy trinity of the 
curriculum. Harlen (2007) wrote about a triadic relationship between pedagogy, assessment, 
and practice. Synthesising the works of Katz (2000) and Harlen (2007), Knight et al. (2013) 
presented the following triad which depicts the relationship between pedagogy, epistemology, 
and assessment. 
 
Figure 7. The Epistemology-Assessment-Pedagogy triad (Knight et al. 2013; Knight et al. 2014) 
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In this figure, epistemology refers to the philosophical study of knowledge about the subject to 
be learned or taught. Pedagogy here refers to how the knowledge about the subject can be 
taught or learned and assessment is the tool of measurement for this learning (Knight et al. 
2013). In this triad however, it is not accurate to say that epistemology, pedagogy, and 
assessment always influence each other (Knight et al. 2014). Katz (2000) saw epistemology as 
underpinning methods in pedagogy and assessment. Pedagogy and assessment, however, share 
an interdependent relationship. Knight et al. (2013) explained that epistemology drives 
assessments that reveal the students’ knowledge and drives pedagogies to teach that 
knowledge. This may perhaps differ depending on the subject of study (Knight et al. 2014). In 
the context of learning dialogic reflection as an epistemology, the triadic relationship is as 
described above. 
12.2. Epistemology 
Dialogic reflection is its own epistemology. To recap, dialogic reflection rests on three key 
principles: 
1. Mediating theory and practice with values 
2. Democratic dialogue 
3. Dialogic reflectors are unique knowers and enquirers 
Dialogic reflection is about bridging theories and practice through value-driven enquiry. It 
grounds reflectors in the value of the experience that is being explored and what it means to 
the reflector. By understanding the meaning of experience to the reflector, the reflector shifts 
between making sense of the theories evident in the experience and the practical aspects of it. 
Democratic dialogue in dialogic reflection is a result of careful consideration of the reflective 
environment. Dialogue that is truly democratic is emancipatory, compassionate, cathartic, and 
honest. However, it is not easily achieved as it demands a great degree of vulnerability and trust. 
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Dialogic reflectors are knowers and enquirers who have their unique perspective of the world 
based on their knowledge and experience. While dialogic reflection welcomes the sharing of 
knowledge and experience from each reflector, it also celebrates the fact that these reflectors 
are different individuals who may have disparate interests in the reflection.  
12.3. Pedagogy 
Pedagogy is the art of instruction. In this thesis, it specifically refers to the strategies, techniques 
and approaches that educators can employ when teaching dialogic reflection as an epistemology 
(Kirschner 2009). As the pedagogy here is influenced by the epistemology of dialogic reflection, 
the ways of teaching and learning dialogic reflection should relate closely to its key principles. 
Currently, in occupational therapy, the methods of teaching reflection can be considered rote 
where students are taught the theories of reflection and expected to demonstrate their 
understanding through the application of these theories in their own reflections, often in the 
written essay form (Wong et al. 2016). However, as Russell (2005) had put it, teaching reflection 
is more than lecturing about it and then hoping for the best. Learning reflection requires ample 
guidance and room for practice without judgement (Wong et al. 2016). Dialogic reflection, 
though closely related to reflection, is trickier to teach and learn because of the principle of 
democratic dialogue. However, since dialogic reflection is natural, it poses the question as to 
whether it needs to be taught; in fact, can it even be taught? 
Pedagogical approaches to teaching dialogic reflection should be focused on positioning dialogic 
reflection in the curriculum such that it can be better learnt rather than producing strategies to 
teach it to students. Dialogic reflection is natural, and students engage in it out of empathy and 
compassion. Therefore, there is no need to teach a student how to reflect dialogically. However, 
a student must learn about dialogic reflection. Learning about dialogic reflection shifts the focus 
to practising dialogic reflection and self-conceptualising its role in the student’s life. As the 
principle of dialogic reflection states, reflectors take from dialogic reflection knowledge that has 
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meaning to them in their own world versions. The purpose and process of dialogic reflection 
have different meanings to these reflectors and this is often in line with how they have chosen 
to perceive the world. Similar to the issues in reflection, the meaning of dialogic reflection can 
be perceived differently. The difference here lies in the fact that these disparate meanings of 
dialogic reflection is the part of the reason for multiple perspectives and therefore needs to be 
embraced completely. 
In this vein, two pedagogic approaches appear to be in line with the principles of dialogic 
reflection. Experiential learning appreciates the reflective aspect of dialogic reflection and the 
principle of mediating theory and practice. Andragogy, on the other hand, respects dialogic 
reflectors as knowers and enquirers (Knowles 1970). The principle of democratic dialogue, 
however, poses an issue to the pedagogy of dialogic reflection and it is useful to see the 
pedagogic approaches to guiding extrospection as slightly different from that of introspection. 
12.3.1. Experiential Learning and Dialogic Reflection 
The value of reflection in education is its ability to bridge theory and practice and this is well 
explained by the theories of experiential learning (Kolb 2014). Experiential learning is a way of 
learning in which “the learner is directly in touch with the realities being studied” (Keeton and 
Tate 1978, p. 2). This idea is echoed in dialogic reflection through epistemic participation. From 
this perspective, experiential learning places emphasis on the sensory experience and action 
that happens in the context, using them as primary sources of learning (Kolb 2014). Specifically, 
in the occupational therapy curriculum in Cardiff University, experiential learning takes the form 
of practice education and to a certain extent, research modules. It is complementary to the PBL 
approach and keynote lectures in the curriculum. 
In consideration of Lewin’s (1946) action research model, Dewey’s (1938) model of learning and 
Piaget’s (1936) model of cognitive development, Kolb synthesised that experiential learning is 
full of conflict. However, it is only through these conflicts can the learner attain new knowledge, 
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skills and attitudes. Hence to be an effective learner, one would require the following four 
abilities or modes of learning (Kolb 2014): 
• Concrete experience – the ability to immerse fully and freely in new experiences with 
an open mind, clear of bias 
• Reflective observation – the ability to reflect on and observe experiences from multiple 
perspectives 
• Abstract conceptualisation – the ability to create concepts that integrate observations 
into logically sound theories 
• Active experimentation – the ability to use these theories to make decisions and solve 
problems 
The relationship between these four modes of learning is illustrated in the figure below. 
 
Figure 8. Experiential Learning Cycle (Kolb 2014) 
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With reference to the above figure, the conflict in experiential learning lies in the two primary 
dimensions of learning: grasping experience and transforming experience. To grasp experience, 
the learner is expected to be immersed in the totality of the experience with an open mind, 
whilst also generate concepts and integrate observations to make sense of the experience. To 
transform this experience, the learner is expected to engage in reflective thought whilst also 
actively experimenting new action. Negotiating these conflicts is where the difficulties of 
experiential learning lay.  
Learning arises from the resolution of creative tension among these four learning modes 
… Immediate or concrete experiences are the basis for observations and reflections. 
These reflections are assimilated and distilled into abstract concepts from which new 
implications for action can be drawn. These implications can be actively tested and serve 
as guides in creating new experience. (Kolb 2014, p. 51) 
Kolb (2014) believed that learning is where knowledge is generated from the grasping and 
transformation of experience, where the former refers to the capturing of information and the 
latter refers to the interpretation and action on the information.  
Practice education modules in the occupational therapy curriculum are opportunities for 
experiential learning to take place (Knightbridge 2014). The real-life practice situations offer 
students the “shock of direct concrete experience” (Kolb 2014, p. 57) they require to kick-start 
the experiential learning cycle.  
Moon (2004) proposed that experiential learning needs to be deliberate and does not occur 
automatically when the learner has an experience. However, experiential learning does not 
emerge from just any experience. Novel situations and problems where the learner has 
insufficient knowledge seem more likely to trigger experiential learning (Davies and Easterby-
Smith 1984). In addition, these specific experiences need to occur at the right time and place 
(Moon 2004). The ability to unlearn is also perhaps more important than learning in experiential 
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learning (Brew 2000), in other words, the learner needs to be flexible and open to the possibility 
of mistakes and errors (Moon 2004). 
However, dialogic reflection is naturally triggered similarly by these emotions and perplexity, so 
it may not need to be a deliberate process. These conditions for experiential learning are similar 
to those that trigger dialogic reflection: 
If someone upsets you and it is really bad. [Alicia in concluding session] 
Or if it is something that you find difficult. [Nicola in concluding session] 
Or something that you have seen and it is hard to understand, you want to try to work it 
out. [Charlotte in concluding session] 
My co-researchers noted that dialogic reflection is triggered by emotions and perplexity. Sarah 
shared that her brother often reflects with her to celebrate his success and to better understand 
what he had done well at. These triggers for dialogic reflection appear to be triggers for 
experiential learning as well. There are also similarities between the nature of dialogic reflection 
and experiential learning. Like experiential learning, dialogic reflection is about learning from 
experience, but through a dialogue about the experience. 
Schön (1987) articulated something similar about learning about reflecting. Reflection 
constructs new knowledge that manifests in future experiences, which in turn become new 
materials for reflection. Therefore, to better learn about reflection, one must practice it (Russell 
2005). Due to dialogic reflection being rather similar in this respect, practising dialogic reflection 
is the best way to learn about it. This process of learning through practising is congruent to the 
experiential learning which makes it an important pedagogic approach to learn about dialogic 
reflection.  
Dewey (1933) argued that: 
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The assumption that information which has been accumulated apart from the use in the 
recognition and solution of a problem may be later on be freely employed at will by 
thought is quite false. (Dewey 1933, p. 53) 
Learning about something ought to be in the context of its application. In other words, dialogic 
reflection needs to be learned through the application of it in real life situations. This way, it can 
be “freely employed at will” later (Dewey 1933, p. 53).  
Smith (1990) similarly argued that, 
Knowledge exists only in the activities and participation of subjects as knowers. (Smith 
1990, p. 66) 
To create knowledge about something, one must immerse oneself in it. Dialogic reflection 
should be learned in its immersion. This alludes to epistemic participation that is inherent in Co-
operative Inquiry (Heron 1996) and dialogic reflection. Knowledge creation is done through the 
embodiment of the experience. Knowers experience and through that they create new 
knowledge about the experience (Heron 1996). Dialogic reflection follows the same process in 
knowledge construction. Dialogic reflection is a place for epistemic participation to take place, 
and through that, reflectors experience dialogic reflection and create knowledge about 
themselves 
Experiential learning and dialogic reflection share some similarities which make experiential 
learning a suitable pedagogic approach to learning dialogic reflection. However, this is not to say 
that they are both one and the same.  
Kolb (2014, p. 57) argued that reflection is “one facet of a holistic process of learning from 
experience” and is not the “sole determinant of learning and development”. Kolb (2014) argued 
that reflection in isolation can alienate the learner from the world, seeking constant self-
confirmation and being unable to arrive at conclusions or experimental action. Reflection needs 
to be supplemented by other processes, such as abstract conceptualisation which gives it 
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complexity and the capacity for critical thinking, to be able to accommodate multiple 
perspectives and methods of analysis (Kolb 2014). However, I argue that dialogic reflection is 
exactly the answer to Kolb’s (2014) critique about reflection being insufficient to generate 
knowledge on its own.  Dialogic reflection is obviously about dialogue and reflection and being 
so has allowed it to accommodate multiple perspectives and methods of analysis as argued in 
Chapter Nine and Chapter Eight respectively. Allowing multiple world versions to meet offers 
reflectors multiple perspectives while empathy and the need to support each other encourages 
reflectors to adopt various methods of analysis. In this respect, dialogic reflection can be 
deemed as a better way to reflect.  
12.3.2. Andragogy and Dialogic Reflection 
Reflectors in dialogic reflection should be treated as individuals who already possess knowledge 
and experience, and their own unique perspective of the world based on them. This is in line the 
principles of andragogy, a theory of adult education advanced by Knowles (1970). 
Andragogy is a departure from the didactic method of teaching where students are expected to 
sit and listen while the educator lectures at them. Freire (1970) noted that there are pedagogical 
strategies that perceive students as empty vessels to be filled with knowledge. In this sense, the 
purpose of the intellectually superior educator is to feed the student with information. 
Healthcare education tends to favour the lecture style of teaching since it saves times and allows 
large cohorts of students to be taught at the same time (Rolfe 2013). Simultaneously, the focus 
in teaching appears to be on passing students on assessments rather than on learning (Rolfe 
2013). Such a pedagogic style is the antithesis of the principles of dialogic reflection. Dialogic 
reflection demands that reflectors are to be respected for their world perspectives, their 
knowledge and experience that they contribute. It denounces the idea of tabula rasa where 
learners are thought to be clean slates or empty vessels. Wang’s (1916) work was centred 
around the belief that learning is about unveiling innate knowledge about the world rather than 
accumulating knowledge about it.  
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As opposed to child education, andragogy is the study of adult education. Approaches to 
teaching in andragogy are specific for adult learning and hence, are generally more suitable than 
pedagogic approaches for children. This is because adults and children do not differ merely in 
quantitative terms (Vygotsky and Luria 1992). Along with the age difference comes a wealth of 
knowledge and experience, complexity of thought and a different identity as a learner (Vygotsky 
and Luria 1992). Knowles (1970) delineated the following differences in andragogy and 
pedagogy, which make up its tenets: 
1. As part of maturation, adults graduate from dependency and have a greater desire to 
direct their own learning. 
2. Adults learners possess a greater body of experience and knowledge which are great 
sources of learning for themselves and others. 
3. Educators in adult education have more responsibility to help adults to learn and less to 
teach them what they wish to learn. 
4. The purpose of education shifts towards being for greater self-actualisation and away 
from learning for future application. 
The responsibility for knowledge acquisition shifts from the teacher to the adult learner. Rather 
than teaching one about the world, one has the autonomy to direct one’s own concept of the 
world. This is similar in dialogic reflection where it is not about teaching each other rather it is 
about what each reflector learns from the analysis of his or her own experiences or that of 
others. Knowles (1970) noted that to accommodate such a difference in education, it is 
important that the learning environment is suitable for adult learning. Apart from the physical 
environment having to respect the learners as adults, such as having full-sized furnishings, the 
psychological environment is even more important. Learners and educators should exist in a 
mutual relationship where they are joint enquirers. Freire (1970) saw the dialogue between the 
student and teacher as where they are all co-investigators. This is similar to the requirements 
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for democratic dialogue. Dialogue is only democratic where participants are open to share their 
own experiences and accept the opinions of others. This, along with the demand for vulnerability 
and trust, places reflectors on an equal level. Failure to achieve this results in reticence. Boniface 
(2002) attributed the success of a reflection to the reflective environment. In her research, it 
was concluded that for occupational therapists to be able to reflect, the environment should 
first be accommodating for reflection to occur. One such criterion is where the reflector can 
reflect and be free of judgement, which is often unachievable in the presence of a supervisor or 
educator. 
As adults identify themselves by their own life experience, they place great value in their 
experience (Knowles 1970). 
And so, when they find themselves in situations in which their experiences is not being 
used, or its worth is minimized, it is not just their experience that is being rejected – they 
feel rejected as persons. (Knowles 1970, p. 50) 
This concept is in line with the principle of dialogic reflection. When dialogic reflection fails to 
respect reflectors for their unique knowledge and experience, its purpose changes from 
gathering multiple perspectives to seeking confirmation and affirmation of one’s reflection. In 
other words, when the value of multiple perspectives is lost, dialogic reflection is reduced to 
merely reflecting in front of other people, rather than reflecting with others. Knowles (1970) 
recommended experiential learning as part of the andragogical approach as well. 
12.3.3. Teaching and Learning About Dialogic Reflection 
Experiential learning and andragogy provide two pedagogical approaches to learning that share 
some similarities with the nature of dialogic reflection. They indicate some considerations in the 
teaching of, or rather learning about, dialogic reflection: 
1. Dialogic reflection is best learned through experiencing it 
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2. It should not be taught, rather it should be learned. Pedagogical approaches should 
focus on assisting the student in learning about it. 
3. Pedagogical approaches should make use of the student’s experience and knowledge as 
materials to learn about dialogic reflection 
4. The right reflective environment for learning dialogic reflection is required. 
This chapter is about learning or teaching dialogic reflection as an epistemology, not as a skill, 
nor as a learning tool or a way to demonstrate professional development. Therefore, the 
pedagogical approach to teaching or learning about it should be similar to teaching about a 
philosophical idea. In that vein, it would be inappropriate, ineffective and even reductive to train 
students to reflect dialogically. Rather, the purpose of teaching and learning about dialogic 
reflection should be about being aware of dialogic reflection and understanding how it applies 
to one’s life. The role of the educator is thus to make students aware of dialogic reflection and 
to make room for its application in the curriculum. The responsibility is on the learner to identify 
where they have experienced dialogic reflection in their lives, in and out of the university setting, 
and find what dialogic reflection means to them. 
From Boyd and Fales’ (1983) work, 
I know that I reflect and I consider myself a reflective person, but I have never thought 
about it and I am not exactly sure what it is that I do. (Boyd and Fales 1983, p. 99) 
There is a similar sense of confusion within this research, 
I think I am reflective, but I am not sure if that is a good thing sometimes I play stuff over 
and over again and that can lead to anxiety. [Sarah in group one] 
We all have the ability to worry about what we have done … That’s reflective, isn’t it? 
[May in group one] 
My co-researchers thought of themselves as reflective however they were unable to explain 
how they reflect. Rather they have seemed to relate reflection and dialogic reflection to 
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something more common such as over thinking, worrying and anxiety. This suggested that 
perhaps how one reflects dialogically reside in the tacit dimension. That would explain the 
difficulty that my co-researchers had when they attempted to articulate the process of dialogic 
reflection and reflection. As the process of dialogic reflection is perhaps tacit, it is not something 
that educators can teach. 
This means that there are limits to which dialogic reflection can be taught and not that it is 
completely unteachable. Educators can teach about dialogic reflection, the principles of the 
epistemology, the difficulties and potential of this way of knowing, the taxonomy of dialogic 
reflection and the difference between extrospection and introspection but they cannot teach 
the students how to reflect dialogically. I experienced the same when writing this thesis, where 
I could delineate the intricacies of dialogic reflection, but I am unable to write about how one 
can dialogically reflect with others. Writing about the types of analysis and roles in reflection is 
as close to the process of dialogic reflection as I could achieve. To a certain extent, I am unable 
to propose a model of dialogic reflection. However, it is possible to express how this 
epistemology can be delivered in the curriculum. 
Russell (2005) expressed a similar difficulty when it came to teaching reflection. Teaching 
reflection by lecturing students on the theories and then expecting them to apply them in their 
own practice was futile. It led to reflective writings that were obviously fabricated, contrived 
and ironically unreflective. However, he found certain success in teaching reflection without 
using the word reflection. Instead, he guided students on their reflection, asking appropriate 
questions to push the students into thinking deeper. Schön (1983) did not explicate the process 
of reflective practice, instead, he showed it via a series of examples where reflective practice 
was evident or poorly done. Critiques about his work being unclear and lacking a definitive 
reflective process miss the point of his work. The value of The Reflective Practitioner (Schön 
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1983) is not in how to do reflective practice, rather it is the epistemology of practice that he had 
offered. This was declared in Schön’s (1983) preface of his book. 
In this book I offer an approach to epistemology of practice based on a close examination 
of what some practitioners - architects, psychotherapists, engineers, planners, and 
managers - actually do. (Schön 1983, p. viii) 
The process of reflection cannot be taught because it is tacit and cannot be standardised. 
Similarly, dialogic reflection has the same quality in education. Educators can teach the theories 
of dialogic reflection if they so wish but they cannot teach students how to dialogically reflect. 
The theories underpinning dialogic reflection have limited use when it comes to applying the 
principles of the epistemology because of this. This would be further explained later in this 
chapter. 
I am not sure if I have met anyone who has said: "a model really made me become a 
reflective practitioner". [Sarah in group one] 
A student is dialogically reflective not because of his or her awareness of the underpinnings of 
the epistemology, but because he or she finds meaning in it and applies it. Therefore, the 
educator should seek to help the student find this meaning and create the right environments 
to apply it. Less effort should be placed on teaching about dialogic reflection. As dialogic 
reflection is a way of knowing and not a skill, one can dialogically reflect with others without 
knowing about dialogic reflection. 
12.3.3.1. Guiding Extrospection 
Guiding dialogic reflection should be the primary goal of education rather than teaching it. 
However, the question is how does the educator guide something that is not taught? Dialogic 
reflection uses dialogue as a platform for reflection to occur hence the first approach should 
involve turning dialogue that happens in the curriculum into dialogic reflection. Not all dialogue 
is reflective, however, they can be made reflective.  
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Dialogue is everywhere in the university, between students and between students and 
educators. They exist in the form of discussions such as supervision, journal club discussions, 
round table discussions, external speakers and PBL group meetings (Cardiff University 2012). 
These discussions are often about a pre-determined topic which is external to the self, such as 
journal club discussions about a specific article. Hence, they are suitable to be made into 
extrospection which is about reflecting on an experience and drawing knowledge about matters 
external to the self.  
The difference between a discussion and an extrospection is the reflective component. Firstly, 
participants of a discussion are commenting and analysing these external topics, without talking 
about their own experiences which is crucial for the process of group world making. Secondly, 
even when experiences are shared, the group does not always reflect on them dialogically.  
The solution to the first problem is rather simple, to ask group members to share their own 
experiences related to the topic of discussion. In the concluding session with my co-researchers, 
I asked if a model of reflection would be useful to structure an extrospection. 
We only need that first part, to get people to talk about their experiences. Like when you 
said let's talk about placement experiences, we all just contributed. [Lea in the 
concluding session] 
This “first part” that Lea was referring to is the first step of most, if not all, reflective models: 
describing the experience. Again, my co-researchers had discouraged the use of a model of 
reflection to guide extrospection. Initiating an extrospection requires one to simply to ask 
people about their own experiences with the topic. May from group one facilitated an 
extrospective session with her PBL group by following Gibbs’ (1988) model of reflection, 
however, she reported that it was difficult to follow the model procedurally because of how the 
dialogue progressed organically. She believed that her group would have been able to achieve 
the same, if not deeper reflection, without the model. At present, because this research started 
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from the point where both research groups trusted each other to reflect comfortably and they 
both preferred natural and unstructured dialogic reflections, suggestions on the use of models 
for extrospection were speculative at best. It was suggested that models of reflection may help 
a new group where members are not as familiar with each other, but it is something that 
warrants further research. 
The second problem where the group does not always reflect on experiences dialogically is far 
trickier as it points to several other issues that relate to dialogic reflection. It appears that 
democratic dialogue is something that is as difficult to achieve as it is powerful. Group members 
are not reflecting even when an experience is shared because, 
1. There is insufficient information about the experience to reflect on 
2. The experience shared does not trigger reflection 
3. Group members are not motivated to reflect 
4. Group members are reticent about reflecting 
The first two issues go hand in hand. In this research, not every experience results in an elaborate 
dialogic reflection. As shown in the excerpt in Chapter Eight, there are multiple different 
experiences shared in the same reflection as part of the reflective process. However, they are 
secondary to the primary experience that the group was reflecting on which was Sophie’s bad 
experience with her educator. While more information can be prompted, it is often the case 
where the dialogue carries on until the group arrives at an experience that evokes strong 
emotions, is perplexing or something that the group finds difficult to make sense of. 
The last two issues are more difficult to negotiate as they pertain to the reflective environment 
and how much democratic dialogue it affords. Dialogic reflection is driven primarily by empathy 
and compassion, therefore if the group members do not feel that way, it is less likely that they 
would be encouraged to reflect dialogically. The crux of this issue lies in the makeup of the 
group. Dialogic reflection is not about having the right number of people in the group, rather it 
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is about having the right people in the group. A group of peers is more likely to empathise and 
have compassion for each other due to their shared experiences. When group members are 
reticent about reflecting, it is more likely that the wrong people are in the group. This means 
that the group is not at the point where they can trust each other. Extrospection demands less 
vulnerability and trust, mostly because it is about topics external to oneself. The reflection is 
about gaining a better understanding of the topic, rather than looking inwardly and drawing an 
understanding about oneself. Therefore, the group is unlikely to be reticent about extrospecting, 
but the same cannot be said for introspecting. In this sense, democratic dialogue is less 
important in extrospection, relative to introspection. 
12.3.3.2. Guiding Introspection 
Guiding introspection is difficult, if not impractical in the curriculum. In Chapter Eight, I explored 
the characteristics of the perfect facilitator: shared experience but external to the group, more 
knowledgeable but not superior, confident but sensitive. The perfect person to reflect with is 
elusive and not always the same person. It is also highly likely that the educator is the wrong 
person to introspect with, resulting in some reticence due to the power they have over the 
students. Educators who wish to be part of the introspection are faced with a single option, to 
be a reflector in the group and not an educator.  
I had faced the same issue with facilitating the dialogic reflections. While I was busy playing the 
devil’s advocate, trying to prompt deeper reflection, I was not actively sharing my own 
experiences and playing the reflector role. Fortunately for me, my co-researchers were 
concerned and interested enough to ask me about my own experiences. If I had not responded 
or made this realisation, the group world could have formed with my exclusion.  
Lea made the following observation about her educators. 
I have not seen any evidence of my educators reflecting on themselves. And I find that 
really strange because they are marking me on it and it is something that I need to learn 
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how to do because it is part of the marking criteria, but they are not showing how they 
do it and they are not showing evidence to me that they have done it. [Lea in group two] 
The relationship between dialogic reflectors can be perceived to be transactional. If one wants 
others to introspect with one, then one must be willing to introspect with others. This is the 
trust building process and educators or facilitators are no exceptions to it. For educators to 
encourage introspection in whatever discursive settings, they must be able to forgo, for that 
moment, their superiority and be a reflector. That means sharing his or her experience, good or 
bad, and subjecting himself or herself to scrutiny. Guiding introspection is not the same as 
applying Johns’ (2013) Model of Structured Reflection, which was theorised for a supervisor to 
guide reflection. It is not as much about asking the right prompts as about the educator allowing 
others to prompt himself or herself to introspect. The educator who wishes to guide 
introspection should also allow himself or herself to be guided on his or her reflection by the 
students. Only doing so will the group world form, welcoming of the input of the educator. 
Nonetheless, this may be an uncomfortable position for the educator. 
It is the power differences, they have power and that is why you feel vulnerable. If it was 
a completely neutral, even relationship you probably would but unfortunately, they have 
power over you and you are in a weaker position … Even if you get on with your educator, 
you still would err on the side of caution because when you reflect you are showing, well 
not your flaws but things you struggle with, your weaknesses or difficulties you are 
having, and you wonder how that is going to be received and interpreted then by the 
educator even if they come across as friendly or go through the reflection with you. It is 
how they feel about it that you are concerned with. [Olivia in group two] 
Getting educators to introspect with students, not facilitate reflection, is difficult as it concerns 
the power differentials between them. Even with suggesting that educators should share their 
experiences and show vulnerability to the students, I believe that it is perhaps best if the 
educator excuses himself or herself from the group during introspection.  
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Narrative pedagogy is a similar approach that encourages educators and students to engage in 
dialogues about their experiences and thus, learn together (Diekelmann 2001; Ironside 2005).  
When teachers enact Narrative Pedagogy, students and teachers engage in public and 
communal thinking and dialogue that turns on sharing and interpreting their experiences 
to discover new understandings … (Ironside 2005, p. 479) 
Narrative pedagogy is a departure from conventional pedagogies that are concerned with 
conveying knowledge in a systematic manner to achieve specific learning outcomes (Diekelmann 
2001). Through the sharing of experiences, students and teachers engaged in narrative 
pedagogies explore different ways of interpreting, thinking and understanding experiences. This 
approach to learning allows teachers and students to develop in their own ways, as a result of 
their different interpretations of experiences. 
Narrative pedagogy argues for the importance of teachers and students being joint enquirers 
and the value of teachers sharing their own experiences with students to develop their own 
practice and learn alongside the student (Diekelmann 2001). This allows the student and teacher 
to engage in a converging conversation that is thought-provoking and impels joint enquirers to 
be openminded.  
Extrospection can be seen as a form of narrative pedagogy where educators and students 
engage in a reflective dialogue about their own experiences in relation to an external topic. 
Reflective dialogue similarly encourages educators and students to interpret experiences and 
learn in their own ways. Both dialogic reflection and narrative pedagogy share the same 
difficulty of overcoming power differentials. Dialogic reflection between educators and students 
is perhaps even trickier as it does not only involve all parties to show vulnerability, it is a form of 
confessional to wrong-doings, oversight, failure, inability and negligence as much as it is about 
sharing good practice. As such there are ethical concerns when conducting this within the 
university environment and sharing of such intimate experiences can have devastating 
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professional ramifications for both students and teachers. There is also the added problem of 
false reflections that could taint or skew the learning process. Dialogic reflection is more than 
storytelling. Unlike narrative pedagogy, there is a tendency and a desire to share intimate details 
and natural focus on experiences that are emotional or even morally questionable. Thus, it 
would perhaps be dangerous to conduct dialogic reflection as one would in narrative pedagogy. 
Like Boniface (2002) argued, people who have the power to sit in judgement of others do not 
make good reflective partners. 
In fact, a possible scenario in journal club is where the educator facilitates the discussion about 
an article, guides it into an extrospective session by asking members to share their experiences 
then leaves the group to allow the students to introspect on the topic. If dialogic reflection is 
about trust then the educators should similarly trust the students to be able to regulate their 
own introspection, this would also show a degree of respect for them as adults. 
Sometimes even peers do not make the best introspective partners. As introspection is highly 
personal, one tends to be even more fussy about who to introspect with. While peers tend to 
good introspective partners, the co-researchers have pointed out that they sometimes prefer to 
introspect with their partners and family members. 
They don’t need to be someone with direct experience with it and that can be helpful in 
different ways ... [Sarah in group one] 
I think someone who is actively listening as well to what you are sort of saying to them. 
If they are not understanding of where you are coming from, you do not feel like you get 
the support that you need to put that issue to bed … [Nicola in group one] 
When dialogic reflectors seek someone to introspect with, they seek support and empathy and 
not professional advice. Hence those who can provide that support that is needed tend to be 
better introspective partners than educators or practitioners, who have more experience in 
practice. Consequently, it is often that dialogic reflectors find people outside the university to 
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introspect with. Introspection in bigger groups is rather problematic because there is a greater 
possibility that there are people that one would rather not introspect with present. In addition, 
introspection with an educator is often inappropriate. Due to the difficulties in creating the right 
reflective environment for introspection, it is perhaps impractical to expect students to do so in 
the curriculum. Students should be encouraged to introspect for it grants them a clearer 
understanding of their world, but should also be left to find their own introspective partners or 
even introspect on their own if they so wish. Introspection cannot be forced. 
Unsurprisingly, the research groups had difficulty expressing prompts for triggering 
introspection. They had noted that it was just the way they show support for each other. It was 
previously noted that some models of reflection appear prompt introspection (Fish et al. 1991; 
Fish and de Cossart 2007; Johns 2013; Wareing 2017), however, as with extrospection, it is only 
speculative and more research is required to explore the extent of their usefulness in 
introspection. 
I had a small degree of success with prompting the co-researchers to introspect. An example of 
this is cited below and previously in Chapter Ten, where Sarah made a realisation about how her 
other peers have inspired her on the course when reflecting on a member of her PBL group who 
was not co-operating. I had prompted this introspection by asking: 
Have you internalised anything from that interaction with that person? Have you picked 
up any sort of reflection on yourself and your own beliefs? [Me in group one] 
I attempted to prompt the group into introspection by turning the focus of the reflection from 
being external, about the particular PBL group member, to being internal, about looking 
inwardly at oneself and the knowledge about oneself that one had elicited. This was not 
completely successful because it still led to some co-researchers reflecting externally instead of 
internally. 
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I think it is an example of what everybody doesn’t want to be. I am not sure without that 
example, everyone is at a similar example and it kind of sets the bar for what you don’t 
want to be. [Eve in group one] 
I had hesitated to consider this response as a good example of introspection because while she 
was reflecting on what she disagreed with, she was still focused on reflecting about that person, 
hence remaining extrospective and external to herself. Sarah followed up with: 
I think it makes people more conscientious about their work, but I think we lose some of 
the more interesting styles of group dynamics. Earlier on we were talking about the roles 
which I can’t quite remember either, but we were talking about some members are really 
good about coming up with ideas and some are good at keeping us on track and all that 
stuff that we have at different degrees and more subtle and interesting. It would be great 
to go like "you know what, I am not very good at putting stuff into something more 
practical, maybe I could work on that" or "maybe I can take a step back and not take 
that much of a leadership role". [Sarah in group one] 
Sarah who responded to my prompt similarly showed some extrospection when she was talking 
about the PBL group member making others “more conscientious about their work” and about 
the roles that other people play in the group. However, she gets closer to introspecting when 
she was talking about some of the lessons that could be learnt from the experience. She arrived 
at introspection later in the reflection where she looked at what she had internalised from the 
experience with that PBL group member. 
We get so caught up with one person and I think like from the very start of this course I 
found like everyone is very dedicated and more than any other course I have done 
including post-graduate stuff, it felt different and felt like everybody knew why they were 
here, what they want to do and I have been inspired by that, straight away I was like this 
is the level I am at and this is what I want to be doing. [Sarah in group one] 
Here, Sarah reflected on herself and where she saw herself on the course. She found that her 
peers were inspirational and through them, she found some meaning in being on the course. 
The point where she arrived at introspection was when she said: “This is the level I am at and 
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this is what I want to be doing.” It was an affirmation spoken with conviction. It suggested a 
great degree of internal reflection had occurred. While I had elicited this with my prompt, I 
doubt that it was an introspection that occurred there and then. It appeared as though it was 
something that this co-researcher had struggled with and reflected upon extensively prior. 
Identifying introspection was not easy. Even though there was a change in the use of pronouns 
from the third or second person to the first person in the examples above it, it required some 
interpretation.  
Introspection is far harder to guide in the curriculum because of the difficulty of prompting 
students into doing it, finding the right reflective partner and interpreting the introspection 
itself. Therefore, expecting the students to introspect in the university setting is rather 
impractical. While it can be encouraged by providing the right environment for it, introspection 
is perhaps best left to the student to conduct on their own volition and on their own terms. The 
onus is thus placed on the student to find an introspective partner to do so or do it on his or her 
own.  
Extrospection, on the other hand, is something that can be part of the curriculum. There is no 
need set up extrospective groups as many discussions at occur in the university or even on 
placement can be made extrospective. The first step is simply to ask group members to share 
their own experiences with the topic of discussions. The next step is to allow the dialogue to 
arrive at an experience that triggers dialogic reflection. It is also possible to transition from an 
extrospection to an introspection depending on the membership of the group, the reflective 
environment, and the using the right prompts to turn the dialogic reflection from extrospection 
to introspection 
12.4. Assessment 
Similar to pedagogy, the assessment of dialogic reflection should be in accordance with the 
principles of the epistemology. Assessment in this triadic relationship is purposed to reveal what 
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the students know (Knight et al. 2013), not to measure the what the student knows. In other 
words, “it is assessment for learning” (Knight et al. 2013, p. 76) and not an assessment of 
learning. However, to serve this purpose, assessment is concerned with developing 
representations of the knowledge that is being imparted. 
This distinction of the purpose of assessment is important because in developing a way to assess 
dialogic reflection, educators, institutions and even the professional body need to clarify what 
is it they would like to assess in the first place. From Chapter Three and Chapter Seven about 
reflection and the difficulties about it, I have shown what happens when this purpose of 
assessment is not made clear from the start.  
12.4.1.1. Present Issues About Assessing Reflection 
The issues about the assessment of reflection at present stem from the fact that the triadic 
relationship between epistemology, pedagogy and assessment of reflection is not explored and 
is full of incongruity.  
To start, the epistemology of reflection is not clear. Chapter Four highlights a few epistemologies 
from which reflection can be understood and Chapter Seven concludes that reflection does not 
have a clear epistemology and there are many clashes in epistemic beliefs in the field. The 
epistemic mess influences the pedagogy of reflection. In a previous paper, I wrote about how 
the way reflection is being taught can be considered rather rote and reductive: 
When students are being taught how to reflect, reflection, itself an esoteric and nebulous 
concept, can be reduced to getting the student to look back at what the student has done 
wrong and how he/she can use this evaluation of self-criticism to identify how to do 
something better in the future. (Wong et al. 2016, p. 476) 
Reflective practice can be taught as a method to evaluate one’s practice, however, in doing so, 
the rich and elaborate process of knowledge construction and reconstruction is lost. Reflective 
practice becomes performance evaluation and less about one’s growth and understanding of 
oneself in practice. Such a reductive pedagogical approach could be avoided if the epistemology 
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was made clearer initially and allowed to influence the way educators teach and the way 
students learn about it. Johns’ (2013) anecdote about his interaction with the nurse cited in 
Chapter Three made a poignant point. Reflection is being taught unreflectively by unreflective 
practitioners and educators. This leads to it being perceived pejoratively by students (Russell 
2005) and practitioners (Burton 2000; Gilbert 2001). 
The assessment in reflection can be treated as an assessment of one’s reflection. The aim of 
assessment in reflection is to judge how one reflects and what one is reflecting on. This 
assessment of reflection presently is often via reflective assignments, where students submit a 
written version of their reflection and practice education, where educators grade a student on 
how he or she demonstrates reflection in practice. Written reflections are a poor representation 
of the elaborate reflective process that one undergoes. 
I find it hard to express myself on paper, particularly with written reflection, I really 
struggle with it. I find it very superficial because if I am reflecting verbally with somebody 
or in a conversation with my educator … as soon as I have been told to write it down, it 
becomes so bitty. [Eve in group one] 
The process of reflection is tacit (Polanyi 1966; Schön 1983), assessing the student’s reflection 
is essentially assessing how well the student can articulate the tacit process of reflection, not 
the how the student had reflected or what the reflection was about. There is an inherent clash 
between the assessment method of reflection and the way it is being taught. If reflection was 
to be taught reductively as a method of practice evaluation then the assessment method should 
measure how well the student had performed the evaluation, not the extent of the student’s 
expressive ability. To assist in the grading of reflection, complex rubrics have been developed. 
While grading the level of thinking in the reflection, these rubrics also factored mechanical 
proficiencies such as spelling, grammar, the structure of the reflection and even the use of 
citations (Georgia State University 2017; University of Minnesota 2017). These rubrics clearly do 
not serve to measure what it is created to measure. When students graded on their reflective 
233 
 
ability on placement, this is also assisted by rubrics that guide the educator on what to look out 
for. In one university, the level of reflective ability is differentiated by the amount of supervision 
and guidance the student needs on it. Educators then pass a judgement on this via their 
observation and some educators may choose to ask students to submit written reflection in 
support of this. The issues surrounding these have been highlighted in Chapter Four. 
The idea of assessing a student on reflection is controversial. While it is expected of universities 
to do so as advised by the professional body (COT 2014b) and the regulatory bodies of higher 
institutions (QAAHE 2001), the question here is if it is even right to grade one’s reflection in the 
first place. Grading a student’s reflection is tantamount to passing a judgement on whether the 
reflection is good or bad, right or wrong. Assessment becomes about achieving “right 
answerism” (Knight et al. 2013, p. 77) which then influences the pedagogy of reflection. To help 
students reflect well as directed by the rubrics, educators teach, and students elicit that 
reflections should be about utilising reflective models extensively, writing beautifully and 
demonstrating development by exaggerating the experience. Russell (2005) found that his 
students were fabricating experiences to reflect on. Demonstrating reflection and reflecting 
becomes about achieving a better grade (Wong et al. 2016). This makes reflecting excessively 
academic and less about self-discovery. Symptoms of the academicalisation of reflection are the 
reticence and false reflections as described in Chapter Seven. If the assessment of reflection is 
grading something false and contrived, then it has clearly failed its purpose.  
I remember once when I gave my reflection in, and then she said in the comment, "Oh 
you’re very reflective" and in my head I was thinking: how do you know that I am 
reflective just by me giving you the paper? [Charlotte in group two] 
As Charlotte had remarked, judging reflective ability is more than reading a piece of writing. If 
reflection were as simple as a skill, then it should be easily assessed, as a skill. However, this is 
evidently not true. Writing reflection is hard, not to mention the amount of vulnerability that is 
required to share one’s reflection with others. This difficulty is present in dialogic reflection. 
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Like dialogic reflection, reflection is emotionally charged and morally driven (Johns 2013). It is 
not a series of logical thoughts and is certainly not always rational. Students make judgements 
on their actions and experiences based on what they know, feel, value, and perceive. They have 
their own world versions and so do the educators. Judging someone else’s reflection is the same 
as judging their values, feelings about the experience, knowledge, perspective of the situation; 
fundamentally, the educator judges the student’s world version. The educator extends beyond 
his or her role of teaching and guiding students to become a referee on the right way to think, 
act, feel, believe. This can be perceived as over stepping one’s responsibility as an educator and 
even unethical. 
From the perspective of the educator, reading and grading someone else’s reflection is 
challenging as well. The following quote is from an educator from Miller et al.’s (2012) work on 
developing a rubric for assessing reflection: 
I found myself forming an opinion about each student based on my own bias about the 
subject matter, applauding when it was incorporated in the writing and saddened when 
it was lacking. (Miller et al. 2012, p. 1) 
While it is challenging for the student to write a reflection for judgement, it is also difficult for 
educators to question themselves about their own thoughts of the subject matter when reading 
the reflection of their students. Reading a reflection also requires one to be open minded 
enough to accept different opinions about the same subject. Educators face a different challenge 
here, to put aside their bias and to assess the reflection as one conducted by the student and 
not contrast how they would have reflected on the same thing themselves. Reading someone 
else’s reflection requires one to enter the world version of the reflector and understand how 
the reflector had seen the experience. This is something that is challenging, especially so in 
dialogic reflection. This is even more difficult when educators must attribute a grade to the 
student’s reflection: is the reflection good, bad or is it just a different way of reflecting? 
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Assessing reflection is problematic, and these issues are shared with dialogic reflection. The 
issues with reflection in curriculum lie in many areas. The epistemology of reflection is unclear, 
resulting in many ways reflection is being taught, some more reductive than others. The purpose 
of assessing reflection is highly questionable and controversial, leading to assessments that 
defeat their own purposes. Reflection in curriculum requires a complete over haul. To start, the 
epistemology of reflection needs to be clear before a suitable teaching and assessment plan can 
follow. In this research, I attempted to avoid a similar fate for dialogic reflection in the 
curriculum by exploring the epistemology of dialogic reflection in Part Three and then make 
recommendations for the curriculum with reference to teaching and learning the epistemology 
in this chapter. 
12.4.1.2. How to Assess Dialogic Reflection 
The same question needs to be asked about assessing dialogic reflection: what is the purpose of 
assessment in dialogic reflection? At the same time, the assessment needs to be in line with the 
pedagogy of dialogic reflection. The earlier discussion about the pedagogy highlighted three 
ways dialogic reflection can be taught and learned: 
1. Theories about dialogic reflection can be taught. Students can be lectured on the 
principles of dialogic reflection and the underpinning theories and ideas.  
2. Students need to learn how to dialogically reflect on their own. For extrospection, the 
educator can guide and encourage the sharing of experiences and reflection on them. 
3. For introspection, students should be given room and the prerogative to pick whom they 
wish to introspect with, or even introspect on their own. 
Students can be assessed on their knowledge on dialogic reflection. If dialogic reflection is taught 
as a body of knowledge, then it can be assessed as so. Like assignments on other topics taught, 
students can demonstrate their ability to analyse and synthesise through discursive assignments 
about the theories of reflection or dialogic reflection. However, this recommendation to 
236 
 
educators comes with a word of caution: the student should not be expected to demonstrate 
the application of theories through introspection or extrospection, and they should not be 
rewarded for doing so too. The purpose of this method of assessment is to assess a student’s 
knowledge about dialogic reflection, not how the student reflects. This intention must be made 
clear to the students for it may be perceived as superior to demonstrate knowledge through 
application. Obviously, this recommendation restricts the student’s expression, that is because 
the purpose of this form of assessment is limited to knowledge about dialogic reflection and not 
knowledge about how to dialogically reflect. As I had noted earlier in the discussion on 
pedagogy, knowledge about dialogic reflection serves little purpose in understanding this 
epistemology. 
Knowledge about how to do something cannot be equated to knowledge about it (Ryle 1945). 
Knowing about something does not mean that one knows how to carry out the action 
successfully. There is a common misconception that students need to be taught the theory 
about a subject before he or she can carry out the application. Ryle (1945) referred to this as the 
intellectualist legend. He debunks this with the following: 
The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be 
more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently 
executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed 
intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle. 
(Ryle 1945, p. 19) 
Thinking about the theories before one conducts an action is an action in itself. This results in 
an infinite regression from which there is no escape hence the intellectualist legend is absurd. 
Intelligent actions cannot be defined by intelligence (Ryle 1945). Similarly, knowing about all the 
theories about dialogic reflection does not mean a student knows how to reflect dialogically, 
hence my claim earlier about teaching dialogic reflection serving little use in the understanding 
of the epistemology. 
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The question next is then: what is the purpose of assessing extrospection and introspection? 
Part of the reason reflection is assessed is that of the requirement of the professional bodies 
and regulatory bodies. While this is a reason for the reductive treatment of reflection in the 
curriculum, this requirement is also born from a reductive understanding of reflection. It is 
because reflection is viewed reductively as practice evaluation that this skill is expected to be 
assessed, which then leads to it being taught and learned reductively. If this thesis is to maintain 
that dialogic reflection is an epistemology, then I cannot, in good conscience and with 
conviction, recommend a method of assessment of dialogic reflection that treats it any less. In 
fact, in appreciation of its full potential as a way of knowing, I struggle to recommend that 
dialogic reflection can be assessed in any way or form. 
Knowledge about dialogic reflection can be assessed but knowledge about how to dialogically 
reflect cannot be achieved without first reducing dialogic reflection to a skill or process. While I 
had suggested earlier that extrospection can be guided and introspection can be encouraged, I 
had purposely refrained from suggesting that dialogic reflection is to be used as a learning tool. 
Extrospection, though easier to conduct, cannot be assessed because that would demand the 
student to think, analyse and conceptualise experience in a certain way that is considered better 
or more right as the grades would reflect. Assessment here returns back to being about “right 
answerism” (Knight et al. 2013, p. 77) which then reduces the epistemology to a skill that has 
certain markers of excellence. Dialogic reflection will then experience the same fate as 
reflection. Like extrospection, introspection similarly cannot be assessed for the same reason. 
In fact, like reflection, assessing introspection is unethical. 
There is perhaps no need to assess dialogic reflection. The dialogic nature is self-analytical and 
self-regulatory. It also morally checks reflectors against each other. As such dialogic reflection 
on its own is a form of its formative assessment. Reflectors question and prompt each other to 
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achieve a better understanding about their experiences, at the same time point out perspectives 
that the reflector fails to consider.  
12.5. Dialogic Reflection and Reflection in the 
Curriculum 
I made a claim earlier about dialogic reflection possibly being a better way to reflect because of 
the multiple perspectives it offers which reflection was criticised to lack. In that aspect, dialogic 
reflection offers something that reflection does not and hence because of that it can be deemed 
as better, only in that specific aspect. I do not claim that dialogic reflection is superior to 
reflection because of how dialogic reflection is conceptualised in this thesis. Dialogic reflection 
can be viewed as an epistemology. While that suggests that reflection can perhaps also be 
considered as an epistemology, it was not the focus of this thesis and this research.  
As with other philosophies, dialogic reflection as an epistemology is something that students 
can take on board or not if they so wish. Unlike how regulatory bodies have perceived reflective 
practice, students do not have to be dialogically reflective practitioners, nor should they be 
forced to apply its principles. Dialogic reflection is not for everyone. Some students may never 
be able to reveal vulnerabilities to others or trust others enough to reflect dialogically. Students, 
in fact, trust some people more than others and the best introspective partner is perhaps not 
from the university or practice setting. Dialogic reflection should be made known to students, 
the onus is then on them to find what it means to them. Educational institutions should allow 
students to make this decision themselves by providing them opportunities to engage in it 
through discussions. Dialogic reflection is a philosophical thought that can be debated, rejected, 
or accepted, hence students should have this option to do so. Professional bodies and regulatory 
bodies should recognise this and not expect educational institutions to prove the dialogic 
reflective abilities of their graduates as this would only lead to a reductive assessment that in 
turns breed a reductive understanding of it. 
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Dialogic reflection can coexist with reflection in the curriculum, it is not an either-or decision 
that the students must make. Rather the student should decide when, how and where he or she 
would like to reflect or dialogically reflect, and who to do that with. This decision differs 
depending on the reflective environment. 
Because it is going to depend on what the topic is about, what the experience is going to 
be about, are the right people in the room, if you are in the right mood to talk about 
those things, there are just too many variables. [Me in the concluding session] 
There are many factors at play that make dialogic reflection suitable for one and as such, 
reflection can be a more desirable alternative. However, it is not the duty of the educator to 
make this decision for the student.  
Before dialogic reflection can be part of the curriculum, there must be room for it. From the 
practice education grading system of a university: 
Fail grade descriptor: Limited ability to reflect on the problem-solving process to the 
assessment level despite direction from the educator … Limited ability to use reflection 
and educator feedback to evaluate and develop professional strengths and identify 
continuing learning needs despite direction from the educator. 
Distinction grade descriptor: Reflect on the problem-solving process to the assessment 
level with minimal supervision from the educator … use reflection and evaluator 
feedback to evaluate and develop professional strength and identify continuing learning 
needs with minimal supervision from the educator. 
At present, reflecting with someone else and allowing someone else to contribute to one’s 
reflection is deemed as a poorer way to reflect. Dialogic reflection is not supported in the 
curriculum because it suggests an inability to reflect independently and a need for direction on 
how to reflect at a deeper level. In light of the findings in this thesis, such a perspective of 
dialogic reflection needs to be changed.  
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Another important change required is the reductive perspective of reflection. More research is 
required to understand the epistemology of reflection and the core nature of reflection. This 
would allow educators and the professional body to reconsider that is it about reflection that 
needs to be taught and assessed. Reflection in the curriculum needs to be reviewed. It would 
then only be safe to introduce dialogic reflection in the curriculum, without fear of it being 
treated reductively after reflection is being reviewed. 
The key point in this exploration is that dialogic reflection must be treated as an epistemology 
in the curriculum and its pedagogy and assessment should reflect an appreciation of it as such. 
12.5.1. Potential of Dialogic Reflection in the Curriculum 
With the above conditions satisfied, dialogic reflection can then play an important role in the 
curriculum besides what it can offer as an epistemology. Dialogic reflection offers students an 
opportunity to learn from others, socialise into the profession and slow down the pace of 
curriculum. Additionally, dialogic reflection can play a beneficial role in the students’ developing 
to becoming a professional. 
The curricula that my co-researchers were in was rather fast paced. The co-researchers felt that 
there was little time to socialise and get to know each other. Dialogic reflection in the curriculum 
will make this possible by slowing down the curriculum. 
it was so rushed we did not have a chance to do a reflection unless we had a session to 
reflect … [Sarah in group one] 
Our course is like you turn up, you do what you need to do and then you go and you don’t 
feel like you have that social support as much. [Isabella in group two] 
I remember people saying that they didn't feel like we could talk and have the time for a 
chat. I don’t know where half the people on the course have been, it is especially on this 
fast-paced course, we don’t really get that chance. [Olivia in group two] 
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Being on a two-year accelerated programme, my co-researchers felt that they had been 
progressing too quickly from case study to case study in their PBL based modules and from 
university based modules to practice education and vice versa. There is insufficient time to 
reflect with others and through dialogic reflection, better understand their peers. Due to this 
fast-paced curriculum, socialising appears to be secondary to getting the work done: 
it’s so quick it’s more like that is not very important right now and what’s important is 
that the handout gets done. [Olivia in group two] 
Aside from professional development, my co-researchers also learn more about each other 
through engaging in dialogic reflections in this research: 
We have done social things and that, but I feel like in these sessions as well, we have got 
the opportunity to bare ourselves and trust each other more. [Isabella in group two] 
I felt a lot closer to the people this year … I feel a lot more relaxed around people and 
open. [Lea in group two] 
Through the process of engaging in dialogic reflection in this research, the co-researchers had 
developed a deeper understanding of each other. Dialogic reflection requires a great amount of 
trust and vulnerability. Through the process of group world making, dialogic reflectors reveal 
and share their world versions with others. They share their lives, beliefs, values, interest, and 
that allows dialogic reflectors to have a deeper understanding of each other, not only as 
students but as all the other social roles they play in their lives. Due to the pace of the curriculum, 
it is understandable that the co-researchers may think of each other as colleagues. Dialogic 
reflection in this research offered them an opportunity to learn about each other outside the 
work capacity and share with others their lives outside the curriculum. 
We noted that there is much to learn from others through dialogic reflection: 
I think it really makes you think about the way you do things and hearing about how 
other people might do the same thing from their perspectives. [May in group one] 
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Having those other perspectives, again it broadens your perspectives and gives you more 
options.  [Sarah in group one] 
You know what to do if that were to happen to you or you have an inkling of what to 
consider if the same thing were to happen to you … Having eight people in a room 
reflecting also means eight times more experiences. [Me in group two] 
We felt that we learn from someone else’s experiences, the choices we had to make and what 
can be considered. Even though these experiences we reflected on does not always belong to 
us, we feel that we were able to learn from them as well. With more people reflecting, the 
variety and amount of experiences each dialogic reflector is exposed to increases. By reflecting 
on these experiences, we learned from experiences that we did not have the opportunity to 
experience. 
The act of engaging in dialogic reflection itself provides opportunities for my co-researchers to 
hone professional skills that are transferable to their practice. 
Transferable skills because things like building trust than in a group situation or learning 
to speak out. [April in group one] 
You are going to have to give feedback as a professional, perhaps you are going to be 
mentoring someone or dealing with the staff member. [Alicia in group two] 
In addition to learning from others, my co-researchers benefited from the process of dialogic 
reflection by picking up and practising transferable skills. Dialogic reflection is something that 
requires trust and tactful communication. By dialogically reflecting, my co-researchers learned 
to trust and build trust amongst their peers and interact tactfully with others. These skills were 
deemed of great use in the professional setting as well. Hence dialogic reflection offered them 
training in professional skills and knowledge in this area. 
Reflecting dialogically on placement is rather difficult due to the power dynamics inherently 
present when students as outsiders enter an organisation for a short period of time. Students 
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are surrounded by educators and other staff who they find hard to reflect with. While there 
were issues about introspection, there were fewer issues with extrospection. Some co-
researchers found that they could reflect dialogically with other more junior staff members. 
Dialogic reflections for this purpose tend to be on their practice experience and this had helped 
them socialise professionally into the placement setting. 
I felt like what I was doing wasn’t different from what they were doing and, so I discussed 
stuff with them and they treated me as an equal. [Sarah in group one] 
With my supervisor, it feels like she had to listen to what I said but with others, it felt like 
I was interacting with other members of the team and it makes me feel like I am part of 
it all as well. [Nicola in group one] 
Nicola above explained that reflecting with a supervisor felt like the primary purpose of it was 
to fulfil the marking criteria. It felt like the responsibility of the supervisor to reflect with her. 
However, reflecting with other members felt different. Other members were not directly 
responsible for her learning hence dialogic reflection was more altruistic and nature. She saw it 
as being appreciated and respected as a member of the team on that placement. 
Nonetheless, they were still wary of the ramifications of what they shared.  
When I was on placement, they were very encouraging for me to reflect on the wider 
service and they felt I was in a good position because I could offer those thoughts without 
the attachment of being employed by the service. But I was very careful because you are 
still on placement and you are still very vulnerable. [Olivia in the concluding session] 
Olivia noted that she felt that the setting could have been making use of her reflections to 
support the staff’s own agenda. She was wary of being made a scapegoat or a proxy for the 
changes that the staff would like to champion for themselves but powerless to do so. She noted 
that she erred on the side of caution and was careful in her reflections with the staff members. 
Gilbert (2001) saw reflections as a form of confession of one’s practice. This anecdote above 
suggested that through this confession, the practitioner inadvertently confesses about the wider 
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service and staff, revealing problems, inefficiencies and even potentially serve as a form of 
whistle-blowing. However, this would be the case only if the true reflection was shared and this 
is rarely the case. Olivia noted that she was careful to edit and filter her reflection, in other 
words, she offered a false reflection. 
It is like dynamics in the placement setting as well … you have to be really careful what 
you say in these situations … you will never get there. [April in the concluding session] 
While dialogic reflection socialises the student into the team, there are still power dynamics and 
politics within the team. As a result, April still saw herself as an outsider just to be cautious.  
These two co-researchers showed that even by socialising into the team through dialogic 
reflection, students are still in vulnerable positions, being an outsider and occasionally the only 
student on that placement. They remained reticent about matters the reflected on and how 
they reflected with others. Democratic dialogue, in general, is an issue in placement settings. 
While non-supervisory staff members can be reflective partners, reticence and the unwillingness 
to be vulnerable still impede dialogic reflection. Students should be advised to pick their 
reflective partners carefully on placement. 
12.6. Conclusion 
Dialogic reflection in the curriculum is a triadic relationship between its epistemology, pedagogy, 
and assessment. The dialogic reflection is its own epistemology, based on its three key 
principles. These three key principles should be inherent in the way dialogic reflection is being 
taught and the way it is assessed in the curriculum. Adopting such a school of thought in 
considering dialogic reflection in the curriculum, I have concluded that dialogic reflection is tricky 
to teach and assess. 
Dialogic reflection can be taught as a knowledge base, students can be lectured on the theories 
about it and its principles. Therefore, dialogic reflection can also be assessed as a knowledge 
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base, through essays and debates. Educators, however, need to be aware that it is the 
knowledge base they are assessing in these assignments, not the application of them. Students 
should not be rewarded for demonstrating the application either or faulted for not doing so. If 
dialogic reflection is to be taught as a body of knowledge, then the assessment should be 
assessing this knowledge and not the application of the knowledge. 
There are many discursive environments available in the university that the educators can use 
as platforms to encourage and guide dialogic reflection. These discussions are typically about a 
pre-determined topic or subject. Educators can lead students to extrospect by prompting them 
to share their experiences in relation to the topic and allow the group to reflect on these 
experiences together. Introspection on the other is something that the student should be left to 
conduct on his or her own, with the people that he or she feels comfortable with, and in his or 
her chosen time and space. It would be impractical and inappropriate for educators to guide 
introspection unless the student wishes to introspect with the educator.  
Extrospection can be initiated simply by asking the group members to share their experiences 
and allow natural dialogue to encourage reflection on these experiences. Introspection, 
however, is driven largely by empathy and support, hence it is up to the group to prompt the 
reflector into deeper introspection and up the reflector to share this process with others. 
Extrospection and introspection can perhaps be guided by models of reflection however natural 
dialogue is ultimately preferred. The use of models was not explored in this research as the 
research groups did not feel that models were useful due to their familiarity with each other and 
the preference for free, organic reflective discussions. Models may provide some direction and 
prompts for use in extrospection and introspection and this is something worth further research. 
Due to the triadic relationship, I conclude that extrospection and introspection cannot be 
assessed without reducing them to a skill or method of learning. Dialogic reflection is morally 
driven, emotionally charged and value based. Assessing dialogic reflection would be tantamount 
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to passing a judgement on how the student thinks, feel, see, and believe about the experience. 
While it is not possible to do so without implying that there is a good or bad way to dialogically 
reflect, it is perhaps even unethical to pass such judgements.  
Dialogic reflection has great potential in the curriculum. Students learn not only about 
themselves through others. They are exposed to experiences that they have not had the 
opportunity to experience and learn from the mistakes and success stories of others then 
consider how they would or would not have done something differently. Dialogic reflection 
slows down the curriculum, such that students can learn more about others, not only as 
colleagues in the same field of study but as human beings who play many other social roles. 
Students sometimes find that opportunities to dialogically reflect with others on placement 
however due to being vulnerable and being an outsider in the team of practitioners, students 
tend to be cautious about what they share. In the same vein, dialogic reflection is not very 
suitable for practice education settings, though it is possible. 
The crux of this chapter is that dialogic reflection in the curriculum is about it as an epistemology 
and not as a learning method or technique or practice. Therefore, there are certain constraints 
on what about dialogic reflection can be taught and assessed. In light of these constraints, 
dialogic reflection in the curriculum should be viewed as the integration of the epistemology 
into pedagogy and assessment, such that while students learn more about the subject of study, 
they also learn more about each other, about themselves and about their world versions.
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Chapter 13. Placing Dialogic 
Reflection in Professional Practice 
Apart from benefits of dialogic reflection discussed in the previous chapters, it also plays a 
crucial role in the professional development for students and practitioners. When on 
placements students have a strong desire to become professionals and this is also expected of 
them by universities. However, students do not automatically become professionals just by 
being on placements. The journey between being a student and becoming a professional 
practitioner is paved with difficult and conflicting situations where dialogic reflection and 
reflection become useful. The same desire to become better exists in practitioners as well. The 
principles of dialogic reflection are important as they play a role in this professional 
development. 
Schön’s (1983) work on reflective practice recognised a shift in nature of professional practice, 
however, the understanding of reflection appears to be less responsive to this 
reconceptualisation. Considering the findings of this thesis, dialogic reflection needs to be 
placed in Schön’s (1983) paradigm of professional practice and not Technical Rationality. Like 
the curriculum, dialogic reflection in professional practice needs to be about it as an 
epistemology, about understanding oneself in one’s practice. It is easier to see how 
extrospection can be part of practice, however, introspection requires a closer inspection of the 
profession’s philosophy. 
Introspection is often met with resistance. Action Inquiry provides some direction as to how one 
can introspect. A pre-reflective mindful state needs to exist to allow one to reflect professionally 
and personally. However, introspection is something natural in the dialogue between reflectors 
and hence is not a process that can be simplified or standardised in a model.  
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Even though this chapter is predominantly a discussion about the application of dialogic 
reflection in professional practice in occupational therapy, the two research groups had 
discussed some these applications in the sessions we had. Hence, where appropriate, I share 
some of our conversations to further support these discussions. Some of the discussion here 
were part of my initial literature review but I have decided to feature them in this chapter 
instead because they pertain to application dialogic reflection and provide basis for the 
recommendations here. 
13.1. Professional Development in Occupational 
Therapy 
The challenge of professionalism lies in its acquisition and evaluation which is rather abstract in 
comparison to practical skills (Fidler 1996; Bossers et al. 1999). Despite addressing multiple 
aspects of professional development in the curriculum, it is hard to address how to be a 
professional person (Bruhn 1987). Professional behaviour is not an innate ability and requires 
practice, support and feedback (Kasar and Muscari 2000). Fidler (1996) identified that 
professional development in occupational therapy is embedded in experience and closely linked 
to an individual’s values and beliefs; therefore, the learning of professionalism occurs in the 
context of its natural use in interpersonal engagement (Fidler 1996). In other words, it is Fidler’s 
(1996) understanding that professional development is better learnt when on placement. 
Placement is intended to provide students with an opportunity to assimilate into the profession 
(Eraut 1994) and immerse in the culture of practice in that setting (Krusen 2011). Gandy and 
Jensen (1992) alternatively suggested that group processes such as collaboration, critical 
thinking and problem-solving, coupled with the reflection that bridge theory and practice can 
facilitate professional development. This is further supported by Alsop (1995a; 1995b) and Crist 
et al. (1998) who are of the view that the reflective element of portfolios allows for an accurate 
depiction of the growth of a therapist. 
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Bossers et al. (1999) had developed framework of professionalism in occupational therapy which 
comprises of professional parameters, professional behaviours and professional responsibility. 
Professional parameters refer to the awareness of legal and ethical issues concerning 
occupational therapy practice. Professional behaviours refer to what the therapist 
demonstrates in practice settings such as clinical skills and teamwork. Professional responsibility 
refers to the areas which the therapist is held accountable for such as career and self-
development and mentorship of students. While Bossers et al. (1999) had delineated 
professionalism, they have yet to identify the components that need to be taught (Kelly 1992) 
and those that develop through experience (Bruhn 1987). Eraut (1994) was of the opinion that 
professional knowledge can be taught but cannot be gleaned from a manual as it requires more 
deliberate processes such as planning and problem-solving (Spalding 2000). 
Mirroring Erikson’s (1982) psychosocial life stages, Kasar and Muscari (2000) had developed a 
theoretical model for an occupational therapist’s progressive stages of professional 
development: beginning student stage, senior student stage, new graduate occupational 
therapist – orientation stage, graduate occupational therapist – novice stage, role identification 
stage, collaborative stage, proficient stage and reflective stage. They had also noted that as with 
Erikson’s (1982) stages each stage has to be successfully completed before moving on to the 
next. This was contradictory to what they had mentioned later in the beginning student stage 
about the resolution of the question of “do I want to be an occupational therapist” which they 
had described as “never completely resolved” (Kasar and Muscari 2000, p. 46) even by a 
seasoned occupational therapist. The model also suggested that occupational therapists’ ability 
to reflect features very much later after the therapist becomes proficient and ready to take on 
the responsibility of teaching. One can argue that this conflicts with the understanding that 
reflective practice should be inherent throughout an occupational therapist’s practice life, from 
being a student to being a mature therapist (COT 2014a). The above critique, with the fact that 
the model is theoretical and lacks supporting evidence, suggested that this model is not 
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indicative of the professional developmental process. It, however, further supported that fact 
that measuring professional development is difficult. 
This was further exemplified in the critique of the Occupational Adaptation Model of 
Professional Development (Garrett and Schkade 1994). The model helped view and facilitate 
professional development of students by using classes adapted from the occupational 
adaptation frame of reference (Schkade and Schultz 1992): primitive, transitional and mature 
classes. Initially, the students demonstrate fear and possibly avoidance of unfamiliar demands. 
They then transition to demonstrate random responses to changes in the task and fail to 
respond to the relevant stimuli, and eventually mature to become goal directed and efficient 
occupational therapists. Kasar and Muscari (2000) were of the view that this model appeared to 
reflect the development of clinical skills and not professional behaviour which is a broader 
concept. The model had also been criticised for its poor generalisability to the curriculum outside 
practice education (Kasar and Muscari 2000; Ledet et al. 2005). Coates and Crist (2004) have 
replicated the research by Garrett and Schkade (1994) and attempted to use the model to 
explain performance maturation of the occupational therapy student in the administering of an 
assessment. In their discussion, Coates and Crist (2004) had achieved partial success with the 
model, where they had identified that students had developed from demonstrating signs of 
anxiety and hesitation to becoming more proficient and comfortable but did not report if there 
was any transition phase as identified by Garrett and Schkade (1994).  
Whilst Bossers et al. (1999) had delineated the relevant components of professionalism, there 
was still an apparent difficulty in measuring and understanding the process of professional 
development (Coates and Crist 2004; Kasar and Muscari 2000; Garrett and Schkade 1994). 
However, there was a certain amount of success in the research around demonstrating 
professional development.  
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Using theories of experiential learning (Kolb 2014; Henry 1989), Alsop (1995b) had made the 
case for the use of portfolios as a strategy for occupational therapists to reflect on the 
experience, identify learning outcomes and document them in a structured way, thereby 
demonstrating the individual’s professional development. This was supported by Crist et al. 
(1998) who had mentioned that portfolios show in detail how the occupational therapist grew 
through a reflective process by documenting what and how something was learned.  
Despite the difficulty in measuring and understanding professional development, Alsop (1995a; 
1995b) and Crist et al. (1998) have both identified that the reflective element of a portfolio is a 
clear and accurate demonstration of the professional development of an occupational therapist. 
Evidently, reflection is of great importance to an emerging occupational therapist. The student’s 
ability to reflect critically, being an indicator of development as a professional, will not only show 
readiness to practice upon qualification but also plot the growth of the therapist from a being a 
student to a qualified practitioner to becoming an expert in the profession. 
13.1.1. Understanding Professional Development Through Dialogic 
Reflection 
Part of this research was to understand the potential of dialogic reflection in the professional 
development of occupational therapy students. To this end, the research groups had developed 
a way of understanding professional development using works of Wilcock (1999) and Schön 
(1983). 
Being an occupational therapy student is an ironical position. Even though students are strictly 
speaking therapists-in-education, when on placement, they are viewed as professionals by 
others on the placement.  
Other professionals, like nurses, they don’t treat you like students, a lot of the time, they 
don’t take the time to look at your badge because they just see your uniform. [Eve in 
group one] 
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I think it is also the patients as well you want to put on that professional face but often 
you think like "I have no idea" and you don’t want that to come across, you don’t want 
to even though you don’t know, but you need to give them that confidence … you are 
faking it and you have to in that case. [Sarah in group one] 
From these co-researchers’ experience, the uniform that students don conveys a sense of 
professionalism to others on the placement. Service users, their family and staff members 
perceive a student in the occupational therapy uniform as a professional rather than an 
emerging professional. The white coat that doctors wear conveys a sense of authority to patients 
(Wear 1998) hence it is not surprising that the white tunic that some student occupational 
therapists wear on placement could have the same effect.  
Lea succinctly summarised her experience of placement: 
You are not qualified, but you are supposed to be acting as if you are qualified. [Lea in 
group two] 
Such expectations placed certain pressures on the students: 
… admitting to yourself that you could have done better is not easy. I do it, but it is not 
nice … you’re are trying to impress on placement too. [April in group one] 
We expect ourselves to behave very professionally, but then sometimes you lose sight of 
the fact that you are still learning, and you forget that you can make mistakes. [Nicola 
in group one] 
My co-researchers believe that being a professional is associated with infallibility and such is the 
concept of professional practice and their expectations of themselves as student practitioners. 
This idea of professional practice is problematic in the sense that it leaves very little room for 
reflective practice to occur. When reflective practice occurs, it is focused on the negative 
experiences and evaluating practice, rather than understanding oneself. While students expect 
themselves to practice perfectly, mistakes in practice are viewed with ridicule and 
disappointment rather than reflective material for development and new understanding to 
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occur. In addition, Schön (1983) noted that reflective practice is a series of experimental actions 
that may or may not work. In that sense, to practice reflectively, one has to accept that there 
are situations where reflection leads to poorer practice, inefficiencies and errors, in other words, 
less professional and more like a student. 
This concept of professional practice by Schön (1983) is different from that of the Occupational 
Adaptation Model of Professional Development by Garrett and Schkade (1994). Professional 
development is not a straightforward progression from being a novice to becoming an expert. 
Instead, professional development is a tango between being a student and becoming a 
professional; through reflective practice, the practitioner sometimes behaves more like a 
student and at times more like a professional.  
The state of being and becoming is temporal (Wilcock 1999). Being is where one is at present 
and becoming is where one wants to be potentially (Wilcock 1999). Being an occupational 
therapy student, there is often a desire to become a professional in the future. Even though 
professional development may appear to be a back and forth movement between being a 
student and becoming a professional, there is a propensity for students to develop towards 
becoming a professional ultimately due to the expectations of them and their desire. 
In occupational therapy especially, being a student and becoming a professional is not as clear 
cut as the quotes have suggested earlier. Students are immersed in professional practice as a 
part of practice education to facilitate this professional development (Knightbridge 2014). While 
there are situations where solutions are clear cut, professional practice is often about the 
“swampy lowlands” (Schön 1983, p. 42) where the practitioner needs to first frame the problem 
before the solution becomes clearer. These situations are conflicting and perplexing (Dewey 
1933) and a reflective conversation needs to be held between the student practitioner and the 
situation (Schön 1983).  
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Figure 9. Professional development through dialogic reflection 
With reference to the figure nine, this reflective conversation in professional development can 
be understood as somewhat similar to the triplicity of logic – thesis, antithesis and synthesis 
(Mueller 1958). A situation in practice is conflicting or perplexing because what the practitioner 
observes in the situation (antithesis) clashes or is dissimilar to what he or she knows (thesis) 
(Dewey 1933; Mueller 1958). When this conflict is resolved via reflection, the new 
understanding (synthesis) does not necessarily mean that the student becomes more of a 
professional. Reflection does not always lead to doing something better in the future, in fact, it 
is possible to reflect and become worse at something as the co-researchers had shared in this 
research.  
However, this relationship between what the reflector knows (thesis), what is observed about 
the situation (antithesis) and what the reflector elicits from the relationship (synthesis) changes 
in dialogic reflection. In dialogic reflection, the same experience is observed from many 
viewpoints, at the same time, knowledge about the situation is shared by other reflectors. As 
the earlier chapters have discussed, this leads to a better understanding of the situation. When 
different world versions meet to reflect on an experience, the same experience is viewed from 
these world versions. As group members share their analysis of the experience, they also share 
their own knowledge about the situation. The new understanding that one elicits from dialogic 
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reflection is developed from a shared corpus of knowledge in the group, rather than from one’s 
prior knowledge and analysis in reflection. Therefore, this new understanding about one’s 
practice pushes the reflector to become more of a professional and less of a student, with the 
help of the contribution of the other group members who share a similar desire and expectation 
to become a more professional practitioner. Hence, for professional development, dialogic 
reflection can be considered a better way to reflect. 
13.2. Dialogic Reflection in a Post-Technical Rational 
World 
Placing dialogic reflection in practice, as an epistemology, is more than considering its 
contribution to professional development. Schön’s (1983) devastating critique of Technical 
Rationality ushered in a new era for professional practice. While reconceptualising the nature 
of professions and the problems they deal with, one of Schön’s (1983) contribution to 
professional practice is the dichotomy of experience and knowledge. Major professions in 
Technical Rationality pride themselves on their own scientific knowledge base which offered 
solutions to the problems they concern themselves with (Glazer 1974). In Schön’s (1983) 
epistemology of practice, he argued that professionals do not only concern themselves with 
problems of that nature, they also deal with problems that are unclear and require framing 
before they seek for a solution for it. These problems require the professional to make use of 
his or her experience alongside the knowledge that he or she possesses.  
When practitioners accept and try to use the academy’s esoteric knowledge, they are 
apt to discover that its appropriation alienates them from their own understandings, 
engendering a loss of their sense of competence and control. (Schön 1992, p. 120) 
This epistemology of practice is popular because it there is a shift of emphasis from the 
application of technical knowledge to everyday practice experiences. This gives the practitioner 
a certain comfort in knowing that his or her practice experience, which is subjective but real, 
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can be used as a source of knowledge in his or her practice (Taylor and White 2000). It allows 
the practitioner to be secure in his or her practice enough to declare “I know so, because of my 
experience”. It legitimises the dimensions of one’s practice which may sometimes be beyond 
scientific evidence (Kinsella 2007b). It emancipates the practitioner from being restricted to 
technical knowledge, granting the practitioner the ability to address problems in practice using 
his or her experience. 
Evidence-based practice in health and care settings is now often used in conjunction with 
reflective practice (Berrado 2005). This is reflective of Schön’s (1983) dichotomy of technical 
knowledge and practice experience in his epistemology of practice. As liberating Schön’s (1983) 
work was, it was also often perceived as confusing and unclear (Kinsella 2009). Practitioners and 
academics demanded more clarity on how to reflect and what exactly is reflection about. This is 
a disappointing sight as Schön’s (1983) contribution was an epistemology of practice and not a 
process or skill of knowing from experience. 
Reflective practice in health and care settings can be seen as a reductive appropriation of his 
epistemology. It was borrowed from his theory to be redefined to now mean the “process of 
making sense of events, situations and actions that occur in the workplace” (Oelofsen 2012, p. 
23). Reflective practice and reflection are often used synonymously to mean a better way of 
practising. Mackintosh (1998) pointed out that in nursing, ‘reflect’ is used as a prefix for nearly 
every aspect of practice. In occupational therapy, reflective practice is packaged as a “toolkit for 
self-directed learning” (RCOT 2017, p. 1). 
Currently, placing dialogic reflection in professional practice will be problematic as it may 
eventually be perceived as a relative of reflective practice, as the profession defines it. This thesis 
offers dialogic reflection as an epistemology, which can have a place in professional practice like 
reflective practice. Similar to placing dialogic reflection in the curriculum, reflection needs to be 
reconsidered by the professional and regulatory bodies. 
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13.3. Dialogic Reflection in Professional Practice 
Discursive environments in the practice setting exist in the form of supervision, team meetings, 
ward meetings, multidisciplinary meetings, and case conferences. These can involve team 
members, supervisors, placement educators, students on placement, other practitioners from 
various disciplines. Society demands a high standard of care and professional practice from 
practitioners (Beauchamp and Childress 2001), hence dialogically reflecting with service users is 
not appropriate, nor would practitioners be willing to do so as it implies an uncertainty about 
his or her practice.  
Due to the nature of case conferences, multidisciplinary meetings and ward meetings, there is 
little room for dialogic reflection to occur. Theoretically, they are suitable for extrospection to 
take place since they are discussions about an external topic, often about service users. These 
meetings provide practitioners with the opportunity to share experiences and to reflect 
(National Cancer Action Team 2010). However, these meetings often have a hierarchy in place 
and they are highly structured and procedural (National Cancer Action Team 2010) which would 
affect the degree of democratic dialogue. In addition, the primary purpose of these meetings is 
for decision making, therefore, reflection and creating new understanding is secondary (Raine 
et al. 2014). Raine et al. (2014) also reported that practitioners critiqued multidisciplinary team 
meetings being too parochial for any room for peer assisted learning to occur. While education 
is sometimes carried out in the form of a multidisciplinary meeting, it usually manifests as 
quizzing of junior doctors and not reflection (Raine et al. 2014).  
Supervision was defined by Hunter and Blair (1999) as: 
a process where occupational therapy staff are able to reflect on, critically look at and 
discuss their work … (Hunter and Blair 1999, p. 344) 
However, while supervision can be reflective, supervision should not be equated to reflection. 
Barr (1980) noted that in occupational therapy, supervision appeared to be focused on teaching 
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and monitoring of learning. Such an approach to supervision places excessive power and control 
on the supervisor over the supervisee, such that there is less room to question and reflect. There 
is an emphasis on managing tasks, rather than reflecting on practice experiences (Martin 1996). 
Supervision is sometimes where the supervisee is directed to what the supervisor perceives to 
be better practice, rather than allowing the supervisee to arrive at what he or she deems to be 
good practice through reflection. 
A co-researcher made the following observation about her team’s group reflection on her 
placement. 
On my first placement, there is one evening after five o'clock and then they would have 
group reflection … What actually happened was an outside psychotherapist came in and 
it was like supervision, gave them supervision on cases they were struggling with. So, to 
me it wasn’t a reflection … they were asking this other professional for their advice. The 
difficulty is that it’s framing it as something that it is actually not. That’s my experience. 
It was called a reflective group, I was expecting lots of things to be flying around but 
really it was an agony aunt, asking advice so it was like more of a supervision more than 
a reflection. [Olivia in group two] 
As Olivia had pointed out, there is a difference between group supervision and dialogic 
reflection. The mode of supervision which Olivia pointed out above is what is referred to as a 
one-to-group supervision (Association of Occupational Therapists of Ireland 2010). In such a 
mode of supervision, the supervisor, who is at a more advanced level of expertise and have more 
hierarchical authority, discusses issues with the supervisees and leads the group. Apart from 
peer supervision, one-to-one or one-to-group supervisions are often hierarchical which would 
lead to issues related to the level of democratic dialogue. Like Olivia had raised, dialogic 
reflection is not about sharing practice problems and expecting professional advice from a 
supervisor in return, or the agony aunt situation. Dialogic reflection is about viewing the same 
experience from different perspectives, where every member shares equal the responsibility in 
the reflective process.  
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Hawkins and Shohet (2012) developed a widely used model of supervision in health and care 
settings. Their model of supervision illustrated the relationship between service user, therapist 
and the supervisor. It featured a shifting focus from the service user, to the therapist or 
supervisee and to the supervisor, then finally to the wider context of practice. The focus of this 
model of supervision was to explore the relationship between these four components in 
supervision and the interlocking systems connecting the therapist with the supervisor and the 
therapist with the service user. 
Proctor (1986) saw supervision as three interactive components in his model. Supervision could 
be normative which has a managerial purpose to develop better standards and ensuring 
compliance with policies and procedures in practice. It could also be educative, being more 
focused on developing skills and practice. Finally, supervision could also be a form of pastoral 
support for the supervisee. 
An important thing to note is that dialogic reflection, unlike supervision, should not be made 
deliberate. The motivations for dialogic reflection often is not done primarily to develop 
practice, rather it is a demonstration of empathy, concern, and support between reflectors, 
which also drives the dialogue and reflection. While dialogic reflection can contribute to 
development in the professional setting, it should not be part of one’s practice solely for that 
purpose. Dialogic reflection can be conducted in supervision however it should be seen as a form 
of pastoral support rather than being educative or managerial (Proctor 1986). 
Faugier (1992) saw that supervision should be to facilitate growth in the supervisee in the areas 
of practice and personal development. The elements that were key in this supervisor-supervisee 
relationship included trust, sensitivity, thoughtfulness, and openness. Dialogic reflection can fit 
well in this model of supervision as these elements are congruent to its conditions and key 
principles. Ideally, this model of supervision creates an environment that encourages the 
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supervisee to share his or her experience, good or bad, where the supervisor and supervisee 
share the responsibility of trying to better understand these experiences. 
It is also important to note that there is a difference between a reflective supervision and a 
dialogically reflective supervision. In the former, one party conducts the reflection and in the 
latter, both the supervisor and supervisee reflect. Dialogic reflection is where every member 
shares experiences and reflects. This is key to building trust and developing the group world 
where reflectors can challenge each other and prompt each other into deeper reflection. In 
supervision, especially in the educative or managerial model (Proctor 1986), the supervisee 
relies on the supervisor for advice and direction. In dialogic reflection, while the supervisor 
provides advice, he or she has to be open to receiving advice from the supervisee. This can be 
seen as the supervising the supervisor to a certain extent. Due to this, there is a difficulty in 
fitting dialogic reflection in a model that encourages a pronounced power differential between 
the supervisor and supervisee. While the educative and managerial modes of supervision are 
important, it is perhaps useful to place an equal focus on the supportive mode of supervision 
such that dialogic reflection can be carried out. 
Olivia had noted the following thought about the supervisory relationship on her placement: 
It's a learning experience to the educator as well so it should, to a certain extent … maybe 
we should be seeing that as sort of a two-way process, like we are developing them and 
their educator skills and we are developing our skills as practitioner skills. [Olivia in group 
two] 
Supervising a student on placement can also an opportunity for the supervisor to develop his or 
her educator skills. While it may be difficult for a supervisor to share negative practice 
experiences with a supervisee, perhaps it would be easier for the supervisor to dialogically 
reflect with the student on his or her experiences of being an educator rather than being a 
practitioner. 
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It would be interesting to see that and how students encouraged educators to think more 
flexibly, you think as an occupational therapist she would be able to view things from 
people's perspective … [Olivia in group two] 
If one were to view supervising a student or subordinate as an educational practice, then there 
is room for the supervisor to practice reflectively as well, as an educator or a supervisor or 
manager. The question supervisors need to ask is whether they would be willing to reflect with 
a supervisee or student, someone who is often viewed as a subordinate in that relationship. If 
supervisors are unwilling to do so then dialogic reflection is not appropriate in that supervisory 
relationship. For the same reason, it is perhaps easier to dialogically reflect in a peer-to-peer 
supervision setting. 
13.3.1. Professional Introspection in Practice 
Extrospection is perhaps easier in practice, where practitioners reflect externally on their 
practice. The aim of the dialogic reflection here is to better understand one’s practice and to 
receive some indication of areas of practice where the practitioner can further develop. The 
reflection remains on a topic external to the self, hence there is less need for vulnerability 
relative to introspection. 
My co-researchers and I believe that introspection exists in two forms: professional 
introspection and personal introspection. Professional introspection is where the practitioner 
reflects on his or her practice philosophy and develops a better understanding of himself or 
herself as a practitioner. Personal introspection is where the practitioners reflects on his or her 
personal philosophy of life, and better understands himself or herself in the world. This 
dichotomy was built on the premise that the beliefs that one carries in one’s practice may not 
always be the same as that in one’s life, similarly, one’s personal values may not be evident in 
one’s practice. 
Maybe there are two levels of introspection, almost like you before you were an OT, your 
very personal self that can creep into practice that you have to bracket, to put aside or 
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be aware of. And then there are things that are inherent in you through your training, 
the way you were taught to practice, i.e. person centred, holistic, occupationally focused, 
meaningful, we are taught those through training … sometimes I do question the stuff 
that we are taught. I don't know if I believe in them completely. [Olivia in the concluding 
session] 
Olivia had noted a dissonance between her occupational therapy practice and what she believed 
in. In my further reading on this, I had found more debate and discussion about this in the fields 
of social work and nursing. This is perhaps indicative of some congruence between professional 
and personal values in occupational therapy and a more profound incongruence in other health 
and social care professions (Rassin 2008; Comartin and González-Prendes 2011; McDaid 2016). 
Rassin (2008) noted that in the nursing profession, 
Nursing professionals, following trends set by society, search for convenience, economic 
stability, power, and control, waiving professional values such as altruism and equality. 
Rapid advances in technological knowledge have led to drastic changes in the health 
professions. Today, more than ever, there is a conflict between personal, professional, 
institutional, and social values (Rassin 2008, p. 614) 
The dissonance in professional and personal values developed due to changes in the person, 
society and the nursing profession. McDaid (2016), however, noted that personal values change 
as the individual develops. Professional values, on the other hand, are not personal to the 
individual. They aim to create a professional culture (Dominelli 2004), which is less elastic to 
changes in comparison relative to personal value systems. Therefore, this dissonance may 
develop anytime in one’s professional career. 
Comartin and González-Prendes (2011) cited an example in their paper where one of the 
authors’ feminist values conflicted with the values espoused by the social work profession. It 
was an ethical dilemma where the author had chosen to bracket her personal beliefs and to 
follow the values of the profession. The author had noted this to be a choice she had to make 
despite the hurt and anger she experienced. Also from the field of social work, McDaid (2016) 
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cited an incident where his personal deontological ethics conflicted with the social work policies 
and procedure on the provision of care for children, which he deemed as utilitarian. A similar 
dilemma between personal deontological ethics and professional policy was raised in a dialogic 
reflection session in this research. 
I think is also difficult in children services in paediatrics, it would be different again if the 
parents refuse treatment, not in the best interest of the child because it would be 
neglectful, what does the code say about that? It probably says something contradicting, 
so I think parent have a parental responsibility haven't they, so if they say I don't give 
consent you can go against that because it is child protection as well isn't it? [April in 
group one] 
While these examples are only vignettes of a potentially wider issue in professional practice, 
they demonstrated that there are indeed cases where professional philosophy and personal life 
philosophy may diverge, or even clash. It is, therefore, necessary to differentiate professional 
introspection into oneself in one’s practice from personal introspection into oneself in one’s life.  
Wilcock (2000) noted that while occupational therapists may have their personal views about 
the importance of occupations in life, this is often dominated by the philosophy of health from 
the medical viewpoint. 
This has resulted in ready acceptance of altered forms of practice and extreme 
adaptability according to changes in medicine, but not necessarily a strong stance 
concerning the occupational health needs of people. (Wilcock 2000, p. 79) 
This could a reason as to why a clash between personal and professional philosophy is not much 
of a debate in the occupational therapy profession. Nonetheless, this does not indicate less of a 
need to introspect professionally and personally. The understanding of one’s philosophy is 
important in the evaluation of the profession’s philosophy (Wilcock 2000; Fish and Boniface 
2012), as it distinguishes one as a reflective professional from a worker who simply applies or 
does what one is told.  
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13.3.2. The Need for Professional Introspection in Occupational Therapy 
“Occupation for health” (Wilcock 2000, p. 82) is the philosophy of the profession, and this is 
evident in the way the international professional body, WFOT, had defined the profession: 
Occupational therapy enables people to achieve health, well-being and life satisfaction 
through participation in occupation. (WFOT 2013, p. 48) 
Wilcock (2000) noted that the profession’s philosophy should be simple enough to 
accommodate the changes in personal philosophies and development of ideas in research and 
practice. However, “occupation for health” (Wilcock 2000, p. 82) is far from being a simple 
philosophy as Wilcock (1998) might have made it seem. There is a need for practitioners to 
conduct professional introspection. In fact, this should be a need regardless of which profession 
one is in. 
All health and social care professions share similar ethical values and the same fundamental 
purpose: to help people achieve a good life (Carr 2000). Social workers provide social counselling 
to service users, giving careful consideration of their welfare and social justice. By the treatment 
of psychiatric disorders, psychologists help those in need gain autonomy over their psyche. 
Doctors cure and alleviate pain, providing better health. All these are done with the aim of 
achieving a good life (Dige 2009). 
As understood from the definition offered by WFOT, occupational therapists help service users 
achieve a good life through activity and participation. Though it may vary for each profession, 
the concept of a good life is understood in occupational therapy as being of good health, well-
being, and life satisfaction. The theories of occupational therapy practice are built upon the 
understanding that a life imbued with activity and participation is relatively more fulfilling than 
one that is sedentary and passive (Kielhofner 1997; Dige 2009; Sumison et al. 2011). Research 
on the positive impact of activity and participation on health (Edwards et al. 2006; Doble et al. 
2003; Ayele et al. 1999; Steinkamp and Kelly 1987), life satisfaction (Janssen et al. 2010; 
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Warburton et al. 2006) and well-being (Adams et al. 2011; Ussher et al. 2007; Litwin and Shiovitz-
Ezra 2006) is in abundance. Well-being is often understood as a state of contentment; however, 
this is not a satisfactory explanation as it alludes to hedonism where vices such as drugs are 
deemed acceptable in the good life. In fact, according to Joseph Raz (2004), well-being, requires 
the “wholehearted and successful carrying out of valuable activities” (Dige 2009, p. 92). This 
theory of achieving well-being sits very comfortably in the profession’s philosophy of a good life. 
Participating in activities is insufficient as some activities can be trivial in terms of what is 
achieved through them and their meaning to the individual. Raz (2004) indicated that activities 
have to be valuable to contribute to a better well-being which is perfectly congruent to the 
profession’s understanding of the word “occupation”. Occupation is defined by the RCOT (COT 
2015) as 
A group of activities that have personal and sociocultural meaning, is named within a 
culture and supports participation in society. (COT 2015, p. xiii) 
Nonetheless said meaning is rather subjective for the value of an activity is necessarily linked to 
one’s inherent values which are dependent on one’s unique experience of life and knowledge 
(COT 2015). 
Whilst it is important to have activities that one finds meaningful, the profession also values the 
ability to participate in them. According to Raz (1996), participation needs to be successful and 
wholehearted. Success is inextricably linked to challenge. The degree of successful participation 
in any occupation is dependent on the nature of the challenge it poses to the individual (Dige 
2009).  
Participation also needs to be wholehearted (Raz 2004). The profession understands 
participation as doing something with sincerity or enthusiasm or commitment which is closely 
linked to the value or meaning of the occupation to the individual. If an activity is of great value 
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to a service user, it can be inductively reasoned that he/she will participate with more 
enthusiasm and commitment. 
People are intrinsically active and creative, needing to engage in a balanced range of 
activities in their daily lives in order to maintain health and wellbeing. (COT 2014b, p. 2) 
The profession is of the understanding that the wholehearted and successful participation in 
meaningful activities is important to health and wellbeing of the individual. Therefore, the 
purpose of the occupational therapy profession is to enable the service user to participate in 
activities that are meaningful to him or her, thereby achieving a good life. 
Though Wilcock (2000) had summarised the professional philosophy in three words, the 
professional philosophy is far more profound than those words. Professionals need to examine 
and evaluate how these professional values relate to one’s personal values (Wilcock 2000). In 
cases of conflict, the practitioner is the one who has to make the choice as to whether to follow 
one’s professional values or personal values as the earlier vignettes have suggested (Comartin 
and González-Prendes 2011; McDaid 2016), therefore professional introspection is immensely 
crucial to one’s practice. Similarly, personal introspection is important in practice for this reason. 
Kasar and Muscari (2000, p. 56) had noted that “do I want to be an occupational therapist” is a 
question that a practitioner constantly asks himself or herself. I believe there is a preceding and 
equally perpetual question that practitioners need to address through introspection: Who am I 
as an occupational therapist? 
13.3.3. Introspection Through Mindful Practice 
Torbert’s (2001) concept of first person Action Inquiry, where one conducts an enquiry into 
oneself, is similar to the concept of introspection. He believed one’s life is situated around the 
lives of others, hence an enquiry into one’s life should be done with others. He noted that to do 
such an enquiry, one needs to be present in one’s experiences of professional and personal lives. 
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Introspection is not easy because “we rarely remember to do so” also, “we don’t really know 
what to do when we do remember” (Torbert 2001, pp. 207–208).  
We rarely experience ourselves as present in a wondering, inquiring, ‘mindful’ way to our 
actions … As much as we may like the idea of action inquiry, we rarely actively wish to 
engage subjectively in first-person research/practice in the present. (Torbert 2001, p. 
208) 
Introspection is sometimes resisted by one because it is painful and complex (Dewey 1933) when 
one one conducts an enquiry into one’s professional and personal self. Additionally, as Torbert 
(2001) pointed out, it is not often one is present in one’s experience such that one can reflect. 
The problem of being present in one’s practice is a problem for some. 
… this particular patient is quite difficult, my brain automatically goes on to all the issues 
that surround that person, so how they got here in the first place, what happened, why 
are they like this, what were they like when they were younger… [Alicia in the concluding 
session] 
April noted in reply, 
Rather than being in the moment ... If you think about your situation, do you need to 
think about what happened to that patient's past or perhaps you need to be thinking 
about who this person is today, what am I actually doing with this person rather than 
"oh what happened when he was younger" and all. [April in the concluding session] 
In this discussion, Alicia pointed out she is naturally very reflective, to the point where April 
noted that she could have been “in the moment” instead of wondering about issues that may 
not be beneficial to one’s practice. Other co-researchers have echoed the similar experiences of 
being occupied with other thoughts rather than being present in their engagement with the 
experience, in both the personal and professional milieu. 
I noted in the same discussion that, 
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The more present you are in that experience, you possibly have more to reflect upon, 
because you are more attuned to what you are thinking and feeling and what you 
actually saw and observed so they become better reflective materials later. [Me in the 
concluding session] 
Being present or more aware of oneself in the experience possibly allows one to have better 
access to one’s internal faculties at the point of reflection. Epstein’s (1999) work advances the 
idea of mindful practice in the medical profession. He believes that mindfulness is a precursor 
to reflection, corroborating with Johns’ (2013) work. Supporting my above contribution to the 
discussion, Epstein wrote: 
Mindful practitioners attend in a non-judgemental way to their own physical and mental 
processes during ordinary, everyday tasks. This critical self-reflection enables physicians 
to listen attentively to patient’s distress, recognise their own errors, refine their technical 
skills, make evidence-based decisions and clarify their values so that they can act with 
compassion, technical competence, presence and insight. (Epstein 1999, p. 833) 
Epstein (1999) argued that mindful practitioners being more acutely aware of their practice 
experience are more reflective. In fact, he believed that the mindful practitioner is also a 
reflective practitioner.  
However, this is not to say that one should halt all thoughts during the experience if that is even 
possible. A co-researcher pointed out that there is an inherent contradiction between being 
mindful of one’s practice and Schön’s (1983) reflection-in-action. If mindful practice were to 
mean that a practitioner is to be acutely aware of his or her observations and actions, they 
themselves may serve as a distraction from the reflection that needs to occur in the space and 
time of the experience to respond swiftly to changes in the situation. Because of this, the co-
researchers cautioned that the practitioner needs to decide what is worth reflecting or thinking 
about in the experience. 
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13.3.4. Prompting Introspection 
Empathy and compassion inherently drive introspection hence reflectors in a dialogic reflection 
naturally prompt each other in their dialogue to introspect. A co-researcher noted that 
introspection can be prompted simply by turning the focus from understanding the external 
experience to understanding oneself, similar to how I had prompted introspection as discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
Maybe that is where you need some prompting, say "has this reflection made you think 
about anything about yourself?" [April in the concluding session] 
I concluded that it is natural, empathetic dialogue that drives introspection beyond this prompt 
and it is not something that can be directed by a model, not in the dialogic sense.  
Similar to introspection in the curriculum, the practitioner needs to find his or her reflective 
partner to introspect with. While this is something that can be done in supervision if the reflector 
considers the supervisor to be a suitable reflective partner, the practitioner should not be 
pressured or expected to reflect introspectively in supervision. Introspection is a deeply internal 
process and the practitioner needs to be granted the autonomy to make this self-discovery, for 
himself or herself. Alternatively, if dialogic reflection is not possible, the reflector may choose to 
introspect as in a reflective monologue.  
13.4. Conclusion 
Professional development is important to all professions however it is hard to measure or 
evaluate. In occupational therapy, some theorists have noted that the reflection is a good 
indication of development, however, there are issues with reflecting for professional 
development. It perpetuates a negative culture about reflection that treats it reductively as a 
method of growth and evidence of it. 
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Occupational therapy students are motivated to become professionals that they sometimes 
perceive themselves more as practising qualified professionals than students. Between this 
journey from being a student to becoming a professional, students face countless conflicting 
situations which can be negotiated with reflective practice. However, reflection does not always 
mean one always grows towards becoming a professional and there are occasions where one 
regresses towards being a student. Dialogic reflection aids this professional development of 
students by supplementing their reflections with perspectives, experiences, and knowledge of 
other reflectors. This provides the student with a better understanding of the experience and 
hence pushes the student closer to becoming a professional. 
Dialogic reflection in professional practice needs to move away from Technical Rationality. It 
needs to be appreciated as an epistemology, that can be used to understand one’s practice 
experiences. The role dialogic reflection plays in practice is beyond rationalising the 
practitioner’s decision making process and complementing evidence-based practice with 
practice experience. Dialogic reflection can be part of many discursive settings in practice. 
Supervision is a good place to dialogic reflect if the mode of supervision is supportive. This is 
also dependent on the supervisory relationship between the supervisor and supervisee. 
Supervision is only dialogically reflective if the supervisor is willing to reflect on himself or herself 
with the supervisee. This is a position that is not easy to reconcile for the supervisor. 
Similar to dialogic reflection in the curriculum, the reflector needs to introspect with someone 
he or she is comfortable with being vulnerable and trusts. A pre-reflective state of being present 
in one’s experience is important prior to conducting introspection in the professional and 
personal setting. In practice, introspection into the professional philosophy is important as it is 
more complex than it appears. One needs to introspect professionally and personally to evaluate 
where one stands in relation to the professional values that the profession espouses. Doing so 
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elevates one to a professional status, rising beyond being a problem solver dwelling in Technical 
Rationality to become deeply reflective and critical practitioner. 
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Chapter 14. Conclusion 
This research was an exploration of the suitability of dialogic reflection for occupational therapy 
students in their professional development. Two action research groups, comprising of 
occupational therapy students and me, were set up for this enquiry. We met regularly for a total 
of fifteen sessions over one year and one month to develop a theory about dialogic reflection, 
to understand its value in the occupational therapy curriculum and suggest ways of embedding 
dialogic reflection into the curriculum. 
Trustworthiness and reflexivity in this research were ensured mainly by maximising the 
involvement of my co-researchers where possible. Their participation, along with mine, in the 
analysis, data collection, development of the methodology and deep reflections about the topic 
implied that the theory generated in this research is a grounded in all of our experiences and 
knowledge. This research was a meta-dialogic reflection and because of this, we were constantly 
challenging each other’s preconception, perspective, and worldview and we were acutely aware 
of how we had influenced the research. As dialogic reflectors, we are individual knowers and 
enquirers. We understood the same experiences in our own ways and from our own 
perspectives, because of our unique world constructions.  
Dialogic reflection is similar to experientialism. Appendix L expands further on dialogic reflection 
by exploring its ontological arguments. Like experientialism (Johnson and Lackoff 1992), the 
objective nature of the world is not of concern because dialogic reflection is always on 
experience, which will always carry emotional, moral, and intellectual elements to it (Dewey 
1934). Only the subjective nature of the world can be understood and reflected upon therefore 
dialogic reflection takes a subjective ontological perspective. Considering this subjective 
ontology, this research was not about achieving consensus. Rather, it was about presenting how 
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my co-researchers and I have understood dialogic reflection. In this thesis, I present a way 
dialogic reflection can be theorised, but I am not arguing that it is the only way of understanding 
dialogic reflection. This is evident in the fact that Glazer et al. (2004), Tigelaar et al. (2008) and 
my co-researchers and I have developed different theories of dialogic reflection. 
Another limitation of the study is the nature of collaboration itself. Heron and Reason (1997) 
argued that complete collaboration is rare in the participatory paradigm. True collaboration, 
where all the co-researchers are involved in the writing and sharing of the research (Lincoln 
1997), was not practical in this research. This was because the research had different meanings 
for all of us involved. Therefore, this research was co-operative to a certain extent, where we 
collaborated on the methodological and analytical elements but not in the writing or sharing of 
the research. This is further expanded on in Appendix J, where I discuss the limitations of 
collaboration. 
In this thesis, I presented that dialogic reflection can be conceptualised as a way of knowing that 
rests on three key principles: 
1. Mediating theory and practice with values 
a. Dialogic reflection is a process of enquiry that is emotional and value-based. 
Through this, reflectors better understand their experience and their personal 
and professional philosophies. 
2. Democratic dialogue 
a. Dialogic reflection is emancipatory. It requires reflectors to be honest and open 
to share their experiences and knowledge, and to be willing to be challenged 
and questioned by others. As this is largely motivated by empathy and genuine 
concern, dialogic reflection requires a huge amount of trust and vulnerability.  
3. Reflectors are knowers and enquirers 
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a. Individuals in dialogic reflection have their own perspective of the world. They 
bring to the group their unique knowledge, experience, and value system. 
Despite being in a collaborative environment, reflectors are appreciated as 
unique individuals and they are valued for their contribution to the multiple 
perspectives in the reflections. 
These key principles of dialogic reflection are inherent in the four main findings of this research. 
1. There are issues about reflection and dialogic reflection that stem from the epistemic 
level. Because they are understood differently by individuals, there is some confusion 
about the concepts. In addition, reflection is a nebulous and painful process, yet it is 
sometimes used as a learning tool or evidence of professional development. This 
becomes problematic when it is being assessed in education and monitored in 
professional practice. Therefore, to resolve this confusion, dialogic reflection needs to 
be understood at the epistemic level. 
2. Dialogic reflection is an approach to enquiry that is preferably unstructured and 
unfacilitated. This allows for a natural form of enquiry about one’s experience that is 
multi-dimensional but also highly analytical. It validates organic, empathetic dialogue as 
an intellectual way to analyse experience develop knowledge. 
3. The value of dialogic reflection lies in the multiple perspectives offered by the individual 
reflectors. This is only possible through developing a protective environment where 
reflectors can trust each other enough to reveal their vulnerabilities. 
4. In addition to the intellectual aspect, dialogic reflection also embraces the emotions and 
values in the experience. It explores the experience as a whole. Therefore, it is an artistic 
way of understanding the world. It also allows one to morally check oneself against the 
moral constructs of others. 
In light of these findings, I offered the following definition of dialogic reflection. 
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Dialogic reflection is a theory of knowledge. It argues that individual knowledge about 
the world can be elicited from a co-operative exploration of experience. It is an artistic 
method of enquiry about the world that embraces multiple perspectives and 
vulnerability. 
Furthermore, we argued that dialogic reflection exists in two forms: extrospection, where 
members reflect on a topic external to themselves, and introspection, where members reflect 
internally on themselves. 
14.1. Recommendations  
I provided the following recommendations for embedding dialogic reflection in the curriculum. 
1. It is imperative that dialogic reflection is treated as an epistemology in education, not 
merely as a learning tool or problem-solving method. 
2. Theories about dialogic reflection can be taught but students cannot be taught how to 
do so. 
3. While learning about dialogic reflection is useful, students should learn how to do so by 
practising it and creating a personal understanding of where it fits in their life. 
4. The main role of the educator should be to encourage and guide dialogic reflection. 
a. Educators can turn discursive settings into an extrospection by prompting 
students to talk about their experiences in relation to the topic of discussion. 
b. Introspection can be prompted by asking student what they have elicited from 
an experience, using the second person pronoun. 
5. Students should be empowered to decide who to introspect with, when, where and 
what to introspect on. Educators should provide students time and opportunity to do so 
in the curriculum. 
6. Educators should not imply that reflecting with others is a demonstration of inability 
and dependency. 
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7. Dialogic reflection should not and cannot be assessed. 
Dialogic reflection is important in occupational therapy practice because of the professional 
development it engenders. More importantly, it encourages practitioners to introspect on their 
professional philosophy and personal philosophy and how they relate to each other. In 
professional practice, I recommended the following: 
1. To encourage extrospection in supervision, the supervisor should be willing to share his 
or her vulnerabilities and difficulties in practice by reflecting honestly with the 
supervisee. 
2. The practitioner should find his or her reflective partner for introspection. 
3. The practitioner should introspect on his or her professional philosophy and personal 
philosophy. 
4. To prevent dialogic reflection from becoming a tool for professional development, the 
professional body should regard them as a way of understanding oneself in one’s 
practice, rather than evidence of growth or a measure of competence.  
Even though this research was conducted in the context of occupational therapy, I believe that 
dialogic reflection has its application in other fields, and beyond education or professional 
practice because we conceptualised it at the epistemic level. As an epistemology, dialogic 
reflection should be something that the practitioner or student chooses to believe in, rather 
than have to follow. This prevents dialogic reflection from being understood reductively. 
Practitioners and students who wish to dialogically reflect should similarly see it for something 
that serves beyond the purposes of improving practice or learning.  
The findings of this research are significant because of their impact on the following groups: 
1. For occupational therapy students and practitioners, the findings validate the issues 
that they may have faced in their own reflective practice. In addition, this thesis offers 
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them a way of engaging reflectively in their own practice, one that they may have 
already been conducting unknowingly. Most importantly this research highlights the 
importance of reflecting with others to further develop practice that is morally sound, 
well-justified and empathetic. 
2. For educators, the findings of this research reveal that there are issues in the way 
reflective practice is being taught and assessed and they have a negative impact on the 
students’ understanding of reflective practice. This thesis offers educators a different 
approach to educating reflective practitioners, one that is truer to the nature of dialogic 
reflection. Another key message to educators is that if they wish for students to reflect 
with them, then they will have to be willing to offer their own reflections, be vulnerable 
and open minded to the students’ input in their reflections. 
3. For RCOT and HCPC, this thesis argues that reflective practice is not always evident in 
the written reflections that they expect from their registrants. Rather than using written 
reflection as an indicator of reflective practice and professional development, the RCOT 
and HCPC should find these elements in the reflective interactions that practitioners 
engage in with their supervisors, peers and with other professionals. Due to the 
difficulty of monitoring, the RCOT and HCPC should see dialogic reflection as a way 
practitioners can develop knowledge about themselves and their practice. While it 
remains a tenet of professional practice, it is not something that can be accurately 
expressed or monitored. However, there should be room for it to occur and it should 
be encouraged in practice via supervision or whichever means the practitioner prefers. 
While this thesis is contexutalised within the occupational therapy field, I recommend 
all healthcare professional and regulatory bodies to similarly reconsider their position 
on monitoring reflective practice. 
Dialogic reflection is a way for one to develop a greater understanding of oneself and one’s 
personal philosophy of life. It is something that most people already engage in because of how 
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natural it is. I recommend that everyone continues to dialogically reflect while being aware of 
this epistemology and pay closer attention to what one is reflecting on and what is one learning 
about oneself. 
14.2. Further Research Recommendations 
This thesis is a beginning to a different way of understanding the world. Hence, there are many 
areas where further research can aid in our understanding of this epistemology and its 
applications: 
1. Models of reflection may be helpful in initiating and guiding extrospection; however, 
they are often theorised to be used in a monologic way. Hence more research is required 
to explore the use of these models of reflection in the dialogic environment and 
adapting these models for extrospection. 
2. Since dialogic reflection is a method to enquiry, it is perhaps also applicable as a research 
method that can be used to enquire about topics, particularly in social science research. 
Research in this would provide us with a method of data gathering and analysis that is 
grounded in the experiences and knowledge of its participants: the researchers who are 
also the researched.  
3. More research, or rather more dialogic reflection needs to be carried out to better 
understand the philosophical position of dialogic reflection in ontology, axiology and 
ethics and how it relates to other philosophical ideas. 
14.3. Now, Where Do I Go from Here? 
This research played a rather significant role in my development as a researcher and as a knower 
and enquirer about the world. I have never questioned, doubted, reflected, and dialogically 
reflected on myself, my knowledge and experience as intensely as I had the past few years. 
Writing this thesis was exhilarating yet sorrowful as it marked an end to a research into a topic 
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that I am deeply passionate about. However, at the same time, it is a new beginning for me, for 
now, I am aware of how I can understand the world through a different lens. 
Publications from this research can be found at the end of the thesis. Even though this thesis is 
focused on the application of dialogic reflection in the educational and professional 
environment, I am convinced that it has a greater and wider application in our lives beyond these 
settings. I feel responsible for taking this epistemology into the wider community and to teach 
it, or rather let others learn about it.  
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 Appendix A: Literature Review 
Method 
The purpose of this literature review was to explore the nature of reflection and dialogic 
reflection and how it is of benefit or could be of benefit to the professional development of 
occupational therapy students.  As the dialogic method of reflection is not widely theorised 
unlike the monologic form of it, I had to synthesise a theory about it using literature from a 
diversity of disciplines such as psychology (Barbera 2009; Rowe 2013), education (Glazer et al. 
2004; Tigelaar et al. 2008; Janssen et al. 2008; Hanson 2011) and health sciences (Gilbert 2001; 
Kember et al. 2001; Kinsella 2001; Boniface 2002; Clouder and Sellars 2004; Barry and Gibbens 
2011). My initial theory was important as it informed my initial thoughts on dialogic reflection 
and thus my participation in the action research later. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
this research sought to explore dialogic reflection through experiencing it, hence some prior 
knowledge and assumptions were important to initiate the research.  
Hence, to achieve this, a structured method of reviewing literature, Critical Interpretive 
Synthesis, was used initially. However, mid-review, this method was deemed unsuitable for 
various reasons. A more reflective approach to the theory synthesis was used. Nonetheless, 
Critical Interpretive Synthesis was useful as it provided a launch pad for the later stages of the 
review. 
Critical Interpretive Synthesis 
Critical Interpretive Synthesis is an adaptation of the methods used in meta-ethnography and 
grounded theory to generate theory from a combination of literature from various sources 
(Dixon-Woods et al. 2006, p. 35). While some literature review methods focused on aggregating 
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and compiling findings, Critical Interpretive Synthesis is focused on interpreting literature and 
aims to develop new concepts through an iterative process of reviewing and synthesising 
literature (Heaton et al. 2012). 
The intention to use Critical Interpretive Synthesis was based on the structured approach 
towards generating a theory from the literature it offered. It was expected that the iterative 
approach would be useful in exploring a broad topic such as dialogic reflection which had little 
research in the health and social care context. The line-of-argument method used in the 
synthesis of searched literature was also expected to inform the generation of the theory (Dixon-
Woods et al. 2006), which would in turn be used to inform the action research later. 
The review question was formulated such that it was inclusive enough to not place excessive 
limits on the amount of information collected (Bales and Gee 2013). Due to its aim to generate 
a theory, there was a need for the review to be broad enough such that it allowed room to 
explore concepts that concern the emergent theory. The development of the theory was 
directed by the literature and not guided by the boundaries of the review (Dixon-Woods et al. 
2006). I used my research question as the initial review question: how suitable is collaborative 
reflection for occupational therapy students in their professional development? The keywords 
“collaborative reflection”, “occupational therapy students”, “professional development” have 
been searched in Medline and AMED databases. The search string is shown below. 
1. Collaborat*.mp 
2. Reflect*.mp 
3. 1 and 2 
4. “Collaborative reflection”.mp 
5. Occupational therap*.mp 
6. 3 and 5 
7. Student*.mp 
8. 6 and 7  
9. “profession* develop*”.mp 
10. 4 and 9 
11. “professional development”.mp 
12. 5 and 11 
13. 5 and 9 
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14. 2 and 13 
15. 7 and 12 
As there is no hierarchy of study designs for qualitative research, I prioritised key papers that 
specifically discussed or researched dialogic reflection over other papers that mentioned it as 
part of a wider or separate topic. These key papers provided direction for the theory generation 
whilst the other papers provided supporting evidence or raised areas of conflicts that may be of 
interest (Dixon-Woods et al. 2006). The assessment of the quality of papers as recommended 
by Dixon-woods et al. (2006) was twofold: papers that were methodologically flawed were 
excluded, then papers were judged on how credible they were and their degree of contribution 
to the emergent theory. I found this step hard to follow since most of the papers I had found 
were theoretical papers or literature reviews. Most of the research papers were not very specific 
about their methods hence it was hard to make a judgement. Instead, I only excluded papers 
that were unrelated to the topic. Out of a hundred and eleven papers from the search, eighty-
six papers were excluded after I read their abstracts and titles, on grounds of relevance to 
research question and duplication. Twenty-five papers were included. From the twenty-five 
papers, another twenty-five papers were reference chained. At this stage, there were a total 
fifty articles that emerged from the first literature search using the initial review question. 
Following Dixon-Woods et al.’s (2006) recommendations, I also added eighty-one articles from 
my own library of literature drawn from my previous dissertation and preliminary review of the 
topic. I had one hundred and thirty-one papers in total by this stage of the literature review. 
Papers included in the review were then reviewed using lines-of-argument synthesis (Dixon-
Woods et al. 2006). It involved the construction of a more elaborate theory grounded in the 
findings of separate studies. Papers were analysed for the following (Schutz 1962; Noblit and 
Hare 1988; Dixon-Woods et al. 2006): 
• First order constructs, which were information in the paper relating to theoretical 
understanding of the subject; 
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• Second order constructs, which were explanation and theories used by authors in the 
primary study reports; 
• Third order constructs, which were original concepts transformed by the author using 
the first and second order constructs. 
A theory about dialogic reflection was then generated using all the above constructs. According 
to Dixon-woods et al. (2006), as the theory developed, new areas of the theory required further 
review emerged. Hence the search for literature would have been continuous. This iterative 
review process would have continued until no more new information is found and the theory 
stopped generating new areas of interest. However, for my own literature review, six topics 
emerged from literature and twenty further review questions had been raised. These questions 
can be found below. 
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Figure 10. Literature review questions after round one 
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It was deemed impractical to conduct a secondary search for each review question as this would 
result in twenty unique searches, the corpus of information would be unmanageable. Judging 
from the first stage of the literature search, it is likely that the second stage would have resulted 
in more questions that would be of interest to the literature review hence it is unlikely that 
theoretical saturation (Dixon-Woods et al. 2006) would be achieved at the second or even the 
third stage. Therefore, I concluded that Critical Interpretive Synthesis was not a viable method 
for this review. This was perhaps a result of the following additional reasons: 
• To understand dialogic reflection, I had to better understand how knowledge can be 
obtained from experience and dialogue. The nature of the research concerned 
epistemology. The depth involved and the amount of reading required resulted in many 
questions being raised after the first stage of searching. 
• This method of literature searching only permitted the search of journal articles in the 
first stage. However, due to the theoretical nature of the discussion, more information 
would have found in books instead. While this was viable for Dixon-Woods et al.’s (2006) 
research which was on access to healthcare by vulnerable groups, it did not seem to be 
applicable for a literature review that relied very heavily on theoretical papers and 
books. 
Upon concluding that Critical Interpretive Synthesis was unsuitable for the research, a more 
flexible and reflective approach to literature review was adopted. I called this process Reflective 
Synthesis. 
Reflective synthesis 
Reflective Synthesis is a process that I have developed to describe what I wanted to achieve 
from my literature review process and how to do so. My aim of my literature review process 
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was not only to aggregate information about the topic of study but also distil the questions that 
have not been explored by researchers and theorists. 
From the topics that have been raised in the first stage of the search, the knowledge disciplines 
that the research was concerned with is far clearer. From the initial Critical Interpretive Synthesis 
I had conducted, I learnt two things about dialogic reflection, 
1. Books were better sources of information on the theory of reflection and professional 
development 
2. Dialogic reflection is not well researched or theorised and I had not found a theory that 
provided a satisfactory explanation about it. 
While I wanted to learn as much as possible around the topic, I needed an approach to the 
literature search that allowed the use of books. In addition, the purpose of the literature review 
had shifted from crafting a theory about dialogic reflection to asking the right questions about 
it, which were then answered in the action research later. 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
Reflective Synthesis is process that was born out of the importance of the reflective process that 
Schön (1983) articulated and the synthesis of information by Dixon-Woods et al. (2006). The aim 
of Reflective Synthesis as I have defined it is not merely aggregating information about the topic 
of study, rather it is about understanding what the researcher knows, not yet knows and wants 
to know more about in relation to the topic of interest. There is a greater focus on the 
researcher’s constructing and reconstructing of his or her knowledge as in the constructivist 
sense (Moon 2004). Reflective Synthesis serves to articulate this process of reading literature, 
understanding literature, assimilating knowledge and developing further questions about the 
topic to satiate the curiosity of the researcher whilst at the same time aggregating and 
summarising information that is already made known.  
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The research question can be understood as the problem that the researcher would like to solve. 
In my review, this problem was to understand how dialogic reflection can be suitable for 
occupational therapy students. Schön noted the following in his theory of reflection about a 
problematic situation, 
It is rather through the nontechnical process of framing the problematic situation that 
we may organize and clarify both the ends to be achieved and the possible means of 
achieving them. (Schön 1983, p. 41) 
In other words, it is through the process of framing and refining this research question that the 
researcher understands how to solve it, ie. develop a methodology to answer the research 
question. The literature review process is thus this framing and reframing process of the 
research question. 
Similarly, in action learning, Revans argued that research is 
… not in finding the answers to questions that have already been posed but in finding 
the questions that need to be answered. (Revans 1980, p. 118) 
Action learning posits that learning is the sum of knowledge currently in use, questioning and 
reflection (Marquardt 1999). As the current knowledge about dialogic reflection specifically is 
lacking, learning about this topic was more heavily dependent on questioning and reflecting on 
it. 
Schön (1983), Revans (1980) and Marquardt (1999) both articulated the primacy of 
understanding the problems that researchers set out to solve before developing a methodology 
for it. Schön (1983) goes a step further to assert that this process of understanding the problem 
is one that requires deep reflection. In action learning, Revans (1980) and Marquadt (1999) both 
argue that constant questioning and reflection is the process through which researchers develop 
knowledge about their topic.  
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In relation to reviewing literature, the reflective process that the researcher undergoes is often 
understated. Literature reviews serve the purpose of conveying what has been studied and 
researched and what requires more research (Barnett-Page and Thomas 2009). To this end, 
researchers often write with the aim of summarising information and articulating how they have 
conducted their literature review in practical steps that can sometimes be replicated as in a 
systematic review (Barnett-Page and Thomas 2009). However, in this process, researchers do 
not often demonstrate how they have related to the research that they have read, how the 
literature may have challenged their assumptions, preconceptions or prior knowledge or how 
the literature may have sparked their curiosity in other areas of the topic. These are the cognitive 
processes that a learner experiences as he or she learns about the topic (Moon 2004), however 
they are not often discussed by researchers. 
Reflective Synthesis serves to shines a spot light on these internal processes. Using the reflective 
process as articulated by Borton (1970), I demonstrate how I have interacted with the literature 
that I read and how they the influenced and modified the way I think, what I know and what I 
needed to explore further.  
Process 
My literature review process is thus characterised by two distinct phases of exploring and finding 
information and then developing and refining the review question. This is demonstrated in the 
figure below: 
 
Literature Questions
Literature search 
 
Reflection 
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Figure 11. Reflective Synthesis 
With reference to the figure above, the literature review would start with a research question 
and then an initial search for the literature using the research question as the review question. 
A reflection on the literature occurs and new questions that emerge from the literature then 
feed into the next cycle of literature searching. This iterative process terminates when the 
questions are so refined such that another round of literature search would be futile or when 
the questions are all answered, in that case, those questions are not of priority in the research. 
This results in a series of questions that have yet to be answered by the literature and perhaps 
can be answered by the research itself.  
As I had already started the literature search using Critical Interpretive Synthesis earlier, I started 
the Reflective Synthesis process using the questions that the search had already generated.  
There were a few questions that appeared to be similar and could be answered in the same 
literature search, hence I had grouped some of the review questions together in the same 
search. The reflective process I had used after reading the literature was adapted from Borton’s 
(1970) “What” model of reflection: 
1. What – What is this literature about and what does it mean? 
2. So What – How does this literature contribute to the understanding of the topic? 
3. Now What – What else do I not know and need to find out? 
An example of the Reflective Synthesis that I had used is illustrated below where I explored the 
epistemology of reflection. 
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Figure 12. Reflective Synthesis on the epistemology of reflection 
With reference to the above figure, I started the reflective synthesis on the epistemology of 
reflection using three review questions which I had obtained from the Critical Interpretive 
Synthesis conducted prior. These questions were: 
1. What epistemology are theories of reflection based upon? 
2. Are there other reflective theories from before 1933? 
3. How has the change in epistemologies over the years affected the change in reflective 
theories? 
These questions were about popular epistemic stances throughout the ages and how they 
influenced the theories about reflection. Hence, to map these changes, I started looking at works 
that more broadly described the process of obtaining knowledge from experience as the word 
reflection was not often used prior to Dewey’s (1933) work. These works were mostly books and 
articles obtained by reference chaining works of theorists on reflection. I found out that prior to 
Dewey’s (1933) work about the use of reflection in education, gaining knowledge from 
experience was more of a philosophical concept. The more popular epistemologies relating to 
Initial 
review 
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reflection
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reflection appear to be constructivism (Kinsella 2006), empiricism (Locke 1690; Hume 1748; 
James 1912) and rationalism (Jowett 1980). Additionally, reflection was also featured in eastern 
philosophies in the form of spiritual enlightenment (Marcotte 2012) or moral awakening (Henke 
1916).  
However, upon reflection on what I had read, I was still unsure of how constructivism, 
empiricism, and rationalism underpinned reflection. Therefore, I refined my review question to 
“how is reflection constructivist, empiricist or rational?” I carried out this search in Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. After learning more about these philosophies, I concluded that 
theories about reflection appeared to come from various epistemologies. The belief in reflection 
is that knowledge can be generated from the intellectual analysis (rationalisation) of experience 
(constructivism) which also involves the sensory (empiricism), emotional and thought aspects 
(Dewey 1934). However, this required some interpretation on my part as theories of reflection 
often do not declare this explicitly. I was still confused as to how reflection can be from 
contradicting epistemologies. I felt that there was a need to know how knowledge can be 
created or discovered in the reflective process as it would be central to understanding dialogic 
reflection. However, this was a question that the literature searches could not answer hence I 
sought to understand this as part of action research. The final refined question was “what is the 
epistemology of reflection?” 
The knowledge synthesised from reading and reflecting on the topic then became part of the 
background chapters in this thesis while the questions that could not be answered by Reflective 
Synthesis then fed into the action research. 
Despite the change of literature review method, the initial search was useful in identifying the 
various disciplines which this subject matter involved. It also established that there was a lack 
of literature in the health and social care context and raised some initial questions that required 
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further reframing. It thus provided direction to which more literature could be found and 
broadened the search to include other disciplines.  
Post-Literature Review 
The review of the literature raised a few questions that I was not able to find a convincing answer 
to. It was also apparent that these questions were all related to the nature of reflection, perhaps 
due to all the confusion around it. 
1. How can reflection be dialogic? 
2. Is reflection only about learning about oneself? 
3. What is the epistemology of reflection? 
4. What types professional development can dialogic reflection result in? 
These questions were included as part of the discussion in the action research later. 
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 Appendix B: Cover Letter 
Dear student, 
I am currently carrying out a PhD here at the School of Healthcare Sciences. The PhD is entitled 
“Collaborative reflection: an exploration of its potential in pre-qualification occupational 
therapy education”. 
I would like to invite you to participate in my research, please have a look a look at the attached 
information sheet and consent form for more information. If you have any queries about the 
research, you may contact me at wongky2@cardiff.ac.uk. 
Thank you for your time. 
Yours sincerely, 
Ken Yan Wong 
PhD student 
Cardiff University 
School of Healthcare Sciences
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 Appendix C: Information sheet 
COLLABORATIVE REFLECTION: AN EXPLORATION OF ITS POTENTIAL IN PRE-QUALIFICATION 
OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY EDUCATION 
As part of this study I would like to invite you to participate in an action research (to be further 
explained below). Approval for this research has been granted by the university’s Research 
Governance and Ethics Committee and your participation would be highly valued.  However, 
before deciding whether you would like to be involved please read the following information 
carefully.  You will also be asked to sign a consent form if you do decide to participate. 
What is the purpose of the research? 
This project is being conducted as part of my PhD at Cardiff University.  The research aims to 
explore collaborative reflection, how it works and its suitability in occupational therapy 
education for a student’s professional development. 
Collaborative reflection is where there is more than one individual in the reflective process, 
commonly in a group of 2 or more people where a facilitator is present (Glazer et al. 2004). 
Glazer et al.’s (2004) study identified that reflecting in groups resulted in participants being more 
willing and more confident to make changes to their practice. It appears to offer opportunities 
for professional growth (Glazer et al. 2004; Morris and Stew 2007) and therefore, there seems 
to be a potential for its integration into occupational therapy education despite the lack of 
research in its use. 
I am particularly interested in exploring the workings of collaborative reflection and hope to 
generate a theory with your input. Hence, I would like to invite you to take part in my 
participatory action research so that we can further develop our understanding of this subject 
together. 
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What is participatory, action research? 
Unlike most research methods, action research can involve the active involvement of the 
researcher with the participants in the study. We will all be ‘co-researchers’ in exploring the 
theory of collaborative reflection. 
Before the start of the research, I will generate a theory of collaborative reflection from the 
available research. Then, you will be invited to join me in exploring this theory through cycles of 
identifying the problems of collaborative reflection, taking part in reflective groups, evaluating, 
and reflecting on our experience. Through that, we will be able to modify the initial theory, 
developing it using our experience of collaborative reflection. 
Do I have to take part? 
Participation in the research is entirely voluntary.  If you do decide to take part in the study, you 
will have the right to withdraw at any time.  Prior to the research you will be asked to sign a 
consent form together with this information sheet.  
You have been invited to participate in this research as you are an occupational therapy student 
who has completed at least 6 placement hours, and have at least 10 weeks of placement hours 
to complete over the course of the study.  
What will my participation in the research involve? 
You, I and 6 other participants will form an action research group. We will meet for 8 sessions, 
every 6 weeks for an estimated time of 1.5-2 hours. The dates and time of meeting will be 
arranged such that it would be convenient for all of us. It is understandable if you are not able 
to attend all the meetings. The research is expected to start on April 2016 and end on April 2017. 
The meetings will consist of discussions about the theory and reflective groups, where you are 
invited to share an experience which we can all reflect on. Due to the nature of our discussions, 
you are reminded not to disclose confidential information such as educator, placement, and 
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patient details. You are allowed to withdraw from the study at any point without prejudice. 
These meetings will be taped using an audio recording device for analysis later. Though the 
group meetings are aimed to develop a better understanding of collaborative reflection, they 
will be conducted in a relaxed and light-hearted manner and your candour will be very much 
valued. 
Anything that results from the discussions such as mind-maps, diagrams or notes will be 
photographed for analysis. During the research you will be encouraged to keep a reflective log 
on the sessions or any thoughts you may have on collaborative reflection. Though it is not 
obligatory, sharing your reflection with me would help me understand your thoughts and 
feelings about reflecting in groups. 
In between the sessions, I will transcribe and analyse the discussions and reflective logs. The 
analysis of the discussions will be shared on a forum/blog page where you will have access to 
them. You will have at least 1 week to look at the analysis and we will further discuss the analysis 
in the next session. Analysis of your personal reflective logs will be sent directly to your emails. 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
While there are no personal benefits in taking part, participation in the research will offer you 
the opportunity to jointly generate a theory of collaborative reflection which may provide others 
with an understanding of how it works. It is hoped that this theory may be transferrable to other 
healthcare courses and even in practice. 
This research may also provide you with the opportunity to pool your experiences as a group 
and learn from each other through collaborative analysis. You are invited to share your own 
experience with the group and it is hoped that the group’s input will help you in your own 
professional development. 
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Your participation may also give you an insight into research methods and processes, such as 
transcription, analysis and reviewing of literature. This experience may benefit you in developing 
and conducting your own research later in your course of study. 
What are the disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
Due to the nature of the research, the anticipated disadvantages/risks of taking part are 
relatively low.  The meetings will take up 1.5 to 2 hours of your time every 6 weeks and are 
expected to take place in the university. Nonetheless, we will arrange the meetings to minimize 
the inconvenience eg. meeting on days when you have lectures. It is also understandable if you 
are not able to come to every meeting, you can have a look at the analysis on the forum to learn 
what has been discussed.  
As reflection on past experiences may be emotive for some, you can seek counsel from your 
personal tutors if you wish. The university also has its own counselling services which can be 
accessed at: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/counselling/. If during the course of research, you have 
any problems with anything, you can notify me or if need be, the supervisors of the research 
(Gail Boniface and Steve Whitcombe) who will be monitoring the research. 
How will confidentiality be maintained? 
At the start of the first meeting, group rules will be set to ensure confidentiality of the 
information shared during the meetings. You will be reminded to not disclose patient or setting 
sensitive information, or any unethical practice witnessed during the meetings and be mindful 
of the confidentiality policy of your placement setting. Pseudonyms will be used in the analysis 
and transcripts to protect the identity of the participants. The transcripts and analysis will be 
kept in password-protected folders. The analysis can only be accessed by me and the 
participants of the study. Extracts of the analysis may be shared with the research supervisors 
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when necessary. The results of the study will be presented as a PhD thesis at Cardiff University.  
Additionally, the results will also be shared at conferences and in scientific journals. 
What do I do next? 
If you are willing to participate in the research, please complete the attached consent form and 
return it to me. Thank you for your time in reading this information sheet. You can contact me 
at wongky2@cardiff.ac.uk if you have any queries or require further information.
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 Appendix D: Consent Form 
Name of participant: 
Research title: Collaborative reflection: an exploration of its potential in pre-qualification 
occupational therapy education 
Name of researcher: Ken Yan Wong 
Please initial the following boxes and sign below to indicate consent 
 
1. I confirm that I have read the participant information sheet for the above 
research and have had the opportunity to ask any questions. 
2. I understand that my participation in this research is entirely voluntary and 
that I may withdraw at any time. 
3. I agree to the recording of my participation in the group sessions.  
4. I understand that I am not obligated to share my reflective logs, opinions and 
personal experiences during the course of the study. 
5. I agree to not disclose any information discussed within the groups to anyone 
outside the research study. 
6. I agree to my anonymised comments/quotes being used in any write up of the 
research. 
7. I agree to take part in this study and understand that I will receive a copy of 
this signed and dated consent form. 
 
…………………………………………….      …………………………      ……………… 
PARTICIPANT’S NAME (please print)     SIGNATURE                    DATE 
 
Ken Yan Wong         …………………………     ………………. 
RESEARCHER’S NAME              SIGNATURE                    DATE 
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 Appendix E: Co-researchers’ 
Demographic Information 
Group Pseudonym Age Gender Previous Degree Past Work Experience 
1 Eve 26 Female BA Media Practice Waitressing and 
support worker 
Sarah 32 Female BA American Studies, 
Children Literature 
Bookseller, bookshop 
Manager 
April 29 Female BSc Sports and Physical 
Education 
Teaching assistant, 
social work assistant, 
family support worker 
Geri 25 Female BA English Literature Retail assistant, 
receptionist, library 
assistant 
Nicola 30 Female BA Educational Studies 
and Humanities 
Support worker, 
occupational therapy 
support worker 
Karen 35 Female BSc Exercise, Sport and 
Coaching 
Msc Nutrition, Physical 
Activity and Public Health 
Health at work co-
ordinator, active 
lifestyle manager, 
exercise on 
prescription and 
health walks co-
ordinator 
May 27 Female BSc Health and Social Care 
Studies 
Optical Assistant, 
occupational therapy 
assistant 
2 Alicia 35 Female BSc Medical Science 
PGCE 
Homeless outreach 
worker 
Sophie 25 Female BSc Psychology 
MSc Clinical Psychology 
Support worker 
Lea 25 Female BA Fine Art – Combined 
Media 
Occupational therapy 
technician, hotel 
facilities assistant, 
kitchen assistant 
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Ava 22 Female BA English Literature Nanny, carer, retail 
assistant 
Isabella 30 Female BA Fine Art - Sculpture Occupational therapy 
assistant 
Olivia 22 Female BSc Health and Social Care Occupational therapy 
assistant, healthcare 
support worker 
Charlotte 23 Female BSc Health and Social Care Customer service 
officer 
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  Appendix F: Session 1 Thematic 
Map 
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 Appendix G: Sessions 1-4 Thematic 
Map 
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 Appendix H: Sessions 1-7 Thematic 
Map 
 
 
Dialogic 
Reflection
Theory
As an 
epistemology
As a natural 
process
Learning through 
dialogue
Value and 
limitations 
Professional 
Development
Personal 
Development
Limitations
Mechanics and 
Organisation
Mechanics
Roles
Analysis
Motivation
Different types
Organisation
Facilitation
Problems in 
curriculum
Writing reflection
Assessing 
reflection
True and false 
reflection
Reductive 
understanding
Supervision and 
power
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 Appendix I: Final Thematic Map 
 
.
Dialogic 
reflection as an 
epistemology
Epistemic conflict
Confusion
Epistemic stances
Implications
Method of 
enquiry
Approach to 
enquiry
Facilitation
Analysis
Community
Group 
Worldmaking
Vulnerability and 
trust
Confidentiality 
and protection
Inclusion, 
exclusion and re-
inclusion
Multiple 
perspectives
Art of knowing
Artistry
Natural enquiry
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 Appendix J: A Caution About 
Collaboration 
Whilst having reinforced the value of participation and collaboration in this research, an 
important area to consider is the idea of ownership of the research. 
If I'm going to collaborate with people and I'm really going to live up to that commitment, 
I can't just write a report all by myself. If we generate a report together, we decide 
together how it's going to be used. (Lincoln 1997, p. 9) 
Reason (1994) noted that it is paradoxical to write about research with a collaborative nature 
on one’s own. In fact, in the truest form of collaboration, the entire process of the research 
should be shared amongst the co-researchers. However, in doing that it is also unclear who has 
the ownership of the research and its contents. This had led me to question some implications 
of collaborating with co-researchers: to what extent did I include the co-researchers in the 
process of the research, to what extent did we share the ownership of the research and the 
products of the research. 
Heron and Reason (1997), however, noted that complete collaboration is rare. Co-operative 
Inquiry is more about the democratisation of the content, where all co-researchers are involved 
in the decisions about what the research seeks to find out and achieve, than the democratisation 
of the method, which involves the operational methods which are used to share the content of 
the research. Though strongly recommended by Guba and Lincoln (1989), complete 
collaboration in practice is often reduced to seeking fully informed consent from the co-
researchers on the researcher’s initial plan for the research then modifying the plan accordingly 
with their input to obtain consent (Heron and Reason 1997). In other words, though not 
collaborative in this sense, setting the research question and objectives prior to recruiting the 
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co-researchers, as I had done, is acceptable in the Co-operative Inquiry tradition if we were open 
and willing to change it as the group deemed fit. 
In addition, dialogic reflection is about creating knowledge that is meaningful to the individual 
researcher participating in it. Hence the writing of this thesis is representational of what I have 
elicited and understood from my experience of dialogic reflection with my co-researchers. Even 
though these findings have been discussed at length with the co-researchers, it would only be 
realistic to accept that not everyone had arrived at the same understanding or valued the same 
conclusions. This thesis is, therefore, an expression of the knowledge that I had constructed 
from this dialogic reflective process with my co-researchers. It is my knowledge and hence it is 
only appropriate that I take ownership of it and the writing process.
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 Appendix K: Roles in a Dialogic 
Reflection 
Roles in a dialogic reflection 
While the facilitator role was an appointed role, the other members in the reflective group 
played different roles in the reflective groups as well.  
Sometimes I am offering my own experience, sometimes I am analysing your experience, 
sometimes I’m the devil's advocate and I am slipping in and out of them. [Me in group 
two] 
These roles however did not stay static and members slip in and out of them throughout the 
reflection.  
Devil’s advocate 
This role was evident when co-researchers turned the reflection around to look at the 
experience from another perspective, it allowed the person who played this role to explore and 
consider the perspective of the other party. Also, it pushed the group to think differently and 
get out of group think 
Analyser 
The analyser was someone who questioned and offered his or her perspective to the reflection. 
They do so by using different methods of analysis. This was usually the way the members 
contributed to the dialogic reflections 
Empathiser 
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Some co-researcher seemed to be able to express feelings or describe someone else’s feelings 
more easily. These members would usually say “you must have felt…” “if I were you I would have 
felt…” “how did you feel…” when they are in this role. On one hand it provided validation for the 
members and also some form of comfort. Often empathy was the drive behind initiating a group 
reflection as well. Co-researchers felt the need to support one another on the course. 
Macro-Analyser 
This was a rare role in the reflective group because the members usually tend to get too involved 
in the analysis of each other’s experience and were unable to take a step back to look at things 
from a broader perspective. The macro analyser was someone who looked at the patterns of 
discussion and commented on the general themes that resulted from the discussion. This helped 
the group to draw links and form connections at a more macro level. The macro analyser seemed 
like the facilitator at times as he or she pointed out circular discussions and summarised the 
session. 
Reflector 
The most common and most crucial role in the reflective group is the person who shared his or 
her experience for scrutiny. There were usually multiple reflectors in the group. The problem 
was when there were more reflectors than analysers because it then became an “aunt agony” 
situation where little analysis of experience and reflectors were merely voicing the grievances. 
These roles had some semblance to the different stages in the process of reflection when 
articulated as a model. For example, the discussion of feelings as in Gibbs’ (1988) model was 
driven by the empathiser in dialogic reflection; the drawing of relationships between theory and 
practice such as The Connective Strand in Stands for Reflection (Fish et al. 1991) can be seen in 
the analysis of the macro-analyser in a dialogic reflection. The complexity and fluidity of these 
roles implied that dialogic reflection was similarly fluid and complex in nature. They further 
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demonstrated that reflection when seen as a reflective dialogue with someone else is not 
procedural like in Gibb’s (1988) model. The implication of understanding these roles in dialogic 
reflection in education is further discussed in Chapter Twelve. 
These roles were fluid and a single participant may play multiple roles in a single dialogic 
reflection session. Group two felt that these roles may be closely related to one’s personalities. 
Some were more sympathetic and supportive of others hence have a propensity to take on the 
empathiser role.  
In highlighting these roles, group two believed that members of a dialogic reflection will learn 
to be able to better reflect because they are more aware of which roles they play often and 
explored the other roles that they had less experience in. By understanding the areas of 
reflection, one develops an awareness of the areas where one requires additional input from 
others. The group felt that members should explore all the roles but not be enforced to do so. 
Certain personality traits will cause people to be more comfortable in certain roles however this 
would then have an impact on the holism of their reflection. While dialogic reflection 
circumvents that by allowing multiple perspectives and multiple roles played by other people, 
for this to translate into personal reflections, the member has to explore these various roles and 
learn why they come more easily or difficult. Through this exploration, the group felt that one 
may perhaps develop one’s reflective process. 
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 Appendix L: Dialogic Reflection, 
Experientialism and Constructivism 
Experientialism  
Experientialism is a philosophy advanced by Johnson and Lakoff (1992), originating from the 
modern advances in cognitive sciences. Empirical studies have offered answers to some 
philosophical questions related to the internal processes of the mind, hence Johnson and Lakoff 
(1992) put forth a case for philosophers to rethink philosophies in light of these discoveries. 
Experientialism is essentially making sense of experience. However, Johnson and Lakoff (1992) 
placed their philosophy in ontology and ethics rather than epistemology. The key principle of 
experientialism is the assertion that “Man is fundamentally an imaginative animal” (Johnson and 
Lakoff 1992, p. 4). Human reasoning is imaginative because of our ability to conceptualise, use 
metaphors and frame situations (Lakoff and Johnson 2003; 1980). Experientialism does not 
strive to seek absolute truth. Rather it argues that the state of being is granted by the metaphors 
that we live by (Lakoff and Johnson 2003; 1980). The abstract concepts about the world 
developed by humanity are metaphors that we have created to understand our experiences of 
the world. These metaphors are projections of our experiences and our existence is thus 
metaphorical (Lakoff and Johnson 2003; 1980). Experientialism seeks to understand this system 
of metaphorical thought as it will provide us with answers to the ontological question (Johnson 
and Lakoff 1992). 
Dialogic reflection agrees that humans have the ability to develop concepts about the world 
through experience. This is evident from the ideas of worldmaking and group worldmaking that 
it is built on. However, this does not make humans imaginative because these concepts are 
ultimately grounded in experiences of the world. Experience is not projected onto metaphors 
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and concepts. It is the material from which we develop concepts through dialogue. Because of 
the dialogue that is required to develop these concepts in dialogic reflection, concepts of the 
world are not merely abstract representations of experiences. Concepts and knowledge about 
the world are developed through a process of co-operative exploration, in dialogic reflection. 
This co-operative exploration makes dialogic reflection an artistic way of knowing from 
experience. Dialogic reflection argues that it is difficult to look at an experience as a whole 
monologically and concepts developed are often skewed toward what we already know and 
how we see the world. As individuals, we see our experiences from a certain perspective and 
are blinded to the rest because of our world versions. Dialogically, however, experience can be 
appreciated for it multi-dimensions and thus knowledge or concepts that have been developed 
from this co-operative exploration is richer. Knowledge and concepts developed through 
dialogic reflection are not just mere projections of experience. They are developed thoughtfully, 
collaboratively and artistically. 
Constructivism 
Schön’s (1983; 1987) work on reflection was based on von Glasersfeld’s (1995) radical 
constructivism and Goodman’s (1978) ways of worldmaking. Von Glasersfeld (1995) 
distinguished his work from that of Piaget’s by asserting that:  
… cognition serves the subject’s organisation of experiential world, not the discovery of 
an objective ontology. (Kinsella 2006, p. 280) 
Von Glasersfeld (1995) noted that it is cognition, not the objective reality that shapes the 
knowledge construction. Hence, the metaphysical question of reality is not of great importance. 
Goodman (1978) echoed the same idea in his work where he argues that world versions are 
more important than the possible existence of an objective external world. Lakoff and Johnsons’ 
(1992) experientialism similarly sidesteps the question of objective reality as it is the 
representation of them that is of greater interest. In the same vein, objective reality is not the 
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primary concern in dialogic reflection, which is more focused on how reflectors understand each 
other’s experiences and those of their own.  
In dialogic reflection, it is possible to reflect on experiences that belong to other reflectors. From 
my observations of how the groups have reflected: 
It is interesting that they are not only reflecting on their own experiences. They are 
drawing some learning points from each other’s experiences as well. Sometimes, 
experiences they have brought to the group were stories they have heard from other 
people outside the group over lunch. [My reflective log of session two] 
Experiences that were analysed in the room are not always shared experiences that belonged 
to the reflectors. There were instances where, through role reversal method of analysis, 
reflectors reflect on experiences that belonged to others. In a dialogic reflection, reflection is 
possible even if that experience does not belong to the reflector. This suggests that interaction 
with objective reality or the external world, if they exist, is not consequential to dialogic 
reflection. The nature of reality is not important. Therefore, like Goodman’s (1978) and von 
Glasersfeld’s (1995) theories of constructivism, dialogic reflection avoids the metaphysical 
question of reality. 
Constructivists base their theories on three key principles (Noddings 1990): 
1. All knowledge is constructed 
2. The process of knowledge construction is cognitive 
3. These cognitive structures develop as knowledge is constructed 
The process of knowledge construction is reflective (Kinsella 2006). As one’s knowledge grows, 
one’s reflective process also changes. Knowledge constructed from experience informs the 
construction process. As new experiences are acquired, one reflects on them and this process 
grows and develops in complexity as one has more knowledge about the world. In dialogic 
reflection, though experience is explored through dialogue, the knowledge constructed is 
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individualised and in accordance to what each reflector deems as meaningful and worth learning 
about. The knowledge that reflectors distill from the experience is assimilated into the world 
version. This results in a development of their world versions which they will use when reflecting 
on future experiences. Therefore, dialogic reflection agrees with the first and third principle of 
constructivism. 
However, the second principle of the process of knowledge construction being cognitive does 
not completely describe what dialogic reflection is about. Chapter Ten essentially argues that 
dialogic reflection is more than cognition. It is more than about understanding thoughts but also 
about understanding emotions and values in the experience. These are internal processes of the 
mind that extend beyond cognition. In Dewey’s (1933) work on reflective thinking, he proposed 
that reflection is cognitive because of its place in decision making and understanding concepts. 
However, this is perhaps because Dewey (1933) perceived reflective thinking as an educational 
philosophy. If experience is artistic (Dewey 1934) and dialogic reflection is understanding 
experience, then it has to be to be more than a way of thinking. It is a way of empathising with 
the reflector, sharing one’s values, demonstrating support and moral checking as discussed in 
the previous chapter. Knowledge is constructed in dialogic reflection as a result of these 
processes, which are internal but more than just cognitive.
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 Publications and Presentations 
Date Title Mode 
April 2016 Teaching and learning the esoteric: an 
insight into how reflection may be 
internalised with reference to the 
occupational therapy profession  
Journal Article (Reflective 
Practice) 
December 
2017 
6.45pm Photography Presentation 
(Images of Research) 
April 2017 Teaching/Learning Reflective Practice Poster Presentation 
(Breaking Boundaries 2017) 
Awarded Best Poster 
May 2017 Teaching/Learning Reflective Practice Poster Presentation 
(Speaking of Science 2017) 
June 2017 Teaching/Learning Reflective Practice Poster Presentation 
(Doctoral Academy Annual 
Briefing 2017) 
November 
2017 
Patients’ stories in healthcare curricula: 
creating a reflective environment for 
the development of practice and 
professional knowledge 
Journal Article (Journal of 
Further and Higher 
Education) 
November 
2017 
Teaching/Learning Reflective Practice Poster Presentation 
(Postgraduate Research 
Symposium 2017) 
November 
2017 
6.45pm Photography Presentation 
(Postgraduate Open 
House) 
January 2018 Theorising Dialogic Reflection: Being 
the researcher and the researched 
Conference Presentation 
(Qualitative Research 
Symposium 2018) 
TBC Intellect, Emotions and Values: The 
Reflexive Triad in Co-operative Inquiry 
Book Chapter Draft 
TBC Knowers and Enquirers Monograph 
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Qualitative Research Symposium 2018  
How Do We Belong? Researcher Positionality Within Qualitative Inquiry 
Wednesday 31 January 2018, 08.00 – 16.30 
The Chancellors’ Building, University of Bath 
Paper title: Theorising Dialogic Reflection: Being the Researcher and the Researched 
Affiliated university or employer: Cardiff University, School of Healthcare Sciences 
Contact information: Ken Wong, wongky2@cardiff.ac.uk  
Symposium theme(s): Inquiring into Positionality or Engaging Positionality 
Abstract: 
This paper is a reflection on the methodological considerations that were integral to my PhD 
study on dialogic reflection, a process where students engage in reflective conversations with 
their peers about their experience. Fourteen post-graduate diploma occupational therapy 
students and I formed two action research groups for this Co-operative Inquiry. We concluded 
that dialogic reflection is an artistic method of enquiry about the world that embraces multiple 
perspectives and vulnerability. 
This research had challenged me intensely in many ways, especially on my thoughts on the 
nature of enquiry and my position as a researcher and a participant in a Co-operative Inquiry. 
Co-operative Inquiry is based on epistemic participation, where researchers develop knowledge 
by getting involved as participants, and political participation, where participants are involved 
in the decision-making process of the research. The students who took part in my research were 
therefore considered my co-researchers. 
Epistemic participation required me to acknowledge the fact that I had prior knowledge and 
preconceptions about the topic of this research. These initial ideas about the topic thus 
impacted the way I had approached the research. Epistemic participation was not easy as it is 
the antithesis to some writings about qualitative research where the researcher is expected to 
distance himself/herself from the researched. Furthermore, it encouraged me to reveal personal 
experiences to my participants which was at times rather uncomfortable. 
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Political participation was not straightforward either. Despite considering the students as my co-
researchers, this research took on different meanings for us. At some points of the research, I 
found myself treating my co-researchers as participants instead. Nonetheless, I had included my 
co-researchers in the methodological considerations where feasible. 
This paper challenges certain ideas about qualitative research and where the researcher belongs 
in the research process. It argues that the researcher is a knower as much of an enquirer, hence 
there is value in involving the researcher in the study as a participant. Conversely, the participant 
has a crucial role to play in developing a study about himself/herself. By reflecting on our 
understanding of the world, we can better understand our position as qualitative researchers. 
